OF WHAT USE ARE COMMON PEOPLE?

H. E. BUCHHOLZ

LIBRARY

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY

REGULATIONS

1. Not more than two books can be taken out at any one time and cannot be retained longer than two weeks.
2. At the expiration of two weeks books may be re-let if returned to the librarian in good condition.
3. A rental of two cents a day will be charged on each book held over two weeks.

Class No. 32.32 Accession No. 8941

Case_____ Section_____

Heterick Memorial Library
Ohio Northern University
Ada, Ohio 45810

OF WHAT USE ARE COMMON PEOPLE?

OF WHAT USE ARE COMMON PEOPLE?

A Study in Democracy

BY
HEINRICH E. BUCHHOLZ

BALTIMORE
WARWICK & YORK, INC.
1923

Copyright, 1923, by
Warwick & York, Inc.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE MAPLE PRESS - YORK PA

323.32
391

PREFACE

America has recently become painfully aware of her common people. The awareness itself is old, but the unpleasant sensation produced by it is new. In years past the common people of the United States were thought of as the salt of the earth, the backbone of the race, the great body of unselect from whom emergency might on occasion draw the very type of material required for a pressing need. This earlier national awareness of a great body of common people as an integrant part of the population was comfortable, whereas today Americans feel, or are seeking to make themselves feel, that the presence in the body politic of this great element of common people is a matter for deep national concern.

Just when the nation's attitude toward its common people began to change cannot be determined precisely, although it is apparent that out of preparation for the country's participation in the World War came certain facts—or fallacies—which crystallized into the prevailing skepticism concerning the political worth of the ordinary, everyday citizen. A group of psychologists devised a series of mental tests to be used on the men drafted for military service with the view to placing each individual in that branch of service for which he seemed best fitted and also for selecting draftees of supposed mental superiority who might profitably be schooled as officers. How far these tests served their intended purpose has appa-

8941

rently been ignored as a matter of slight consequence, while the data produced by the testings have been accepted as altogether reliable and are being freely interpreted, by scientists and laymen, to indicate that an amazingly large percentage of the entire population is incapable of mental development past that of a twelve year old child.

A fair specimen of such interpretation is found in *Men and Half-men* by Seth K. Humphrey in March, 1923, issue of "SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE." From the scores made in the army tests this writer concludes that one-third of the population "represents the flower of the country's mental inheritance. The next 25 per cent revealed mental ages of thirteen to fourteen years—minds fairly well equipped, if we remember what these mental ages stand for in the tests. These have the making of good, average citizens. Next came 20 per cent whose mentalities stopped developing at twelve years. . . we leave these grown-up twelve-year-olds to be struggled with by unhappy employers who sigh to heaven over their incompetency. This accounts offhand for three-quarters of our population. The problem is in the remaining one-quarter. The army tests indicate, with an approach to accuracy which cannot seriously be questioned, that more than twenty-five millions of our people can never get beyond the mental age of eleven years—the age of unformed youth; while a good ten million of these are saddled for life with mentalities of ten years or under—the age of irresponsible childhood. From this lowest one-quarter we obviously derive most of our social disturbers, at least one-half of all the children born to inherit

this land of ours, and one-quarter of the electorate. It's a fine prospect—for the political demagogue and the bolshevik agitator."

No matter where the contemporary reader turns—to newspapers, to magazines, or to books—he finds this kind of disturbing analysis of the American people coupled with the suggestion, veiled or open, that democracy as democracy has heretofore been understood is a dream fast turning into a nightmare. This in itself seems sufficient excuse, if excuse be needed, for the appearance of the present work, which attempts to set forth a few conclusions regarding both democracy and the common people with particular regard to the possible interdependence of the two. In his undertaking the author has been helped by the constructive criticism of Professor Boyd H. Bode, of Ohio State University. Indeed, credit for such merit as the study may possess is due in no small measure to Dr. Bode, whereas many of the demerits persist because the author's affection for them overruled Professor Bode's strictures. Acknowledgment is also gratefully made of aid received from Professor William Chandler Bagley, of Teachers College, Columbia University, and Mr. John Haslup Adams, Editor of "The Baltimore Sun," who were kind enough to read and criticize the study in proof form.

H. E. B.

Baltimore, May 1, 1923.

CONTENTS

PREFACE v

I. Blowing Straws 1

II. A Homespun Criterion 14

III. Rights and Wrongs 28

IV. The Body Politic 40

V. The Conventional Majority 52

VI. Mutinous Minorities 65

VII. Democracy in Practice 83

VIII. Freedom and the Individual 100

IX. Education and the Commonalty 114

X. Commonplace Attitudes 131

XI. Fallibility of Judgments 147

XII. Art and the Vulgar 162

XIII. Vanity of Manners 179

XIV. Philosophy and Mediocrity 196

XV. Reproducing Their Kind 213

XVI. Follow the Leader 226

XVII. Finding a Bull's-eye 242

Index 247

OF WHAT USE ARE COMMON PEOPLE?

I. BLOWING STRAWS

In the nation's album of sainted maxims is boldly written: "United we stand, divided we fall." More than once has this forecast of the downfall threatened by division roused to action the American people. "United we stand, divided we fall," served as an effective appeal for a closer welding of the several states after the Revolution. It reappeared periodically thereafter, varying sectionally in its persuasiveness as the nation approached the Civil War, until the surrender of Lee at Appomattox seemed with finality to seal unity as a national principle. But those who in days gone by used the phrase, invariably had in mind a union of the states as so many geographical units, and the outcome of the War Between the States apparently precluded America from ever putting to actual trial the ability of any one section of the country to exist as a separate and independent government. Today even the Southerner, doubtless, will subscribe to the opinion that a bloodless division of the nation in 1860 might have spelled greater disaster to the cotton-growing South than did its espousal of a losing cause.

During the decades that have passed since the collapse of the Southern Confederacy, slowly but

surely the bonds that join the states in a nation have been tightened, so that now the imagination of man cannot conveniently picture the return of a time when any commonwealth or group of commonwealths might attempt to take up separate national existence. Therefore, a discussion at this day of the question whether America if united will stand or if divided, fall, may seem impertinent. The interdependence and interrelations of the various states are so firmly grounded, that no conceivable cause seems capable of developing a situation when a section of the country will hazard breaking away from the Union. As states, certainly united the states stand. But even a superficial glance at current American life must impress the observer with the unfortunate absence of anything like a spirit of unity on the part of the people. Politically—using the word not in its partisan sense—the people are not of one mind; they recognize no common destiny; they seem actually to glory in the knowledge that the attitude of their particular group toward America and Americans is diametrically opposed to the attitudes of other groups of equally *bonafide* citizens.

There is no basis for expecting that so vast a body of people as make up the population of the entire country is, or ever could be, completely solidified on all matters of national scope; but ground exists a plenty for deep concern over the marked and growing indifference of the American people toward a gradual disintegration into groups and classes which survey the nation from entirely different viewpoints. Moreover, there is a total disregard of the need in a democracy of a composite or integrated viewpoint for all the

people on matters that are vital to the life of the nation. In a country where the authority for government is supposed to rest with the whole body of the people, it would seem that the first demand is at least the approximation of an agreement on the question of national ideals and the proper method to be employed in attaining such ideals.

Instead of this, however, the citizenry is breaking up into groups that disagree concerning the aims and purposes and even the powers of government. Certain such groups, representing insignificant fractions of the total population, boldly attempt to recast the national ideals in accord with their own unrepresentative views. With flagrant indifference to the rights of those who do not accord with them, even though the nonconformists may comprise a preponderance of the people, they demand that the nation as a whole subscribe to their proposed revision of its national creed. When such movements are fostered by groups of recently acquired citizens, it is charitable to condone their behavior on the score that they have not yet fully caught the so-called "spirit of America." But more often and much more aggressively these movements find parenthood among groups that trace their American ancestry back two, three, or more generations. Even these descendants of early Americans show an anarchistic readiness to cast to the wind those principles which underlie the established government, and to resort to trickery, intimidation, and even violence in order that they may imprint the nation's policies with their unrepresentative views. If they failed, their activities would still be a matter for public concern; but with increasing frequency they succeed.

A random sampling of movements that are today attracting widespread attention, reveals evidence that the process of disintegration is affecting simultaneously every phase of national life. The population of the United States is a cosmopolitan group. Many nations and numerous races have contributed in varying degrees to the peopling of the land. For some decades past loyal Americans have aimed to harmonize this heterogeneous group so as to minimize the friction between representatives of different races. But overnight there springs up in the land an organization designed not only to tear open the recently healed wounds of racial antagonism, but to wage a general warfare on certain races and sects. It is hard to determine which is the more surprising phase of this movement: the willingness with which seemingly intelligent men flock to the standards of a revived Ku Klux Klan or the cowardly crimes that are being perpetrated by members of the organization. If the earlier ideals of what an American should be still persisted, any man not a criminal would resent as an insult the invitation to join a secret order whose regalia is the badge of cowardice and whose practices would discredit savages.

The hope of the modern Klansman is to profit dishonestly by denying "fair play" to negroes, Jews, and Catholics. It is a brazen attempt to hasten the disintegration of the American people along racial and religious lines. But fully as audacious as the Klan's activities, and perhaps as un-American, is the conspiracy of a clique of capped-and-gowned libelers of democracy who propose usurpation of the people's authority by college-bred aristocrats. George Barton

Cutten, President of Colgate University, speaks things that are in the mind of members of this clique when he proposes to take the suffrage from all citizens who score low in intelligence tests. "The divine right of the people has no more foundation than the divine right of kings," he asserts, and then proposes a program for establishing the divine right of superior mentality.* He adds: "The South was entirely right in disfranchising the negro, but the South did not go far enough. The 'po' white trash' should have been disfranchised, too . . . We must move toward a rule by an aristocracy, that is to say, a rule by the best . . . Obviously the task of colleges and universities is the training of this intellectual aristocracy, morally as well as intellectually . . . Already we are building up a caste system as rigid as that in India. We are now examining children in the public schools, and find all grades of intelligence from imbecility to genius. We are told that the intelligence quotient of a child rarely changes, so that we can tell from his early life what the limit of his intelligence is, what class of vocation he is fitted for, what, in fact, his destination is. We should restrict the franchise by a mental, not an educational test. We should drain the dregs from the bottom of the barrel." And this head of an American university makes it plain that he and his fellow-conspirators regard an enormous percentage of the people as "dregs."

These several samples disclose not only a willingness, but a determination to break the American people into unharmonious groups on the basis of race, religion, and mentality. If the various fanatical

* *The New York Times*, November 26, 1922.

uplift movements that are sweeping the country may be regarded as expressions of morality, then in the reform campaigns waged by elements of the nation are found startling evidences of a purposeful furthering of the threatened disintegration of the people. A specimen of uplift violence to all other viewpoints is found in a notice published "To Whom It May Concern" by Lorraine Elizabeth Wooster, Kansas' State Superintendent of Public Instruction: "Hereafter no recommendations for school positions will be made for teachers, instructors or superintendents who use tobacco in any form. No state certificates or institute certificates will be issued to tobacco users. Schools and colleges which permit the use of tobacco by administrative heads, instructors or pupils cannot remain on the accredited list. Credits sent to the State Department from normal schools, colleges and universities where the heads of these institutions, faculty members or students use tobacco in any form will not be accepted for certification."

There is more danger to a democratic people in the hostility of radical labor agitators toward fellow workers who refuse to follow their lead in radicalism, than in the autocratic treatment by many capitalists of those who do the day's work. The resentment of labor organizers because public education, for instance, declined to become unionized, is indicative of a spirit that makes for a disintegration of the whole people. A blanket condemnation of public school teachers, such as is presented by James H. Maurer, writing on *Labor's Demand for Its Own School* in "The Nation," cannot help the cause of democracy. He alleges: "The workingmen's children return from school with accounts

of indictments of the labor movement made by their teachers or by propagandists who have been allowed to address the pupils. Horrible stories have been told about the Bolsheviki, and in the next breath the suggestion has been made that the American labor unions are filled with such people. Children have been led to feel that their own fathers, as active unionists, have been made the dupes of treasonable conspirators. And they have been told that the open-shop campaign is a great patriotic movement to save America from bolshevism. Workingmen have also observed the snobbishness of the average school-teacher. If she shows any sympathy for working men and their families it is the condescending sympathy that is worse than contempt. She herself is not a working woman, but a 'professional' woman, her starvation wages notwithstanding. But she will not join the teachers' union even when it is possible for her to do so, because it would lower the dignity of her 'profession' to organize as do ordinary tradesmen and working girls."

As a union of states, then, the nation may be more firmly united than ever before in the country's history; and insofar as such unity makes for national stability, united America stands. As an enormous aggregation of people, however, Americans are by no means united, while the present trend is further away from, rather than toward national unity. Because of the closer affiliation of the states, brought about through various steps in centralization, this tendency of the people toward a breaking up, with undemocratic minorities factoring more effectively than majorities, is fraught with grave dangers. When public business, for

instance, has reached a point where a handful of people, self-chosen, can dictate to the nation on certain matters, and when that nation is so highly centralized that its acquiescence in the dictation is easily obtained, it seems only a short step further for a like group, if it is unscrupulous enough—and it must be unscrupulous when it disregards the interests of the majority and all other minorities—to become dictator in all matters, in fact if not in law. The natural sequence of this would be despotism of steadily increasing viciousness until enough people are hurt to be driven to revolt; then there is civil war.

A civil war in which allegiance is determined primarily by geographical lines is seldom as disastrous, other things being equal, as an internal strife where allegiance is not prescribed by state boundaries, but by class, group or sectarian distinctions. To predict that America is facing toward such an internal strife along group or class lines would be just a little less presumptuous than to assert that the future holds no such possibility for the American people. In this period of uncertainty as to what the future may bring forth, the venerated maxim, "United we stand, divided we fall," returns with a new lease on life, but in its resurrected form the "we" now stands for the American people instead of the American states. The question is: Will the American people, if united, stand; if divided, fall?

No American who notes the present tendency toward a breaking up of the people into hostile groups, dares shut his eyes to the danger signal. For years before South Carolina formally asserted her independence of the Union, a steadily widening breach

existed between the cotton-growing states and the North. Little was done, relatively, to counteract the growing feeling of sectional antagonism; but much was done by radicals on either side to shut all avenues toward a calm and careful discussion of sectional differences. It is easy, but surely not scientific, to conclude that a civil war was necessary to settle these differences between North and South—easy, because war was resorted to as the arbiter; unscientific, because no data have been adduced for determining whether military conflict could have been avoided without imposing a greater loss on the nation than resulted from war. The fact must not be overlooked that for every drop of oil which broad-visioned men poured on the troubled waters in ante-bellum days, whole barrels of hatred were dumped into the seething mass by misguided fanatics and rascally agitators. Although there may have been a semblance of calm on both sides when war did come, it was the calm intervening between a long season of encouraged passion and pampered hatred, and the actual breaking of a storm of passion and hatred.

While lines of similarity appear between the dangers that seem now to confront the nation and those which confronted it something less than a hundred years ago, this significant difference is found: Then it was a threatened breaking up of the states into sections; now it is a threatened breaking up of the people into hostile groups. It is well to bear in mind that a disunion of a people is more easily attained than the dissolution of a confederation of states. Secession demanded a formal, legislative act, and this step awed for a time those who contemplated taking it no less

than those who stood by as silent spectators. The breaking up of a people into hostile groups is, by comparison, so quietly and insidiously accomplished, that the process may nearly be completed before suspicion of what is occurring becomes widespread. An insignificant wedge is inserted in a small breach in the massive oak. It seems anything but an agency capable of splitting the trunk from top to base. But once properly placed and then driven inward, and very quickly the great body of timber is ripped wide open. A hundred wedges, none apparently capable of doing much harm, are being forced quietly, day after day, into the massive body which is the American people. An occasional faint protest warns of danger; but the magnitude of the danger has not yet occurred to most of those who are being bitterly antagonized with each fresh drive on one of the wedges.

Fanaticism run mad with its disciples in the name of some revamped fetish demanding the blood of personal liberty, is merely a series of wedges inserted threateningly into the body politic. If these abnormal, self-anointed moralists, who would pilot the ship of state, are permitted to carry on, encouraging their followers to trample upon fundamental principles of self-government, the day will come when twentieth century Puritans will crash with men to whom liberty is religion, and heaven save the bits of religion and liberty that may survive!

Labor's recruiting of unscrupulous disturbers, who would rather gain a livelihood by agitation than by honest work, and who barter for silver the faith of those who put them into office, is a series of wedges inserted threateningly into the body politic. If these

labor charlatans are permitted to carry on, inoculating the weaker-minded workman with a belief that the toiler's salvation lies in willful repression of and interference with production, rather than in an intelligent attack of his own particular economic problems, there will come a day when enlightened labor will rise against benighted labor, and heaven have pity on the crippled toilers who survive the conflict!

The nurturing of racial antagonism; the erecting of a snobbish aristocracy of intellectuality; the concealing of vice by denying its existence through legal enactments; the endeavor of churches, that have failed in their true mission, to become political agencies; the breeding of intolerance among interdependent groups; and a host of other present-day tendencies are all wedges that are being placed—thoughtlessly, subconsciously, or maliciously—so as to break up the nation into groups that are bound eventually to clash, and in the many-sided clash of the people, will they, divided, fall?

The discovery of an ill does not necessarily suggest a remedy for its correction, much less does such discovery always prompt the discoverer to seek after a remedy. Just ordinary discernment may make patent to the average citizen the fact that something is going on in America which does not promise well for the future. He senses this even though he may be unable to read the cause of the disintegration of the people into groups and classes that are aggressively hostile to one another. He may not understand that such disintegration, unless arrested or controlled, imperils the very foundation of the country; and

because he does not understand, he innocently allows himself to be used as a factor in the process of breaking up.

If he is warned against the unhealthy growth of class consciousness among the people, he remains undisturbed because of an unwarranted and selfish belief that when class segregation is completed he and his will be in the favored strata. If he is told of the dangers that are threatened by industrial radicalism, which asks not only that labor shall be equal to capital, but that capital shall now be relegated to the position of bondage from which labor not so long since freed itself, he quiets his soul with the thought that good fortune will carry him safely through ordinary times of storm and stress. When he sees mentality deified by those who hold an individual with a high intelligence quotient as necessarily a superior being to the average person, he flatters himself with the assumption that beneath the underbrush of his deficient schooling is concealed, somewhere, a prized IQ. Even when he sees iniquitious legislation passed, he consoles himself with the resolve personally to disregard laws which he may think silly or unreasonable, forgetful of the fact that when individuals start to decide which laws each will obey and which, ignore, the more vicious element of the population is sure to follow suit by refusing to obey laws which make for decency and public safety; then anarchy will raise its bloody head.

Two truths must be brought home to every observant American who pauses and notes the signs of the times. First, the people of the United States are gradually being broken up into unsympathetic groups,

each group pulling selfishly in its chosen direction, away from rather than with other groups. Secondly, a democracy cannot last, much less progress, when its people become divided into Ishmaelitish bands. And the question is, whether America is willing actively or passively to discard the principles on which the democracy was established and the ideals which for long have been its goal, in order that this or that aggressive minority may make a nation-wide experiment in undemocratic government?

II. A HOMESPUN CRITERION

When this study was first projected, the writer conceived his rôle to be that of critic, not teacher. The woods are annoyingly full of those willing to parade as teachers but unwilling first to serve as learners. And it seemed that no serious obstacle need close the path to an author who might undertake a critical survey of present political tendencies in America, together with an appraisal of the possible future value of common people, while refraining steadfastly from advancing ideas of his own as to what would constitute an ideal democracy or other form of government. But a prerequisite for criticism is a standard or criterion by which to gauge the thing being measured. If history recorded the founding and successful maintenance of a democracy by a group having any similarity to that of the American people, then a critical study of present conditions in the United States might have been made in the light shed by that historical record. The success or unsuccess of the American experiment to date could be measured by such an established standard. Unfortunately, recorded history offers no such criterion. As far as the United States is concerned, its adventure into popular government is unique and is still in an experimental stage. No one can say with authority whether the seeming shifting in purpose revealed by the changing attitude of the American people results from a

blind groping in the dark or a definite, progressive move toward an attainable goal.

Despite the absence of a standard for measuring democracy, and the uncertainty whether observed changes are produced by aimless shifting or purposeful progression, democracy is freely denounced as a failure—condemned as an unsatisfactory cake while it is still dough. This widespread condemnation would merit serious attention were it not for the fact that in many instances the alleged failures for which democracy is damned may really be successes misinterpreted. For example, George Bernard Shaw, having been defeated for Parliament, straightway pronounces democracy a failure and declares that everybody is tired of this form of government. But if Shaw could be as critical of himself as he is of all established order, he might see in his defeat evidence of growing discrimination on the part of the "ignorant" voters who marked their ballots for his opponent. There is a striking likeness between the ability of voters to judge which candidate will be the best to represent them in a legislative body and the ability to judge which one would unquestionably be the worst. Neither the world nor Shaw has reason for presuming that Shaw would make as good a representative for the people as the candidate who won over him. The defeated candidate proclaims learnedly that the teachings of history are: "First oligarchy, then democracy, then tyranny, then a threat of the breakup of civilization." He apparently is not careful in his reading of history or he would admit—and thereby puncture his own bubble—that with each reappearance of democracy, the scheme has been more

pretentious and the subjects seemingly better able to carry the schedule assigned them.

When the word democracy is used today, there is not necessarily an agreement as to what is meant. Bryce in his *Modern Democracies* complains that "The term Democracy has in recent years been loosely used to denote sometimes a state of society, sometimes a state of mind, sometimes a quality in manners. It has been encrusted with all sorts of associations, attractive or repulsive, ethical or poetical, or even religious. But Democracy really means nothing more nor less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes." In a subsequent chapter an effort will be made to ascertain if a democracy conforming with Bryce's definition could actually be attained. But people are not so much interested in a correct definition of democracy as in a workable form of democratic government. And the present task is to locate the criterion for a workable scheme of democracy.

Government or the exercise of political authority is merely a derivative of family government. This family idea of government persists in the stock phrases of the nations, although the significance of the idea is given scant consideration by those engaged in political activities. Such terms as "Mother Country," "Fatherland," "Sons of France," and "Sister States," fall readily from the lips, but few pause to sense their meaning, to ponder their origin. The four terms mentioned at random—mother, father, sons, sisters—represent a complete family group and seem to invite a consideration of political government in the light of the family idea. This conception must not be

confused with paternalism, a principle of government that is much condemned, sometimes ignorantly, and which sees government in the rôle of a dictatorial father. Nor does it parallel the principle of familism. Rather the thought is that the family idea translated into government would regard the whole body of the governed as constituting a political family, with the family spirit as the dominant force.

Unquestionably, the earliest step by man to create a scheme of control over the conduct of himself and others found expression in family government. In course of time thereafter, political government made its appearance. There is entirely too much speculation in the present day concerning social and political organization in prehistoric times for the writer to venture like guesses. Those who attempt to reconstruct a fossil tooth into a whole Neanderthal community, with its diversified activities and customs and traditions, may be left to follow this diversion. Nevertheless, data more or less reliable are found in the records of primitive peoples to warrant the conclusion that political government was originated for the purpose of affording a group or family of families the same sort of coöperative direction in certain matters that had previously been exercised within the family circle as long as it was maintained as an independent political or social unit. The chief purpose of this early political government was the protection of family units. The idea, then, of family government may be kept well to the fore when studying political government. What would be the ideal for family government in any age and country should really afford a framework around which could be constructed

an ideal for political government for that particular age and country. The closer family government approaches its ideal, the nearer it comes to being democratic. The closer political government approaches its ideal, the nearer, it would seem, it will come to the ideal for family government.

Since history does not offer a standard for measuring the success of such a democracy as that attempted by the United States, the writer who undertakes a critical study of the existing government could accept as his criterion that governmental design which founders of the nation worked into its declaration of principles and purposes, or else he might undertake to construct a new criterion which would reflect developments in political thinking that have occurred since the early national pattern was first laid down. Here, however, is encountered a delicate situation for the writer who would appear as critic rather than teacher. Early American ideals were not worked out in luxurious libraries by exclusive theorists, but in a wild, open country by pioneers who shouldered the axe and musket, blazed the path through virgin forests, and exposed their necks to the hangman's rope by voicing unorthodox political principles. Less presumptuous, then, than constructing a brand new criterion for democracy with which to replace the old, will be the course of testing American ideals or aims, past and present, with the ideals and aims of family government—the most primitive, and perhaps the most consistent, conception of democracy—as the standard.

The initial step in the formation of a family unit which will pave the way for ideal family government, is the bringing together of a man and woman who

pool all their interests. The idea of a pooling of interests is decidedly more significant than that of "a community of interests"—the phrase usually employed in discussions of democracy. A community of interests signifies that there is a similarity between the interests of one individual and those of others, whereas in a pooling, dissimilar interests will be brought together and, perhaps, harmonized. Out of a pooling of interests is sure to grow a community of interests. That such a procedure exacts its tithes from the individuals going into the pool is undeniable. But the exaction of these tithes is not necessarily undesirable even from the standpoint of individualism. The suggestion may outrage the views of rabid individualists, but no rational form of government could be proposed that would conform to rabid individualistic principles. The daily press makes much ado about the occasional couple that proposes to maintain the marriage state on an unconventional plane in order to realize its ideal. An instance in point is that of a woman who maintains her separate home; has prescribed mornings for taking breakfast with her husband; and retires, now as a single woman, now as a wife—however temperamental caprice may dictate. But such an experiment has no meaning for the world at large. No problem of the married state is attacked when two individuals of independent means, by maintaining separate establishments, undertake to keep apart much of the time in order to avoid tiring of the sight of one another. Such an arrangement merely sidesteps the real problem which it acknowledges; and this problem is how not to weary of one another no matter how constantly together.

An ideal friendship is that where two individuals can be together at any and all times without being annoyed by the other's presence, not as the result of what might be termed trained toleration, but through so complete an understanding that the presence of either can at times become so unassertive that the other is fully as comfortable as if he were alone.

Inasmuch as this is not to be a homily on the marriage state for young sentimentalists, the relations between husband and wife, as a factor in family government, may be looked upon with prosaic practicalness. There is an old kitchen rhyme which tells how—

> Jack Sprat could eat no fat,
> His wife could eat no lean;
> And so between the two of them
> They licked the platter clean.

The Sprats were not democrats, but individualists. If they had undertaken a sensible pooling of their interests, Jack would have learned to eat a little fat and his wife to consume a bit of lean. Such intimate relations between a man and a woman as are usually brought about by marriage, cannot be maintained on a practical basis, much less a sentimental one, unless the pair subscribe individually and collectively to a give-and-take policy. The marriage state has no business to impose perpetually on Mr. Sprat the task of searching out every little bit of fat and passing it over to his wife, nor of imposing on Mrs. Sprat a life sentence of unceasing self-denial in feeling moved, every time she buys a piece of meat, to get it as lean as possible in order to humor Jack and punish herself. A great pitfall for the ideals of early married life

is dug whenever one of the contracting parties yields, sentimentally or henpeckedly, to the temptation of doing all the giving and allowing the other one to do all the taking. That the loving husband or wife should never tire, seemingly, of trying to overwhelm the other with kindnesses and favors and concessions, is romantically beautiful, but governmentally it is foolhardy. And married life is not romance, but government.

The development of both the man and woman, and also the organization which their union creates, is most satisfactory all around when the principle of give-and-take is firmly set and adhered to, neither one permitting himself to give chiefly or take chiefly, but both, regardless of what their impulses may be, holding to a middle course because their common-sense, mutual understanding makes them realize that this is the only safe policy. The inferior position of the female in both family and political government is the fruit largely of woman's willingness to take and not give. That she tended the fire and plied the needle and filled the cradle, is true, of course; and for these performances poets and rhapsodists have spun beautiful laurels for her head. But she, as a type, traded for centuries on the tradition that hers was the rôle of recipient; man's, that of giver. Man was accepted as the provider, the defender, the law-maker; the stronger sex. Woman, on the other hand, was meek and unresisting, especially when showered with favors and flattery. Because of her meekness and non-resistance, man also heaped abuses upon her position. In spirit she grew accustomed to take, not give; and in flesh she almost completely lost the ability to give as well as take. The excuse may be offered

that tradition was against her; but that tradition, for all the world knows, was of her own making as much as man's.

The joining of a male and female in the relationship of man and wife lays the foundation for family government. It is, however, the coming of children that brings the larger problems to the family unit and calls for a complex scheme of government. If connubial relations did not, as a rule, result in the bearing of children, family government would be a much simpler matter. The composition of the family unit, when it comprises both adults and children, calls for a coöperative plan of direction and control. The situations that must be met in governing the family are determined by natural laws. Whether nature designed the form that family government has taken on or man patterned it so as to meet natural situations, is beside the question. Again, whether nature implanted in human beings those traits that prompt normal adults to see certain supposed compensations in the rearing of children or if parents, in course of time, built up traditions that lead people to believe such compensations are found in parenthood, is not of moment here. For the average individual the married state, the family unit, the home idea become parts of the atmosphere in which he can live and develop most naturally.

No effort will be made here to state what family government may mean in all its ramifications. Just a few of the more important phases need be noted.

For family government to approach anything like an ideal, there must be a pooling of interests; else the house becomes divided against itself—which is

regarded as the forerunner of downfall. First the interests of the man and woman are pooled. As children arrive, the pool must be reopened so as to admit the interests of the offspring. Indeed, provision is frequently made for the children's interests in the pool even before there is certainty that children will be added to the unit. The composite aim of the family may continue the same as child after child arrives despite the accession of such new interests in the pool. On the other hand the expansion of the pool by the addition of new interests may necessitate a radical changing of the family's aim. For instance, almost a revolutionary revision of the family's aim may be wrought by the birth of a physically or mentally crippled child. When parents have been drilled in the principles of give-and-take, by both example and instruction this principle will find its way into the functioning of the children as members of this family group. A new meaning is found in life for the child who becomes impressed with the thought that in return for all the things he takes, he can give even in so small a matter as being considerate and pleasant. He ceases to see himself as a beggar, and it doubtless is because he often is made to see himself solely as a beggar—a taker—that he begs so constantly.

The snap judgment of the world is that married couples without children much more readily develop traits of selfishness than adults in a family where there are children. Whether this is true or not need not be debated, but the statement bears a suggestion of reasonableness. Certainly each child usually brings with him to the family unit a demand that the principle of give-and-take be worked out in finer details. The

conception of justice and fair play, for both parents and children, is better developed in a family that has more than two children than in one that has fewer than three children. As far as parents are concerned, it is obvious that several children bring to them an appreciation of the increased difficulty of being perfectly fair in matters between themselves and each child and in matters among the several children. As for the children: A child with neither brother nor sister suffers in his development for social activity because in the home he is not brought in intimate contact with his kind in inexperience and impulsiveness. With a two-child family, neither child is sure to profit when youthful interests clash either by the incident itself or its outcome. But it is when a child must justify himself not only before the brother or sister with whom he comes in conflict, but also before other brothers and sisters who are merely spectators, that the need to be fair is brought home to him.

Ideal family government aims at the development not only of the family as a unit, but also of each member as an individual. An over-indulgent father may be so careful not to allow either wife or children to have a part in the burden imposed by managing the organization, that his passing away will leave the remaining members of that unit helpless and at the mercy of any unfavorable wind that chances to beat on them. Such a man doubtless prides himself in life because of the wonderful provision made for his family but the chaos produced by his death bears testimony that his sort of provision, which enabled the family unit to keep to its course and maintain its equilibrium only as long as he lived, really constitutes a betrayal

of the position entrusted to him in the family government. Those who seek an ideal of government for the family unit do not lose sight of the necessity of so conducting affairs that, should either parent be bereft, that one will be capable of offsetting the loss to the organization. Moreover, precaution will be taken so that every child, no matter how any one may be handicapped, will be trained to look out for himself should something befall which will throw him on his own resources in the world.

The family government deals with a group of differentiated individuals as far as mentality, physique, temperament, and other traits are concerned, and it usually deals with these individuals equitably. The Cinderellan picture of criminal discrimination against one child is not often encountered in real life. While the average family government may fall far short of its ideal, no child, as a rule, is favored undeservedly and another oppressed willfully and maliciously. Sometimes a later child is dealt with more intelligently than were the earlier children, but this is the result primarily of the increased knowledge that has come to parents through experience. Caste lines are uncommon in the average family group. Because of the leavening influence of a pooling of the interests of all members, the interests of any one member usually become the interests of all, and there are no significant jealousies. The aim of ideal family government is to give each member the largest possible opportunity. If one member of the family unit reveals marked ability, it is not uncommon for the other members to make endless sacrifices so that the talented one may be afforded every chance to develop his peculiar

ability; but success, if attained, is not thought of as his success as much as their success. Again, if because of early economic circumstances some members of the family group are not enabled to pursue education as far as the ambition of the family group might wish, there is no ill-feeling, but rather sincere delight on the part of these meagrely educated older children, if a change in circumstances makes it possible to give the younger children more adequate schooling.

If, as certain theorists seem to hold, the family is to be thought of primarily as an agency for producing generation after generation of human beings, the ideal family happily escapes the misfortune of regarding its mission in this light, and is pleased to see in every day while passing so much that is immediately appealing as to want to hold firmly to the present. Parents are not impatient to see their children grow to maturity in order that they, in turn, may become parents on their own account, but rather enjoy so much the things that life has to offer today as to regret the thought that tomorrow will bring its change.

This outline of a few of the outstanding features to ideal family government may be filled in with parallel features which, it seems, should characterize an ideal democracy.

An ideal democracy would show a pooling of the interests of all the people, and certainly no one group or element would endeavor, or, if it were willing to endeavor, would be permitted to advance its own interests by ignoring or outlawing the interests of other elements.

An ideal democracy would be one in which the principle of give-and-take found full expression. The

whole people will be ever on guard so that no element may fall into the habit of taking only and not giving. Just as in the family unit of many children, so in an ideal democracy the youngest or weakest group will be safe from unfair dealings by all other groups, whether strong or weak, since each group will feel the necessity of justifying its conduct before all other groups.

An ideal democracy would be one in which concurrently with the development of the group as a unit will come the development of the members as individuals. An ideal democracy would not propose to place all responsibility for its course on just a few and purposely circumscribe the training of the many so that they will be unable to assume responsibilities, since, if the trained few should fail or weary of their job, then the many would be helpless, not due to their alleged native limitations as much as their circumscribed training.

An ideal democracy would not attempt to prescribe any one quality, such as wealth, intelligence, social position, as entitling the possessor to preference over others, since the outcome of a pooling of the interests of those of all states of means, all grades of mentality, and all standards of social position, will automatically adjust the relations between individuals or groups of different characteristics and qualities.

Without presuming, then, to present a new creed for democracy, the writer proposes to hold up the ideal of family government as the criterion, in the belief that democracy therein may behold, as in a mirror, the features that would make for ideal government.

III. RIGHTS AND WRONGS

Whenever—if ever—an absolutely perfect form of government shall have been developed by a people, it will be proper for that people not only to combat any endeavor to change the form, but even to regard as treason a mere suggestion of changing. However, government in the United States has not reached such a stage of perfection; it both can and should be bettered; consequently the American who denounces as sacrilege any proposal to touch the established order of things may be standing in his own light and that of his country.

But a distinct difference is to be noted between a movement to carry the present American venture in government further toward the ideal of democracy and, on the other hand, schemes for substituting some different pattern of government which can make no pretense at being democratic. In order to determine whether a proposed change in the plan of the present government promises good or evil, it is necessary that the people first agree upon a definite, common ideal for their government, so that all proposals to alter prevailing practices may be judged wisely with that ideal ever in mind. The present humor of the American people, however, is against rather than for the finding of a common ideal. Instead of a pooling of interests, there is a reckless divorcing of interests, and out of such division comes the unhappy result of starting elements which were once wedded on their separate ways with a feeling of bitter-

ness toward those elements from which they find themselves separating. If this disunion of these elements which should be coöperating continues unabated, whatever the developments that may be recorded with the passage of time, certainly they will not be along democratic lines, but most likely will end with a complete repudiation of the basic principles of democracy. Group and class antagonism, if encouraged long enough, will lead to group or class domination, and this in turn must produce oligarchy, autocracy, or perhaps some brand new and as yet unnamed experiment in government.

Already raids have been successfully made in the United States upon certain principles that are to be regarded as fundamental to a democracy; other attacks of like character are either now in progress or else in contemplation. The raiders are, in instances, those who frankly condemn the present form of government and, in other instances, those who, while not openly opposed to the idea of democracy, yet see no good reason why the idea should not be shelved whenever it becomes convenient to ignore it. But before these raiders are permitted, by a process of piecemeal substitution, to replace the underlying principles of democracy originally incorporated into the American venture with principles that are pronouncedly undemocratic, an opportunity to approve or disapprove what is being done with their government should be afforded those—possibly a majority of the people—who in time may find themselves literally shoved outside of the government.

Now and then a note of warning is sounded to the whole American people by those who become disturbed

because of the various attempts to undemocratize the government. Today the protest may be that the people's rights are being trampled under foot; tomorrow's protestant may care nothing about so-called contractual rights, but his concern is for the preservation and development of the national ideal. The forward-looking idealist frequently finds it difficult to see any strength in the position of his fellow-protestant who, like Lot's wife, is continually looking backward at so-called contractual rights, and *vice versa*. Meanwhile the public presumes that the idealist, on the one hand, and the contender for contractual rights, on the other hand, are at cross purposes; and such a presumption is not surprising since frequently idealist and legalist fail to note that the ends they strive for are identical. The one lays down his course by fixed land lights and the other steers by the stars—but the destination of both is an ideal democracy. It seems proper, then, that a survey of present tendencies in the American democracy should take some preliminary account of those who, solely on the score that citizens' rights may be violated, oppose various movements that threaten to undemocratize the government. Dual significance attaches to this question of the individual's rights. It is largely because so many Americans presume their rights to have been disregarded by public officials, legislative bodies, and federal courts, that disintegration of the body politic has progressed so rapidly. Again, if the whole people can be brought to see the individual's status in a democracy as something that cannot be adequately defined by legal enactments, it will make the individual more useful in developing democracy and

public office more considerate in dealing with individuals.

There are laws that set forth clearly the rights of various members of the family. These laws are, perhaps, of no concern to that family which strives after a high ideal in its government, since the performance there will always exceed the requirements of any enacted law. If all families since the beginning of time had sought a like ideal, no law setting forth the rights of individual members of the family group would have been required. In like manner, if all governmental administration since the birth of political government had been sensible and just, no need would have arisen for men to stipulate the rights of individuals under government. But just as family administration in instances countenanced abuses, and these abuses had to be fought and overcome and the victory sealed with a legal enactment, so political administration has frequently become corrupt, and out of the corruption have sprung injustice and oppression. Whenever those oppressed by a government have been able to free themselves of that oppression and injustice, they have memorialized their victory in a law, written or unwritten, that stipulated precisely the rights recovered or first formally acknowledged. Such laws may be of no moment to a government that strives after the ideal of democracy, but even for such a government to acknowledge these rights can do of no harm. The commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is not offensive to the man who is incapable of even wishing a fellow-man ill. To the political idealist, then, there need be no offense in encountering a man who insists upon thinking of the Constitution of the

United States as a contract between the government and the governed which promises the individual that certain rights, guaranteed to him, will be held inviolate. After all, constitutional rights may be thought of as a fitting starting point even for an ideal democracy. It is not wise, perhaps, to accept the Constitution as a chart of the furthest point to which American democracy can advance; but it is entirely sensible to regard it as marking points past which democracy dare not retreat without imperiling both government and the governed.

Various groups of citizens that do not subscribe to the fundamental principles of democracy are seeking to rewrite America's creed to square with their own unrepresentative views. The creed which they seek to replace rests, in part, on the tenets of an individual's natural rights and restricted governmental authority, while the proposed new creed repudiates both of these principles. If, therefore, because of the broken front presented by the American people, as a consequence of the present tendency toward disintegration, these newer and narrower views should be foisted upon the nation, by the very process of such foisting certain rights of the individual as well as restrictions purposely —and wisely—placed on government may be swept away. It can be argued, of course, that in order for government to take a step forward, the governed may be called upon to make concessions; possibly even to surrender certain rights that have been regarded by them as inviolable. But if the family idea of government is applied to democracy, it becomes apparent that such a change must not be accomplished at the expense but without the consent of those who are to

get no benefit, while those who force the change and bear none of the expense reap a selfish, personal advantage. A democratic people must ever bear in mind that the net result of the surrender of personal rights may be to clear the way and furnish an incentive for an undemocratic clique to swing the entire government away from democracy. In most instances, established individual rights represent permanent lines of defense which man has erected as he gradually advanced government to a position where its mission was accepted as one of service to the governed, instead of the governed, in part at least, being regarded as creatures existing primarily for the benefit of government.

A democracy that aspires to approach the ideal of government must touch very cautiously rights which are held, or are presumed to be held, by the people. When political government acknowledged certain rights as belonging to the individual, it merely subscribed to reason as against force in deciding justice. As long as might was right, a schedule of individual rights did not have to be worked out and certified. Each acknowledged natural or legal right of man, then, is to be regarded as a milestone erected as government progressed gradually from the theory of rule by force to rule by reason. If this is true, it readily appears how dangerous a practice it is for any government to treat lightly rights already recognized and established. Mention has been made in a previous chapter of the peril to a people when a citizen looks lightly upon the passage of a supposedly iniquitious law because of his predetermination to disregard it. The Volstead Act was voted for by

many congressmen who felt that, because of their official position, they would suffer no personal hardship under this congressional measure, and many of them have realized their hopes in being able ever since to obtain alcoholic beverages in such quantities as they wish. But a disregard of the Volstead Act by those, both in and out of Congress, who buy liquor illegally has created another element of disregarders of law for the purpose of producing and selling this liquor, and this latter element is rapidly becoming a real menace to American society. In much the same manner, a willingness of law-makers and law-enforcers to disregard rights that are supposed to be enjoyed by the individual may not appear a serious offense on the surface, but it may set a precedent for further disregarding of like rights that will in time prove a most serious matter to the whole people.

Among the guarantees made to American citizens under the Constitution is one that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." It is immaterial whether the stipulation of such rights be looked upon as a contract between the government and the citizen or solely as a recital by the government of certain humane principles to which it subscribes. The people might amend the Constitution, in the way prescribed, so that future generations will not have this written promise of immunity from excessive bail and fines and from cruel and unusual punishments. But regardless of what the Constitution may say on such matters, there are fundamental, basic laws concerning an individual's natural rights that would have to be recognized by any govern-

ment pretending to be civilized, and these must also be recognized by the whole people forming such a government. Any statute, then, that sought to deny a man, who is not found guilty of having committed a capital crime, the privilege to live his natural life, would merely appear a form of legalized murder, and the government making such murder legal could not hope for the respect of its citizens.

In several states the proposal has been made, and seriously considered by an element of the people, that imbeciles and idiots hereafter be put to death, and that negative eugenics or the sterilization of all persons below normal mentality be authorized. Imbecility and idiocy are a misfortune always, but at present not a crime. It might be advantageous to eliminate the lowest type of subnormals by putting them to death; also to endeavor to control mental deficiency by sterilizing other types of subnormals. But the benefit would be negligible as compared with the damage that is bound to occur the instant government trespasses upon that human ideal which holds it the right of a citizen not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law. The due process of law for putting a person to death is to bring him to trial for a capital crime with the privilege of submitting his case to a jury. Moreover, the members of the jury must not be prejudiced against him. The thought, therefore, of putting an invalid, whether his ailment be mental or physical, to death, not for the purpose of easing his sufferings, but to relieve others and the state of the burden of his care, would outrage another sacred ideal of most people. The suggestion, once translated into legislation, would do a hundredfold

more evil in encouraging a further disintegration of the people than it could possibly do good in raising the average intelligence of society. Then, too, a feeling of insecurity would spread among the people that would compel them to distrust their government. The dread would come that some day they or those near to them might fall prey to an incurable mental ailment or they might bring into the world a child who would be adjudged sufficiently below normal to warrant the state in denying it a chance to live.

The question of an individual's natural or constitutional rights does not concern the present study except in so far as it may have a definite bearing upon democracy's task of bringing about a pooling of interests, from which is to grow the desired community of interests. With this aspect of the subject in mind, and still holding to that section of the Constitution which promises the citizen that he will not be subjected to excessive fines, note may be made of the fact that a surprisingly large number of Americans have submitted quietly to the imposition of excessive fines laid against them by the federal government for the very innocent offense of not filling in troublesome income reports and filing them within a prescribed time. What is the effect of this? True, a guaranteed right has been violated; but this disregarding of an individual's rights by the government is much more significant to democracy as an offense against an ideal than as an offense against a lone, helpless citizen. The impression is broadcasted that because the private citizen is relatively small, and the federal government is very big, its agents take advantage of the government's superior size and convert a

government the people are expected to respect into a bully. Another illustration of this is found in the attitude assumed by the collectors of internal revenue to all Americans who are expected to report on their income. It is the legal right of the individual to be regarded as innocent until he may have been tried and found guilty. It is, however, no exaggeration to assert that some of those who serve in planning and making the collection of income taxes arrogantly assume that they are dealing with a nation of thieves. It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the common disregarding of an individual's rights by those entrusted with the enforcements of national prohibition. The bully—even when he represents the government—loses the respect of all fair-minded people and also his self-respect. Consequently, bullying agents of a democratic government infect with disrespect the whole structure of the nation. They, the agents of a supposed democracy, become arch enemies of democracy through the obstacles they place in the way of the desired pooling of interests by all the governed.

Agents of the government doubtless dare to make a bully of the government because they feel confident that whatever they do will be sustained by federal courts. Senator James A. Reed asserted in the upper house of Congress: "I do not know whether either the Congress or the courts have longer respect for the Constitution of the United States. We have gone so far from the old landmarks and the old canons of construction that it sometimes seems to me that the Constitution is about to be repealed by the process of legislative chicanery." He then intimates why legisla-

tive chicanery succeeds, by adding: "The courts long ago laid down the rule that they will sustain any act of Congress if they can find any reasonable construction which will allow them to maintain its constitutionality." This explains in part why executive officers, legislative bodies, and federal agents have come to the point where they regard with something akin to contempt the Constitution of the United States, and, in turn, why the people have come to the point of regarding with something equally like contempt those who make and administer the laws as well as those who pass upon the legality of these laws and the method of their enforcement. For mild acquiescence in this disrespectful attitude of the government toward the Constitution, rather than stiff opposition to it, the people themselves may seem blamable, but the chief source of the trouble can be traced to that gradual separation of the population into unsympathetic groups, with a resultant wavering in the matter of national ideals. Various antagonistic groups wink upon a brazen disregarding of the Constitution, chiefly because they hope to profit personally because of this disregarding. The really important phase of this matter to the people is that whenever a supposed right of the individual is violated by a government agent, that violation threatens to place in the hand of government agents such arbitrary powers as no democratic people may dare entrust to its public servants.

It may be said, parenthetically, that the federal courts have been most generous contributors in destroying American ideals of personal rights and liberty as based upon the Constitution, so that today

many citizens feel called upon to apologize for rather than take pride in what their government apparently stands for. It is because of the havoc that has been wrought with American ideals through court decisions, and through asinine legislation passed on the assumption that it would be sustained in court, that public confidence in both courts and legislatures has been weakened. The weakening of this confidence is reflected in the disintegration of the people. It may be broadly asserted that the rights of the individual cannot be trespassed upon recklessly by the government without an accompanying lowering of the standard of democracy. The trick, for instance, by which the right of jury was withdrawn from those who may be charged with violating the Volstead Act, did not and could not make for better government. Legislators and judges who became responsible for this trick, by their very course certified that they had no confidence in the American people, as a whole, and by their course they justified the American people in losing confidence in legislators and courts.

IV. THE BODY POLITIC

According to established hospital procedure, after an ailment has been diagnosed and a major operation prescribed, the patient's heart is tested to ascertain his chances of surviving the shock; and subsequently, as a matter of wise precaution, his history is written down so that full statistical data will be preserved to medical archives should the operation furnish—as frequently happens—a *finis* to the biography.

The patient at present under observation is the American body politic. This body politic is the whole mass of the people gathered into something approximating a political unit for the supposed purpose of exercising self-governing functions. The patient is himself conscious of the fact that he is ailing. Representatives of various schools of political healing are soliciting, each according to his particular brand of ethics, the business of providing treatment. There are political chiropractors who, without seeing the patient, diagnose the trouble as growing pains; they propose, by trick manipulations, to readjust the spine and effect a cure. There are political vivisectionists who ask permission to sever the head from the body, and let time determine the wisdom of their program. There are political Christian Scientists who think to correct the ill by denying its presence.

But a careful examination reveals so many symptoms of unhealth, that the ailment does not promise

to yield, except perhaps disastrously, to these proposed treatments. There is found, for example, an advanced stage of disintegration—a breaking up of the people into groups and classes that are becoming increasingly hostile to one another. This disintegration may be translated into the medical term of degeneration, with a cautioning, however, that degeneration as here used is not to be confused with the word in its moral sense. When physical degeneration sets in, every part of the material body is threatened, and continues in peril until the disease has been arrested or the patient succumbs. In like manner, with a breaking down of those tissues in the body politic that bind up all sorts and conditions of men into one common political unit, a state of advanced unhealth is disclosed which threatens to spread its virus with disastrous result throughout the entire system.

Disintegration or degeneration is not to be regarded as the disease itself, but rather as a by-product of disease. The progressing disintegration of the American people is actually the outcome of two distinct pathological conditions. On the one hand there are relatively small elements in the body politic that are dividing the people into hostile groups either subconsciously through present efforts to gain control of public affairs or else designedly in the hope that, after the resistance of the whole body has been lowered, they will meet little opposition when they seek to control the government. On the other hand, there is the performance of those who, having been placed in authority by the people, are exercising that authority in such a way as to create a disrespect of government for the people and of the people for government. The real problem is not the success of any particular

brand of government or the development of isolated elements of the people, but the welfare of the whole people as a unit.

With no intention of going into minute detail, a superficial survey may here be attempted of the American people as a whole. When an effort is made to analyze so vast a population as inhabits the United States in order to determine the character and quantity of the component elements, the danger is that any adequate scheme of classification must become highly technical. Looking at the American people in just their social aspect, the conventional scheme is to have them fall into three major divisions, roughly: aristocrats, bourgeosie, and plebeians; or high class, middle class, and low class. But in America no such sharp lines of social demarcation can be traced, since the middle class slants up into the aristocrats at one end and shades off into the plebeian group at the other end. Theoretically, the population might be represented by a graph showing a low straight line for the plebeians; then a sharp rise and a much longer horizontal line for the middle class; then another rise to the aristocrats, in this wise:



But such a charting would have no basis in fact, since an accurate graphic presentation must reveal an overlapping and joining of the three elements thus:



Moreover, the writing down of an American as an aristocrat, middle-classer, or plebeian, offers only a superficial indication of his social standing and disposes of him not at all as regards his functioning in the body politic. The highest official position in the land is not legally inaccessible to the most commonplace plebeian, and with that office goes entrance into the best society of the country. Because of social position, mental calibre, or economic condition a man might be regarded as an aristocrat, whereas by his political attitude toward his fellow members of the body politic he may reveal himself as autocratic, democratic, or socialistic. Having inherited or accumulated or developed some element of power among men that would, conventionally, seem to entitle him to more voice in public affairs than is exercised by the average citizen, he may, altruistically, so conduct himself as to indicate a firm belief in the doctrine that all men should appear equals in the eyes of the state and that the few who are peculiarly favored with features of seeming superiority should oppose any inclination of the state or its agents to show them partiality. On the other hand, the avowed disbeliever in all forms of government may need only an opportunity in order to blossom forth as the champion of tyrannical autocracy, as did the bolshevists of Russia.

It becomes apparent that a scientific scheme for indexing Americans according to the social, political, economic, moral, religious, and mental characteristics each reveals would result in no end of involution, and the chart would become so crowded with cross-sectionings that it might be no more intelligible than a railroad map of Illinois. Moreover, the gauge would

become unwieldy as well as unimpressive. It seems wise, therefore, as an aid to the reader's thinking, rather than as a means for accurately placing all Americans, to seek a simpler, even though less dignified key for classification.

Most Americans are familiar with the phrase, "feet of clay." An individual is encountered who appears to be a superman, but every now and then he reveals his limitations and the feet of clay are disclosed—once more exploding the idea that there are true supermen. It is the feet of clay that hold this individual to the commonplace, everyday world; and those who are intimately thrown with the so-called great men of the day, in course of time become properly disillusioned by realizing that the great and small are more like than unlike one another. This idea of clay is employed in other though perhaps less familiar connections. In a certain section of America, for instance, most of the inhabitants date their ancestry back to very early settlers who lived on the same lands which they now occupy. But there is no common bond between the several groups into which the people of this community fall; indeed, a more marked social caste prevails than is found anywhere else except, possibly, in India. There are people whose ancestry was always well-to-do, and they accept themselves as hereditary aristocrats, even though some of them may have become relatively poor. Another element of the population is composed of people whose ancestry was always poor, and in that community these dare take no special pride from the fact that their American lineage is as ancient as that of the alleged aristocrats. The less fortunate citizens are referred to by the

proud descendants of supposedly aristocratic settlers as clay eaters, and the tradition is that their forebears were so poor that they did actually take to eating clay. If the tradition is true, it is a damning commentary on the aristocratic settlers to have permitted fellow pioneers to become so hungry that they had to seek the same sustenance as worms. But this legend is not introduced here to preface a tirade against the brutality by which social caste is sometimes created and maintained; rather it is mentioned to give the basis of precedent to clay as a symbol when considering certain individual or group differences.

Finally, it was doubtless those who accepted literally Job's declaration, "I also am formed out of the clay," who introduced into the English language the term clay-brained, finding in it a suggested explanation of why those to whom the phrase was applied appeared stupid and dull.

Not as a matter of charity toward those who may seem less favored, then, but as a means of coming to a truer understanding of the relations among all sorts and conditions of men, it is well for the individual to see the common origin and the close relationship of all people who make up the population of a community, of a nation, of the world. Whether or not all men, like Job, are formed out of clay, certainly as with Job, each creature is finally returned to the clay, and the extreme range possible to human life is represented, on the one hand, by the unfortunate who may be written down as clay-brained and, on the other hand, by that fortunate whose presumably phenomenal flight does not, however, carry him so high that, figuratively, his feet cease to rest upon earth.

All human life apparently makes its start at a common point since to outward appearances all newly born infants come upon the scene in a like state of helplessness and ignorance. A very small percentage of a people never succeed in making much progress past this starting-point; but all the others, with varying degrees of success, lift themselves or are lifted so that they appear graduated from the permanently clay-brained up step by step to those creatures who seemed to be anchored to earth only by the feet of clay. Therefore, when a survey is attempted of a whole people, it is decidedly more sensible to see all the individuals making up that body as striving toward that maximum elevation which can be attained only by the most favored, than to conceive of them as falling into radically different and entirely divorced phases of human existence.

That vast body of ordinary, average, every-day individuals who manage to get enough to eat and wear when times are propitious, but who are apt occasionally to walk on their uppers—the people who plod along socially, economically, politically, mentally, with seldom getting past the plodding stage, are with increasing frequency being labeled as clay-brained by those who in the labeling reveal at most superficial intelligence. The very struggle of the plodder against the forces that seek to sweep him backward appears as a counterpart of the endeavor of those individuals who have risen above the commonplace and are striving to hold the advanced position or pass it. On the surface of things, the plodder's prospects may not appear encouraging. Equipped with an average mind, running from mediocre to dull; pursu-

ing an average existence, running from humdrum to purely routine; mating usually with a like creature and conventionally bringing forth his kind—some twofold, some fourfold, some tenfold—the mediocre plodder is too readily written down as clay-brained or else close kin to the clay-brained. But the circumscription of his vocational pursuit, the restriction of his social outlook, the limitations to his intellectual horizon, are things for which he is not necessarily responsible. These are conditions which the world imposes on as many people as it can; the ability to escape them, no matter what that ability may actually signify, is accepted as stamping an individual as uncommon; while those who do not escape—comprising of course a vast majority—are accepted, unstamped, as commonplace. Ordinarily, then, common people may be thought of as constituting that great body of individuals who cannot locate an avenue of ingress to the rank of those who possess wealth, or command social position, or boast peculiar ability in science or art, or reveal marked mental ability.

Science is at present inclined to the view that an enormous portion of the people are common because they are born clay-brained, and that neither books nor tutors, prayers nor curses, can remove this inherited taint. If this were a discussion of mentality, which it is not, it might be in order to demand that science make certain reservations; but for the present purpose the rather broad, although not entirely accurate, edict of science may be permitted to stand temporarily. In a subsequent chapter an effort will be made to show that being clay-brained is not always a congenitally determined condition, although frequently it is.

But note may be made, in passing, that while the clay-brained male and female do frequently produce clay-brained children, the rule is not invariable, no more than it is true that parents of exceptional character, when they condescend to reproduce, bring forth only children of exceptional character.

When the state takes inventory of the body politic, it will, of course, find a preponderance of its human stock consisting of everyday, average ordinary creatures. But the state will not as a consequence be disturbed by those who seek to alarm it with a fear that it has overstocked in this respect, since the strength of both human society and political government is more dependent upon the presence of those who are like than those who are unlike. Likeness may be regarded by the unlike as commonplaceness or even mediocrity, but it makes for unity, and unity in turn makes for social and political stability. The state will not see its common people as submerged, but merely as less emerged than the uncommon people. It is just as simple as it is inaccurate to regard the common people as having got into a rut of existence because of their stupidity. The truth is that all life starts in a rut and, in a measure, continues in a rut to the end. The uncommon creature is he who can through his own ability or the aid of others succeed in freeing himself of this rut influence a little more than the average.

But in thinking of common and uncommon people, it is essential always to bear in mind that seeming uncommonness or superiority may be revealed in only one or a few phases of the individual's make-up, whereas his make-up in its entirety consists of many

phases, and in a majority of these he may continue commonplace or average. It does not necessarily follow that the man who in some phase of existence lifts himself higher out of life's rut than most of his fellow men, will, as a consequence, gain worldly recognition or accumulate wealth or be more useful socially because of such superiority as may be represented by his seeming differentiation from the average run of creatures. Nor is the man who displays the ability to rise above the average or commonplace in one phase of existence always freely accepted as outside the commonalty by other supposedly uncommon creatures. The over-read college professor will not subscribe to a rule that would shove into his set the successful business man who, in his quest for gold, neglected to study the Queen's English or to inform himself concerning history, literature, science, and art. But the scholar is too ready to assume that the only intelligence worthy of the name is that which seeks book learning. So, too, the captain of industry is apt to scorn as stupid the artist who lacks the business sense to make his art pay. But in the final analysis, it will be found that as with "the colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady," so with John Dewey and Henry Ford, the philosopher and the unschooled manufacturers are brothers superior under the skin. Dewey has an exceptional mind particularly suited for philosophizing, while Ford has an exceptional intellect for thinking in terms of industry. By the ordinary information or mental tests, Ford would doubtless grade low and Dewey would certainly score high; but regardless of the testimony of measures and tests, Ford as truly as Dewey represents a creature who has been

capable of emerging far out of the rut in which commonplace existence finds its footing. This point could be pressed further to make clear the folly of one type of uncommon creature flattering himself with the thought that his phase of uncommonness is the only one of moment. On the score that Ford is largely self-taught, he might be accepted as of the same teaching profession as Dewey, and since the merit of the teacher must be gauged by his product, Ford stands forth as the product of his self-teaching, while Dewey does not.

This suggested, rather than developed, outline of the body politic lays no claim to being scientific, but it does have the merit of being natural. All human existence is cast into a rut of relative commonplaceness. What would constitute commonplace existence for a backward or primitive race would of course be radically different from the commonplace existence of a progressive, civilized people, and so, too, what might be commonplace existence at one stage of a people's history may not be like the commonplace existence of another stage. In any body politic there will always be found individuals and elements which in this or that particular are capable of rising above the point to which the people as a whole rise. These may be regarded as the select, and by a process of elimination such as remain may be written down as the common people.

V. THE CONVENTIONAL MAJORITY

When universal suffrage is thought of as the outstanding requirement in order to have democracy, democracy in turn is apt to be thought of as government by the majority. This explains why many Americans, who look upon voting as the citizen's only means of functioning politically, are not particularly disturbed when they behold the successful candidate of a campaign treating public office as if it were a trophy to be used by him and his party for personal advantage and, if possible, to bring discomfort upon the party that suffered defeat in the election. When the idealist contemplates this conception of popular government in practice he declares, with justice, that what is alleged to be democracy may, in truth, be tyranny. Nevertheless in thinking of democracy, it is impossible to brush to one side the idea of the majority's power without sweeping democracy along with it. Whenever public matters are decided by the ballot in a country where the franchise is general, unquestionably those public matters appear to have been decided by the majority. Again, whenever a public official is elected by the ballot in a country where all people enjoy the franchise, certainly the official so elected appears to have been chosen by the majority. The outcome of this state of affairs can easily be pictured so that it will represent an exact replica of government in primitive times when

by universal practice might made right. As between physical strength and numerical strength decreeing that its view must be adopted, there is merely a difference in the form of the evil. It thus becomes apparent that what was designed for a democracy can be corrupted into the very antithesis of democracy through the conduct of the people constituting the government. The danger of this is, perhaps, always present; but it becomes most imminent when there is open hostility or antagonism between the various elements composing the body politic. With these things in mind, the damage that may be done to the American democracy through a complete disintegration of the people becomes apparent.

The fact that physical might and numerical strength have been employed to make wrong right, is not sufficient ground for government to regard either as a necessary evil. Physical strength must always be a factor in life, but brute force has been tamed and serves government well as a policing agent. In like manner, the majority will always be a powerful element in government, either for or against the established order. The despot dares not forget the presence of the majority, but because his administration antagonizes this majority, the majority stands forth as a continual threat against his rule. A republican form of government that has the support of only a minority of the people is not secure; but a democracy that is subscribed to by the majority should be able to weather any storm. Consequently those who may seek to weaken or to strengthen popular government, although each has in mind a different end, give first thought to the majority.

What may be thought of as "the majority" of the American electorate is composed largely of commonplace people. An average person is relatively a commonplace person; it is commonplaceness that makes him average and, of course, the average constitutes the majority. The common people who constitute the majority might be just as well off in the United States, or they might even be better off, if divested of the franchise, which, in theory, makes them the deciding element in governmental matters. But in that case the government would not be a democracy nor would the people be a democratic people. The majority believes that it can be happiest under a democratic government. This would be true, unquestionably, if the government aimed at an ideal of democracy. But whether the government of the United States is ideal or no, it rests with the majority, it certainly would seem, to determine if there is to be a change in the form of government. Nevertheless such a change might be brought about without being referred to the majority simply by a disintegration of the people. Therefore it becomes apparent that the majority will be most affected by a complete breaking up of the people into discordant groups, with the probability that a minority, antagonistic to the principles of democracy, may gain control of public affairs. The many, then, who seemingly are threatened with the greatest loss by a change in the form and the aims of the government, evidently constitute the sole element that at the present time has within grasp the might to save its power under democracy and also to save democracy—since the salvation of one apparently means the salvation of both.

An attempt may be made to get a definite mental picture of those individuals who constitute the majority and who, according to the principles of government under which they are supposed to be living, should be able to control the affairs of the nation. In American politics reference is frequently made to the common people by those who have at most a very hazy conception of the element that they suppose constitutes the commonalty or masses. When a government rests with nobility, either in part or in its entirety, the commonalty is supposedly made up of the untitled people. Even in a republic like France, the man who cannot claim, either through legitimate or illegitimate inheritance, a strain of noble blood is regarded by the descendants of nobles, and usually by himself, as a commoner. On the other hand when Bryan, the prince of demagogues, paraded before the American people as the self-styled "Commoner," he pulled as daring a bit of demagogy as history records. What is the commonalty of a democracy? The very term suggests a paradox, since a pure democracy should absorb all people into one body of political peers or common people.

Certain obstacles stand in the way of any nation ever reaching an ideally democratic state in which all the people will compose one body of true political commoners. These obstacles are furnished by the nature of man. There are, too, obstacles that stand in the way of any government of gigantic proportions ever enjoying a real representative government. Such obstacles are provided by the very agency that brings about the naming of representatives—politics. In sociological thinking, the common people

would be put down as those in ordinary economic circumstances with no claim to social rank because of birth and possessing just ordinary, everyday minds. But in political thinking, the common people may be regarded as those who confine their political functionings to voting—or not voting; who take no active part in politics; ask no special favors of politics; and do not assume a critical attitude toward those who make a business of politics. Politically they never rise high enough above the rut of average indifference to matters of government to be able to see government in its proper perspective with other human activities. It is well, then, to bear in mind, when reference is hereafter made to the common people, that in political thinking the ranks would seem to include quite a few of the select who, however, are pronouncedly commonplace in their political functioning.

On the shoulders of the common people theoretically rests chief responsibility for directing a democratic government, since they are enormously in the majority. There is a host of opportunists and tricksters and grafters who are willing to remove this responsibility from the shoulders of the majority, and assume it themselves. But the day the country sees the political might which belongs rightfully to the majority completely usurped by a minority, in the evening of that same day democracy may wisely begin to rehearse its swan song. Moreover, if the common people cannot be trusted either to determine themselves the course of public affairs or to choose who shall represent them as their agent in such determining, not once for all, but from time to time as each

fresh emergency arises, then democracy itself cannot be regarded as a practical scheme of government.

It is also essential in a true democracy that the majority should decide what should be the nation's ideals and should be ready to defend them. Of all the elements found in the population today, perhaps, the common people who make up the majority have the most definite national ideals, and the most childlike faith in their country. They believe that the United States is an ideally governmented nation. Their faith gets no nourishment from critical observation, since they themselves are not critically observant; but it feeds on the assumption that certain lofty political ideals spouted by American statesmen long since canonized, must surely survive, functioning somewhere in the national life. Despite the fact that these common people are continually perturbed by incidents which seem to grow out of fundamental defects in the governmental machinery, yet their faith in that machinery remains unshaken. Indeed, a childlike faith has grown out of childhood's learnings. In the background of his consciousness, the everyday, ordinary citizen entertains beliefs to the effect that the colonies really afforded mankind all that freedom in matters religious for which they were, traditionally, founded; that the Constitution of the United States created a perfect union which guarantees justice, insures domestic tranquility, promotes the general welfare, and secures to Americans and their posterity forever the blessings of liberty; that all Americans are created equal with certain inalienable rights, among which is the pursuit of happiness; and that the nation represents in true form a government of the people, by the

people, for the people with its just powers derived from the consent of the governed.

Because of a conventional conception of what patriotism demands of him, the common man, on these meagre data, part superstition and part tradition, bases his belief that America is a great democracy; that all Americans are real democrats; and that the United States government is superior to anything ever devised by man for directing a people's public affairs. This faith of the common man in the idealistic character of his government is with him close kin to religion. Naturally, the smaller the calibre of an individual's mentality, the greater the load of bigotry he can marshall to the defense of his faith. Therefore, it is fully as hazardous to criticize destructively his faith in country as it is to dissect unsympathetically the doctrines on which rests his religious belief. In the matter of religion it is wise to avoid a discussion which is predestined to clear no issue, but to sow seeds of bitterness. It is with no holy purpose that the unbeliever attacks, for popular consumption, those religious tenets which are accepted by an overwhelming majority of the people. Controversial discussions of metaphysical matters are not suitable diet for the average mentality. And since a man's patriotism may be to him as sensitive a theme as his religion, the wisdom of debating that patriotism, with him or for him, may on the surface appear a course of questionable discretion. Certainly to the individual who has no faith whatever in the underlying principles of democracy, there can be no justifiable motive in seeking to persuade commonplace people that their faith in country rests on

fallacies, for the simple reason that this unbeliever in democracy admits that he sees no value to the political life of the nation in the participation of the common people. His appeal to the reason of the commonplace, then, becomes an indirect admission of the existence of reasoning ability in the commonplace. Moreover, why should he concern himself with an attempt to proselyte the common people to his own oligarchic viewpoint, since acceptance of this viewpoint by them would mean their self-elimination from a voice in the government? Oligarchies are founded and maintained by excluding the majority, not with, but against its consent; whereas to develop a true democracy not only is the consent, but also the coöperation of the majority essential.

That the United States does not support the kind of government the common people believe, is well known doubtless to all but them. But such an assertion need not prove depressing even to the common man, since the really important issue is not whether or no the nation measures up to the majority's ideals, but if the majority wishes to continue to cling to those ideals with the purpose of gradually approaching them more closely. An ideal, after all, is not an accomplishment, but a goal, and usually an unattainable goal. When the nation was established and during its early years of independence, its statesmen gave birth to ideas concerning government that were ideal, and these national ideals still persist among the common people. The ideals were called into being primarily as a goal to be aimed at. They cease to be a goal whenever the nation heads in an opposite direction; and this the nation seems on the verge of doing.

Despite the years that have passed since the writing of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States; despite the newer and more humane viewpoint from which government is being regarded by all too few idealists; the democratic principles set forth in Revolutionary days and under the Federation, may call for expansion, but not revision.

If there is no value to a democracy in the ordinary, everyday individual as an active participant in government, then seemingly there is no value in the whole scheme of democracy. A majority of the people must always be, relatively, commonplace; and therefore in so far as the majority influences government, that influence will be of the commonplace. Certain visionaries stimulate their imaginations by picturing a future in which, through education or scientific breeding, an overwhelming majority of the people will be developed into highly intelligent and reasoning beings; but they have as little authority for their prophetic picture as have those daring historians who attempt to chronicle in minutest detail prehistoric times; and the imaginings of the one group are as unconvincing as those of the other. Of course, education may become so common that the average person of the next decade will be a college graduate. Many a college graduate of today, however, testifies to the fact that book learning has not been able to cure him of mediocrity. Education may give the most ordinary individual a wider acquaintance with certain facts or knowledge, but such acquaintance with facts does not necessarily transfer in the form of wiser discretion in acts of volition. It is by no means

assured that the country would be appreciably better off if every native citizen were compelled hereafter to continue his education to and through college, although it is undeniable that the average amount of education acquired by the common people could be increased by several school years with vast benefit to both individuals and the state.

When considering education as a factor for progress in a democracy, it must not be presumed that through education commonplaceness can be removed. Such individual differences in learning capacity as are at present manifest are apt to maintain approximately their present ratio. If, by magic, three additional years of schooling could be transplanted into every citizen over night, the nation would awake to find itself better off, naturally, but as far as the relative positions of the various groups would be concerned, there would be only a fractional change. Common people of a new type, but just as pronouncedly commonplace, would still compose the majority.

In attempting to find a possible future value of common people in a democracy, the dreamer too often presumes that the ordinary creatures must necessarily be transformed in order that they may become truly valuable. This dreamer supposes, subconsciously doubtless, that the common people must be corrected of their commonplaceness, and therefore the remedy he has in mind is impracticable, since commonplaceness in a majority of the people is eliminable only by destroying the element that is commonplace. When monarchs, centuries ago, declared that "to make society happy it is a requisite that great numbers should be ignorant as well as poor," they offered no

recipe of originality, but merely reëchoed a decree which nature at the very beginning of time promulgated. It does not lie within the power of man to make the average or majority superior and the minority, inferior, either as regards wealth or mentality. Mediocrity predominates in every phase of life, and nature is so arbitrary in having her way that, were it possible to produce a race of women most of whom would, according to accepted present-day standards, be beautiful, nature would trick the eye of man so that he would soon come to see as commonplaceness what is now regarded as beauty, and the homely, because of their rarity, would be accepted as distinctive, uncommon—beautiful.

When royalists subscribed to a scheme whereby a majority of the people would be kept poor and ignorant, they thought solely of strengthening the foundations on which monarchial authority rested. It was not these monarchs, but those whom nature had made poor and left ignorant, who, despite their ignorance and poverty, upset monarchy from its seat. What to royal society seemed fit material only for the rough footstool, in popular government becomes a powerful force that must be reckoned with. When such an irresistible force apes the precedent of despots and disregards the rights of all others, bolshevism blossoms forth under the name of democracy, bringing tyranny on a much more gigantic scale than could ever be staged by a monarchy. Bolshevism has its bearing upon a study of America's future, or, for that matter, upon the future of any country; but the bearing is chiefly one of warning. Russia in chaos represented a disintegration of the body politic.

The favored few had been shoved higher and higher; the majority had been pressed lower and lower. Finally revolt occurred. But a large element of the common people, especially of the better class, had through years of oppression been subdued into passiveness, listlessness. This state enabled the poorest element—intellectually, socially, morally—to gain control of the government.

Class distinction in an empire, such as was developed by the Romanoffs, is even less dangerous than it may prove in a republic where all the people have been trained to believe they are not inferior to any other group or class. If the common people of a republic are willfully antagonized; if they are segregated from above and then imposed upon; the natural reaction will be for the oppressed elements to look with vindictiveness not only upon those above them, but upon those of other wronged elements as well. This attitude is tobe noted in the field of labor today, where radical unionists are even more unfriendly to the brother toiler who will not join their militant command than to their alleged arch-enemy, the capitalist.

This picture of democracy, with the gigantic form of the majority looming up as a powerful monster, able to dominate, capable of dominating with cruelty and injustice, may seem sombre when viewed in certain lights. But illuminate it with the family idea in government, and it stands forth as the masterpiece for which the ages have been searching in their experiments with government. In ideal family government, majorities and minorities are merely different avenues through which expressions may be obtained

in order to make for the best administration as far as the entire unit is concerned. Decisions are reached without friction; frequently without the several individuals taking note where responsibility for the decision, which is sealed unanimously, actually rests. The father receives a call to another city. It means increased remuneration, enlarged opportunities, professional advancement. These are things to be considered, not only for the individual but for the group. On the other hand, there are ties that bind other members of the family to their home town. Friends of the parents, the children's playmates, school connections, perhaps even the old burial ground; each of these points, and countless others, are taken under consideration. In the discussion there may be a minority and a majority; but the decision is for the best interests of the group, and leaves no suggestion of victor and vanquished, but all share in a feeling that they have succeeded in making family government, or domestic democracy, both practical and ideal.

VI. MUTINOUS MINORITIES

It has been asserted that the average American, who complexions the majority of the body politic, believes, despite his occasional sense of irritation at the trend of public affairs, that the United States really represents "a government of the people, by the people and for the people." This belief need only be tested superficially in order that certain of its fallacies may be exposed. But the presence of these fallacies need not prove fatal to the belief, since the belief itself is founded on an ideal rather than an accomplished fact, and if the belief is strong enough it may make the ideal an actuality. And inasmuch as a critical survey has been attempted of the majority, which, for the sake of convenience, may be thought of as the common people, it seems proper to subject to like scrutiny those various minorities which, with increasing vigor, are striving to curtail the constituted authority of the many and to bring to pass, eventually, a government of the people by some one self-selected group of the people for—the devil knows whom!

In certain instances these minorities are composed of the select or uncommon people of the body politic, i.e., individuals who are actually superior intellectually, culturally, or economically to the average man. In most instances, however, unharmonious groups are found composed of persons who possess no native or cultivated trait which distinguishes them from

the common people of the nation, provided a professed disbelief in the present form of government need not itself be accepted as an indication of superiority. Most citizens who pooh-pooh popular government, asserting that the masses cannot be trusted to govern themselves wisely, are in no single respect better than those whom they patronizingly regard as constituting the masses. Therefore, to refer to every professing disbeliever in "a government of the people, by the people and for the people" as of the select, would be to imply that all dissenters to the established rule are necessarily superior in some particular to those who do believe in the principles supposed to underlie the present arrangement.

A happier term for those who profess to have no faith in the self-governing capabilities of the common run of people is mugwump. Although the word mugwump, because of its use during the presidential campaign of 1884, has come to suggest chiefly a bolter from some political party, the term enjoyed considerable vogue in America prior to the Blaine-Cleveland contest, having been employed, usually ironically, as a synonym for "big man." Sometimes the mugwump was truly a big man, but oftener he was a relatively small creature who saw himself through eyes blinded with an exaggerated idea of his own importance. Bearing in mind, then, the earlier use of the word as well as the significance given it in the election of 1884, mugwump may be thought of as a fitting term for the man who because of real or imagined superiority separates himself from the group with which he has been associated. In this sense it is more appropriate than the term pharisee, since the pharisee

has always held himself aloof, whereas the mugwump is converted to aloofness. Any citizen of the United States, whether born in America or naturalized, who dissents from those fundamental principles of government upon which the nation supposedly is established merits suspicion of being, politically, heretic or hypocrit —either his early professions of belief in Americanism were insincere or else he has changed his faith since making them. This point is really important, because it is the mugwump, not the everyday, ordinary American, who is seeking to revise America's political creed, and therefore on him rests the burden of proving not only that democracy is a failure, but that the scheme he proposes is better than democracy. His attitude would be bad enough if he were to say: "Democracy does not seem to work well, so let us try something else." But undemocratically he proposes: "A few of us are not pleased with the present state of things, and so we intend to take over the government and run matters in accord with such views as we may develop."

When considering the various types of American mugwumps, it is well to bear in mind that a large body of people—even the population of one large city—is naturally made up of elements that differ markedly as regards social outlook, economic status, ancestral root, racial extraction, mental calibre, religious training, and vocational activity. Only a visionary will presume that a great body of people differing in so many respects could ever be completely harmonized on all such points; and even if this visionary's dream could come true, there is no certitude that the latter state would be preferable to the former, or that,

once attained, it could hope for permanency. Nevertheless, under the nurturing influence of the American government as developed, heterogeneous elements were gradually becoming reasonably well harmonized in one particular, and this was in their functioning in the body politic. But now the mugwumps start in to undo the work already accomplished, and through antagonism, accidentally or purposely created, seek to set the various elements of the population at cross-purposes.

A youth who has always lived in an environment of luxury cannot be expected to see the same world that is revealed through unwashed windows to the lad who is reared in abject poverty. Life's situations will always hold different sensations, or sensations of varying intensity, for the bright child and the dullard. An industrial worker whose paternal forebears followed a like vocation does not possess the same viewpoint as a college professor of Greek whose father and grandfather before him were also students of ancient languages. The outlook on life is not the same to the indolent daughter of moneyed aristocracy and the toiling female operative in a factory. An effort might be made, say by the teacher, to get the toiler's viewpoint, but there could never be more than an approximation of success, since the teacher would be projecting himself into a situation which to him would be artificial, but natural to the toiler. On the other hand the toiler might attempt to get the teacher's viewpoint, but with at least no greater success.

Now these are truths that may be ignored, but by ignoring they are not destroyed. The differences

among people, due to one or more of many possible causes, cast them into various groups which cannot be successfully compounded for most of life's activities. But in the political relationship of a democracy, elements of different quantities and qualities are expected to be intimately mingled into a unit. No matter how ideal conditions may be in a family group, the various individuals composing that unit cannot escape being so many distinct individuals; moreover, the things that any one member gives and takes from that unit cannot be identical in all respects with what another member contributes and receives. However, all the members of a family and all the elements of the body politic contribute to one common, composite character for the family and for the body politic respectively. Those qualities which predominate in the entire body, give the composite thing its outstanding features. Reference is frequently made to the United States as a melting pot. The country is regarded as a receptacle into which all sorts of immigrant material is being poured, but from which emerge Americans. The only certain transformation, however, that can be demanded of the melting pot is that every product, whether a recent immigrant or the offspring of an immigrant several generations removed, should function coöperatively in the body politic. It would be foolhardy to expect that an entirely new type of individual could be created through the agency of the melting pot, or that every citizen turned out by it should be like in all respects to other citizens turned out at the same time, turned out in years gone by, or to be turned out at some future time. America has no need to concern itself because of the inability of

the melting pot to recast all the material going into it in a common mold. To the nation the big thing is not the inevitable differences that will persist in the people as individuals, but the phases of resemblance that are capable of further development throughout the group. After all, features of resemblance are of prime importance to the body politic; points of individual differences are of less moment. And herein lies the danger to national life in the activities of the mugwumps who would stress as the only things of value to the future of the nation, those qualities wherein a minority of the people differs from a preponderance of the population.

A striking example of the willingness of the mugwumps to play up the thing in which a small minority differs from the majority and use this as sufficient warrant for attacking the fundamental principles of democracy, is found in the program of radical champions of the intelligence tests. Few people will question the validity of the claim that in a miscellaneous assembly of people a wide range in mentality will be represented. Roughly, the population of a city may be regarded as made up of normals, subnormals, and supernormals, or people of average intelligence, people of almost no intelligence, and people of more than average intelligence. Such a broad classification is not precise, since there are hundreds of grades of mentality and these shade into one another like the colors of a rainbow. Among a hundred thousand unselected people, a small number will be found who are unusually brainy and a small number who are brainless. These constitute the two extremes, and in between are the majority who are distinguished

by neither brilliancy nor stupidity. But the instant intelligence is mentioned, the mentality mugwump sees in his mind's eye a curve which he undertakes to read, and he reads it as intelligently as a gypsy fortune-teller reads the lines on a dupe's palm. Educational people seem drifting to a point where, unless they are permitted to graph any and all data, they appear helpless in interpreting them. Every fact must be represented graphically, even though the graph misrepresents the fact. When, therefore, they undertake to picture individual differences in mentality, the graph is the normal curve of distribution:



It is unfortunate that the curve has come to be regarded as so essential to the thinking of educators, psychologists, and others who discuss mental differ-

ences, since it frequently conveys a false impression not only regarding the various grades of intelligence, but also the relations between one grade of intelligence and another. As in the social sphere, so in the field of mentality, variations are much more accurately shown by a diagonal line with bright minds at the top, shading down to average minds, and continuing on to dull minds. With such a representation the men-



tality mugwump would not have been confused into making some of the foolish errors into which the curve has led him, since the curve has been responsible for the spread of a delusion that there is as great a chasm between the bright man and the average man, as between the average man and the idiot. Occasionally a mental defective is so barren of intelligence that he tumbles right off the diagonal line into

oblivion, but history records no case where an individual has been so bright that he could not still be kept on the upper end of the line. Between the one man in a hundred thousand who has the mind of, perhaps, a genius, and some other man who would fall in the very middle of the average-minded, will be found no end of varying grades of mentality. Inasmuch as the average mind is strikingly in the majority, this it is that contributes most to the composite mentality of the body politic.

The proposal of the intelligence mugwumps is that the majority of ordinary minds should step out of the picture of the body politic, retiring with halfwits and imbeciles, while creatures with better than normal minds should be commissioned to do all thinking for the body politic. The doctrine is boldly preached by these mugwumps that every child entering school should be tested for the calibre of his thinking apparatus, and that, (following such testing with instruments of doubtful accuracy,) those who possess supposedly superior minds should be trained for leadership, while the overwhelming majority of normal-minded children should be trained for followership. The proposal goes one step further by demanding that, in training, the future leaders should be segregated from the future followers.

On the surface, the fallacies of this proposal stick out like a handful of sore fingers. Time cannot be taken to rap more than one of these offending digits. By somewhat common consent, the highest type of mind is regarded as that capable of abstract thinking. But neither history nor logic supplies data in support of the conclusion that an abstract thinker is equal

to, much less that he surpasses, the non-abstract thinker as a rational leader of men. These intelligence mugwumps are supposedly profound thinkers, but out of their profound thinking has come the judgment that there is as much difference between exceptional intelligence and normal intelligence, as between normal intelligence and no intelligence. They publicly proclaim—and the conventional curve of intelligence (from which they cannot get away in their thinking) is presented as proof of the claim—this as an established truth. Mathematically it may be as true as the statement that the difference in speed between a train moving sixty miles an hour and another moving thirty miles, is the same as the difference between a train moving thirty miles an hour and another standing still. But as between the sixty-mile intellect (which travels so fast that it cannot see the difference between a thirty-mile mind and a stalled mind) and the thirty-mile intellect, it would appear, just on such evidence alone, that the body politic will ride with greater security if left to the thirties.

The proposal to exclude all but the brilliant minded from the mentality of the body politic may be examined in the light of the mental life of the ideal family group. There are as many grades of mentality in a family as there are members. The family problems, collectively, call for attack not only from different mental standpoints, but for attack concurrently with different forms of mentality. The mother's mental apparatus may be peculiarly adapted for economic household administration; a daughter may have superior social intelligence; one son may have keen business sense; another son may be imaginative; and

the father may possess the sort of mind that is capable of abstract reasoning. Without that spiritual bond that unites these people into a family, each individual would go his own way, handicapped perhaps because of the one-sidedness of his mentality; but as a family unit, each member gives and takes and by the giving and taking the mentality of the unit is decidedly more efficient than could be the mentality of any one member if isolated. Moreover, in the family circle there is no segregation so that one type of mind may be developed away from different types of mind, but rather the mingling of the thinking of various types of minds serves as the best means for developing each individual. Fast thinking, slow thinking, abstract thinking, and all the other kinds of thinking make for a composite form of thinking that proves most efficient for the interests of the group.

There is a measure of similarity between the position occupied by intelligence mugwumps and the self-styled intellectuals who discredit the whole scheme of democracy. These alleged intellectuals deny that the common people—from whom they think themselves distinct—are capable of voicing an intelligent opinion regarding the most elementary matter of government or of voting for capable representatives to act for them. They seek to dismiss all but their kind from the body politic. If the total conceit of which mankind is guilty could be distributed under the various qualities upon which conceit is based, a lion's share of credit would go to intelligence; while beauty, strength, courage, piety, charity, and other virtues, collectively, would get less than half. Age always believes it is wiser than youth, and youth

never agrees; but in both instances it is usually a case of conceit resting on a false foundation. Mothers invariably believe they know everything about the proper method for rearing children, and just as invariably every spinster thinks she knows more about child raising than all the mothers of the universe combined. The same divergence of opinion obtains in every walk of life. Whether it be principal and teacher, preacher and parishioner, lawyer and client, artist and critic, employer and clerk, boss and workman, manager and patron, or you, Gentle Reader, and the writer—the former always assumes that he knows more than the latter, and the latter subscribes to an opposite assumption. It is all vanity erected on an unwarranted belief in one's own superior intelligence.

In a world, then, which is puffed up by beliefs in superlative degrees of intelligence, it is not surprising that some citizens who have a liberal share of such conceit should see their importance to the body politic greatly magnified. These self-styled intellectuals are frequently honest men. They are more honest, probably, then other men who, although just as vain about their mentality, pretend modesty and protest that they have just ordinary minds, hoping always that their protestations will convince others that, in addition to being brainy, they possess the added virtue of modesty. But no amount of honesty on the part of the individual who freely intimates that he has a master mind can offset the danger to democracy of having him seek to usurp such power in the nation's thinking as he feels he is entitled to because of the evaluation he places on his own mind.

The wiseacre occasionally encountered in the family may be its most intellectual member, but his arrogance neutralizes the worth of his mental superiority, and the family group, as a rule, would be both happier and more efficient without him.

In recent years the mugwumpery of self-styled intellectuals has been heavily recruited by a class of individuals who are pleased to regard themselves as iconoclasts. Some of these claiming iconoclasts undoubtedly possess good minds, but more of them merely humor themselves by prattling stereotyped slaps at convention. They assert that the average man is a boob; that virtues are simply vices; that patriotism is ignorance; that faith, hope, and charity are charlatans—all of which would not be disturbing were it not for the fact that these people seriously expect the world to accept their willingness to mouth puerile iconoclastic fragments as evidence of a superior intellect back of the mouth, and to accept them as prophets of a new and better political era. As between the mugwumpery of the intelligence testing theorist and the mugwumpery of self-styled intellectuals and iconoclasts, it is difficult to determine the lesser of the two evils. A real iconoclast can serve a useful purpose in the body politic as long as he remains true to his job and does not aspire to popularity. By the very nature of things, he is not fitted to dominate the composite opinion; at best he is a safety valve to protect the group from excessive credulity. For instance, the iconoclast may succeed, in his somewhat offensive way, in clearing the atmosphere when his country is aroused against another nation. He may ridicule that type of false patriotism which

prompts a citizen to declare his country always right, and through such ridicule may sharpen the judgment of the people so that they will seek to make sure their country is right. As to his imitators, however, the pseudo-iconoclasts, who merely think they see things differently and presume that "differently" means more intelligently—they are usually very commonplace somebodies who are ashamed of their conventionality.

In addition to the mugwumps already enumerated, countless other groups of political dissenters are today active in America trying to tear down faith in the existing form of government. The religious or uplift mugwump has already been considered. He generally chooses one or two phases of personal discipline that cause him no inconvenience, and seeks to use these as his war-cry for forcing the entire nation to follow in his footsteps not so much of righteousness as of political wire-pulling. Then, too, there is a mugwumpery built upon strictly social foundation. In the social life of a cosmopolitan community it is inevitable that lines, based on ancestral root and race, should appear as barriers between certain groups, although it does not follow that people showing a preference for the society of others acknowledging like origin to themselves thereby lay claim to superiority. For instance, Americans of French extraction are apt to prefer to be found associated with sons of France, or sons of sons of France rather than with Swedes and Irishmen. This preference finds its root in the ability of those of French extraction to resort on occasions to French as a medium for conversation; their possession of like French tempera-

ments; their easily aroused affection for things French. These and other factors work toward bringing them intimately together. An American citizen who in this respect is proud of the country that produced his forebears can still be as good a citizen as an American who finds no reason for pride in his ancestral root when traced to a foreign shore. For a man to show enthusiasm for anything bearing the imprint of that other land from which his ancestors originally came, is not a matter to give the nation concern. But a weakness in a supposedly democratic people is revealed by the discreditable record of many Americans—and Englishmen—who during the World War sought for traces of German and Austrian ancestry, and took it for granted that the trace would always lead to a man who should forthwith be persecuted, jailed, and hanged.

Somewhat parallel to the question of an American's interest in the foreign country to which he can trace his ancestral root, is the matter of racial preferences. People of cultural conservatism may object, possibly prejudicially, to having social relations with individuals of a race that traditionally is supposed to go in rather strongly for ostentation and materialism in social matters, as, say, the typical Jew. There are Jews, of course, who can and do move in the most exclusive Gentile social circles and neither Jew nor Gentile is disturbed thereby. But the man who prefers, even though blindly, not to have the Semitic viewpoint injected into his social clique, has the right to exercise his social prerogative without being criticized from any source. In the same manner, the Caucasian who feels that no need exists for him to

have social or even business dealings with the negro, takes a stand that need not be censured. But when these social attitudes are made political attitudes, an entirely different situation is encountered. The negro, for instance, is as much a part of the body politic as the white man, and when a small group of white men band together in the body politic with the purpose of eliminating the negro, the danger against the negro is no greater than against white elements in the body politic.

The negroes' presence in the body politic is a peculiarly sacred responsibility on the shoulders of all the people. Most immigrants came to America willingly and in the hope of bettering their condition. But the negro became an American through no personal choice. His forebears were enslaved and dragged to the colonies so as to enrich early settlers. Parodoxical as it may seem, the bondage of the negro was no small contributor in accomplishing the liberty of the American colonists. Moreover, even those who in 1861–1865 most strenuously opposed emancipation of the black race, recognized the iniquity of the institution of slavery. The freeing of the negro left America no alternative between officially taking him into the body politic by removing discriminations against his race and transporting him back to the land from which he had been stolen. Enfranchising the negro put a difficult problem on the American people, but that problem is not solved by having white pygmies seek, through secret and cowardly organizations, to eliminate the negro from the body politic. The problem of the negro in America's political life becomes most acute when he is forced to see himself

as a resented and resentful race element. These agitators against the negro seek to commit two offenses against democracy, first, by having the white people of the nation ignore the negro's interests in the nation's pool, and, secondly, by forcing the negro to see his interests as antagonistic to rather than sympathetic with the interests of other elements in the population.

Even outside the secret anti-negro organizations will be found a great number of whites who display hostility toward the negro solely because he is gradually lifting himself above the pitiful position in which emancipation left him. This hostility shows itself most pronouncedly when negroes are encountered who have been able to raise themselves to positions of economic independence. But the white people who display this hostility damn the negro, unreasoningly, as being fit only for menial work, whereas their resentment arises chiefly when they behold negroes who have proved themselves capable of rising above menial endeavor.

There is no need to deal further with instances wherein American political tails are found attempting to wag the dog. The several groups of mugwumps already examined are representative. These mugwumps—the wedge-drivers who seek to separate the various elements that compose the body politic so that the whole people will be unable to work as a unit—proceed generally on the same principles, although they approach their tasks from different angles. Their attitudes are based on prejudice and they ignore thought of the general good when seeking, selfishly, the good of isolated groups or, vindictively,

the harm of unoffending elements. If democracy is to strive after an ideal by the pooling of all interests with the family idea always in mind as a criterion, it cannot permit either the preference or the prejudice of one element member to become a national attitude.

VII. DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE

Due to the fact that the franchise is supposed to be universal in a democracy, the common error is made of concluding that wherever all the people have the right to vote, the universal voting right of itself makes a democracy. Thus voting, rather than the results attained by the voting, is regarded as the important thing. If the aftermath of an election in which everybody votes is that the party receiving a majority of the votes directs all public affairs for its own advantage and purposely against the interests of the other party or parties that polled fewer votes, such a government could not be accepted as democratic. That would merely be government by might, and government by might, whether the power exercised is physical or numerical strength, certainly can never be looked upon as democracy. It would be just as logical to say that the self-government of the United States is military because by the militarism of resistance to England self-government was inaugurated. Universal suffrage, then, must not be regarded as constituting democracy but rather as a tool whereby the government may be made truly democratic, although the tool can be used to make a government that boasts universal suffrage utterly undemocratic.

Democracy is an ideal which no nation has attained. A pure democracy would be a government having its supreme authority vested in all the people, and all the people, either directly or through chosen representa-

tives, would coöperatively determine the stand to be taken on matters falling within the province of the government. Under such circumstances the judgment of a majority of the people might prevail, but unless that judgment was reached by considering the interests of all the people, democracy would not be attained even though the means to democracy—universal suffrage—might exist. But history bears record of no nation ever having dared to propose a literal acceptance of that principle of pure democracy which stipulates universal suffrage as a means. Such democratic forms as have sprung into being and have been developed countenanced marked restrictions in granting the right to vote, so that each one of them, in this respect or that, fails to stand forth as a government by *all* the people.

In the earlier ventures with popular forms of government, when the populace would gather in public assemblies and conduct the affairs of the nation, those admitted to such gatherings were, at most, a relatively small part of all the people governed. No one thought then to give adult women a voice in public affairs and, of course, all children were excluded —this in itself meant the elimination of something like three-fourths of those who were to be affected by the decisions of the assembly, presuming for the time that every adult male was admitted to the council. But in these earlier experiments with popular government, great numbers of adult males were denied a voice in public affairs because they did not meet specified qualifications. The excluded groups included those who did not own property, those who were not native born, those who were classed as other

than freemen, and there was discrimination, also, against many others because of the section of the governing territory in which they resided, or else the particular vocation they followed, or else the faith to which they subscribed.

Since a pure democracy would seem to call for political participation by all the people governed, the United States, when it made female suffrage nation-wide, blazed the way for the closest approach history has yet recorded of an endeavor to bring into operation something approximating ideal means for attaining democracy. Nevertheless, the granting of a right to vote even to a majority of the people does not mean that majority will, therefore, function politically, and the individual's failure to function politically can prevent a government from being democratic, as far as the franchise goes, just as surely as if a number equal to these neglectful individuals was denied the right to participate in elections. It is necessary to bear in mind always the difference between a right granted or acknowledged and a right exercised. A right, like a muscle, develops strength through exercise, while constant disuse does more than deny it development, it actually starts deterioration which may eventually destroy the inherent possibility for development. The Englishman's zealousness not to lose a right once established, is not so foolish as sometimes appears on the surface. There is the instance where an English landowner permitted the townspeople to cross his property in passing from one end of the town to the other. This privilege was extended for a period of such duration that it came to be looked upon as an irrevocable right. Then the landowner wished to

erect a building in the middle of that lot. This necessitated diverting the pathway, and the townspeople did not object to this although they insisted on passing through the house, over the old route, once a year as a formal declaration that they had not surrendered their right in the matter. At first blush, this may appear silly; but it reveals the spirit which makes established rights sacred not only to the governed of England, but as well to those who are entrusted with governing.

If the people of a democracy could look with the same zeal upon their right to vote, both they individually and their country governmentally would benefit. A critical study of American political history reveals the fact that the government, even on momentous questions, does not get an expression of opinion from all the people who are entitled to express themselves. A government designed to be democratic can easily have this aspect of democracy defeated through the neglect of those who fail to exercise the right to participate. If all the people at present granted the franchise in the United States should take an active part in political matters, the government, even though it would still fall short of being one by all the people—since a restriction would remain on those of both sexes who have not attained the age of twenty-one—would, in the matter of voting, come as near to the ideal of gaining an expression from all the people as any republican government can safely hope for.

By literal interpretation, a government of all the people would, of course, be one in which there were no restrictions and, according to this interpretation, it is more than doubtful if any nation will ever be fool-

hardy enough to attempt it—impractical enough to extend the suffrage to adolescents and children. Unrestricted participation may be viewed from two distinct standpoints. Seeing the matter in a legal light, there may be readers who, relishing speculation, will wish to picture what the future may bring forth in the matter of giving the ballot not only to all citizens who have reached the age of twenty-one, but also to all offspring of such citizens right down to infants in arms. In such a case parents might be permitted to act for minors, as is done now in legal proceedings. Moreover, in order to make pure democracy ideal, according to strictly legal interpretation, in addition to removing restrictions which, to say the least, appear sensible, some method could be devised for compelling all the enfranchised people to vote. On the other hand, viewed with regard to the family idea as applied to democracy, it appears plausible to erect a democratic government in which participation will literally be universal. If there is a pooling of the interests of all the people, then the national pool will include not only the interests of those who are entitled to the suffrage, but as well the interest of those who are under the age at which the franchise becomes a right, and even of unborn children. The fact that children and even babies would not consciously become members of the pool, would not prevent them from becoming participants in it through representation of those who are watching out for their interests, and such activity by representation would accord with the most precise interpretation of democracy. Looking at the matter in this light, the present threat against democracy in the proposal of those who would reorganize

the entire public educational system for the benefit of the few exceptional children immediately becomes apparent in all its viciousness.

Quibbling over hair-line distinctions between various interpretations of words and phrases is a vice with many writers who undertake to discuss scientific matters, and there is no wish here to fall into like sin. Attention is directed to certain particulars in which the United States falls short of having the means—and the franchise may be looked upon as the means—for an absolutely pure form of democracy. The fact is, that since the founding of the nation progress has actually been made toward a truer form of democratic government in the matter of obtaining an expression of public opinion. Too many Americans, when taking a superficial glance at public affairs, past and present, assume that in the days of Jefferson and Jackson the United States government was more responsive to the wishes of the people than it is at present and that the force of popular government has been steadily circumscribed. Present-day conceptions of the larger part which the common people played in the electorate of past decades, are due to the acceptance of histories written by fictionists rather than by scientific students. In the adolescence of the republic, not only were all children excluded from the suffrage, but all adult females were likewise denied the ballot. Moreover, a considerable element of the adult male population was not enfranchised. As late as the second-quarter of the nineteenth century Jews were not allowed to vote in certain States. Property ownership was for a long time a prerequistie for office-holding and even voting. The adult male negro

was not enfranchised generally until after the Civil War, and there is reason for suspecting that even now in parts of the United States the negro has not succeeded in clearing the way for exercising the suffrage granted him under the constitutional amendment proclaimed in 1870. Moreover, until comparatively recent times rowdyism frequently denied enfranchised citizens the privilege of expressing their views by the ballot, and many early elections were carried by an appeal to the savage principle that might was right in intimidating voters, or else through daring raids on the ballot-boxes after the polls had closed.

Of the present total population of the United States approximately 56 per cent may be put down as of the age of twenty-one and over. Roughly, then, it may be said that before female suffrage became general, not more than 28 per cent of the citizens had the right to vote, even after restrictions had been removed in the matter of property-holding; after political discrimination against the Jews had been discontinued; and after the negro had been enfranchised—assuming that the negro after 1870 was allowed to vote. The returns from the presidential election of 1856, when the United States had a gross population of about twenty-seven millions, show that only 4,053,971 ballots were counted. The total vote, therefore, represented about 14 per cent of the entire population. In 1900, with a population of nearly seventy-eight millions, 13,959,653 ballots were counted, showing a gain in representativeness of the returns to 18½ per cent of the gross population. Although all women who had passed their twenty-first birthday were entitled to vote in the presidential election of 1920, female

suffrage then was still something new and the machinery for elections was so inadequate for taking care of the expanded electorate, that the returns from this campaign cannot be accepted as at all indicative of the extent to which the Nineteenth Amendment will raise, say within another decade, the percentage of the total population that will henceforth participate in elections.

The ideal of democracy is government by all the people; the principle of democracy is government by a majority of the people; but the practice of democracy so far has been government by a minority of the people. In the practice of democracy the presumed dominance of a majority of the voters does not usually obtain even in an election—and, after all, elections must be accepted as one way of determining how far the people are self-governing in the selection of their representatives. First, there is the division of the enfranchised element through the failure of a portion of the citizens (sometimes a surprisingly large percentage), to vote. In the 1856 national campaign, when the country was being stirred by the abolitionists, the 14 per cent of the people who actually cast ballots represented, at most, only a substantial majority of those entitled to vote. It is not an uncommon thing, even in a major election, for 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the electorate to fail to function. This may mean that 60 per cent of the constituted voters will cast ballots. If in a two-candidate election the results are close, this discloses the fact that the successful candidate represents the preference of perhaps not more than one-third of the electorate. But with democracy in practice there comes the other obstacle in the way

of majority judgment when one political party may have two candidates on the ticket for the same office. In thinking of American politics, it is customary to see the body politic divided into two parties of primary importance. There are, of course, minor organizations, such as the socialists, the prohibitionists, the labor element, and organizations that thrive in some particular section; but none of these is of sufficient strength to be regarded as a factor in determining a national election. Either the votes of these minor parties are scattered sparingly throughout the country as tombstones of a forlorn cause, or else they are localized and influential only in a small area. On the whole, the American people do not seem capable of getting away, for any length of time, from a two-party line of political affiliation. Whenever there has been a splitting up of an old party, either the offshoot has grown so strong that the parent organization passed away, or else the offshoot has in due season found itself absorbed by the two older parties.

If the American people supported in all sections of the country three or more permanent, substantial parties, there would be no ground for expecting that any election would represent the judgment of a majority. With but two major parties, the presumption is that there is decision by the majority, but this is far from the case. Factionalism sometimes steps in and divides the power, first, of one party, and then of the other, and occasionally of both parties. In the long ago, Bolingbroke asserted that government by a party "must end always in the government of a faction—and in the oppression of the people." Partial substantiation of this is found in American

history. Turning back to the election of 1856, when Buchanan was chosen president, preferences were recorded by 14 per cent of the total population. Buchanan received 1,838,169 ballots as against 1,341,264 for Fremont and 874,538 for Fillmore. Therefore, the successful candidate had 400,000 ballots fewer than his two opponents combined, and did not represent the choice of anything like a majority of the voters. In so momentous a public matter, then, as the choice of a president at a time when the nation was catching the distant rumble of approaching sectional strife, the man elected was chosen by about 6.8 per cent of the total population of the country. In the election four years later, when Lincoln won his first presidential term, less than 13 per cent of the total population voted; and Lincoln, polling 1,866,352 votes as against 2,800,000 for his three opponents, represented the choice of 5.9 per cent of the total population. More recently, in the Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt campaign—when factionalism disturbed the waters of the Republican party—Wilson was elected by 6,286,214 votes, representing 6.8 per cent of the population. Statistics show that at the time of the Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt election, there lived in the United States nearly twenty-seven million males—just a few hundred less—of voting age. Of these, 17,710,697 were native born white; 2,641,637 were native negroes; and 6,646,817 were foreign born. Of the foreign born, approximately 40 per cent had been naturalized. This made a total possible voting population of twenty-three millions. The full vote cast was fifteen millions. This indicates that 35 per cent of the people who might have voted either did not

or else their ballots were not counted. On the other hand, the candidate elected received only about 27 per cent of the electorate, or fewer ballots than were lost, figuratively, because of failure of citizens to exercise the franchise. These figures are significant in revealing the danger to the American people in having representatives presume that victory in an election gives the victor the right to ignore the interests of the opponent party or parties; first, because majority rule in an arbitrary manner is necessarily dangerous to a democratic people, and, secondly, because the successful candidate does not, except in rare cases, represent the choice of the majority, but rather receives merely a plurality of the ballots actually counted.

In addition to the large proportion of the total population which, although entitled to the franchise, does not vote, and the relatively small percentage of the voting electorate that may name the successful candidate, there are other marked differences between democracy in theory and in practice. The political boss stands forth as one of the supreme obstacles in the way of making the practice of democracy approach an ideal. In every political organization will always be found a group of men who make a business of politics. They are not candidates; they are not patriots; they are not philanthropists; they are merely self-chosen individuals who undertake to run the machinery by which candidates are nominated and elected, by which appointive public offices are filled, and by which legislation is passed. The boss serves a good purpose in politics, perhaps, in oiling and running the machinery of elections; but he also serves an evil purpose in defeating the wishes of the people,

in corrupting the people's representatives, and in seeking to restrict public service to those who, while in office, will feel their first duty to be that of representing the interests of the boss who helped or permitted them to enter public service. All in all, political bossism as today constituted is much more an evil than a good in the community. A nearer approach to democracy would be if the people, independent of bosses, should at least be permitted to nominate the candidates for whom they are subsequently to cast their ballots, so that a candidate, once elected, would see his obligation to the people, not the boss or a political machine. Candidates whom the people would approve do not always win in primary elections, while candidates whom the bosses endorse usually do win the nominations. For this failure of democracy in practice, the people themselves are to be blamed, since they do not turn out in sufficient number to vote in the primaries by which candidates are nominated. But the present scheme of party organization places a serious handicap against those people who do vote when it comes to expressing a preference for a candidate, especially in the campaign for nominations. Moreover, if the boss can avoid it, invariably he prevents the holding of primary elections.

The question which first arises, on considering the political boss, is how he gets the power he exerts in campaigns—and also the money he spends. The largest source of power to the political boss is the army of henchmen he commands. This army is composed of various types of politicians and beneficiaries of politicians. There are, first, the men who serve principally in running the machinery

of elections—the executives of the party in every ward and precinct, and the judges and clerks employed in every voting place. These party executives and paid election officials owe their appointment, as a rule, to some political boss who, by hook or crook, controls such appointments. Connected with the precinct, in addition to executives and judges and clerks, are a lot of lesser henchmen who are hired by the party as runners either at so much *per diem* paid out of money the boss has collected from such candidates as he agrees to support in the election—so-called contributions to campaign expenses—or else hoping to be paid at some future time with some political favor which the boss may have the power to bestow. Any student who turns to a survey of party politics, is appalled by the stupidity of many seemingly intelligent men who will labor for years as party workers in precincts and ward in the hope of being appointed some day to a political position of uncertain tenure and niggardly remuneration. This large army of party men who are active in elections will, usually, follow unquestioningly the instructions or "word" sent out by the boss as to how they themselves shall vote and influence their friends to vote. These men are not political followers in the same sense that a candidate for office may have a personal following; they are chiefly subsidized hirelings. In somewhat the same class are most government employes. These office-holders are frequently men who have been promoted from judges, clerks, and runners, and either owe, or are made to believe they owe, their appointment to clerical positions in the government to the boss. They range all the way from street-cleaners and eleva-

tor men in public buildings to department employes and clerks and also department heads.

On the surface of things, this following of a boss may not appear formidable. But if account be taken of the number of men engaged in the street-cleaning department, on the police force, in the fire department, in public parks and buildings, on construction work for the government, together with their relatives and friends; and if to these be added a precinct executive, a party judge, a party clerk, and a few down-and-outs hired as party runners in each polling place, together with their relatives and friends; and if to these be added those citizens who receive courtesies or favors from such henchmen at the command of the boss, together with their relatives and friends; it will be seen that the boss commands an army of fair proportion.

The professional politician devotes much of his time to doing little kindnesses in the firm belief that a favor cast upon the people comes back periodically in the form of a vote—a vote frequently when votes are most needed. When a public performance is given, even a school commencement, the politician takes possession of as many admission cards as he dares claim without infringing too brazenly on the rights of parents of the graduates, and these cards are distributed where they will do the most good to the politician. Race tracks, public amusement places, theatres and other business enterprises that feel they may require the services of the politician, honor his demand for passes, and he uses these passes in building up a "clientele" of registered voters who will answer his call in an emergency. In cases, this seeking of a

"clientele" has gone so far as for a politician to ask the privilege from the owners of large office buildings to recommend men and women for menial work, such as janitors and charwomen, and the "philanthropy" of the politician becomes a business investment. Only recently a boss of national reputation devoted a large part of two days to placing a Swede, just landed, in a job. His interest in the matter, enlisted by another Swede who had become naturalized, was not allowed to hide under the bushel.

If a boss can send his *word* down the line to three, five, or eight thousand voters in a city where the party affiliation is thirty or forty thousand, he can make a show before the people that deceives them into believing he controls the situation. Moreover, if he has sufficient discretion not to back an absolutely impossible candidate, so that the men he supports are usually successful in the primaries, he increases the people's faith in his potency. The political boss usually knows approximately how many votes he can swing, although he is wise enough not to tell. In any campaign, he starts out with the advantage of these sure votes. The larger the indifference on the part of the public, the greater becomes his advantage in the primary. If he has his way in the primary, then, of course, he is willing to let the people have their way in the general election, since the candidate to be voted on is already bound to the boss. The boss, because of his power to manipulate a primary election, is regarded as a person to be consulted by the aspiring candidate before he announces his candidacy. The boss's permission for the aspirant to run is usually granted if the aspirant is able to offer sufficient

financial aid for carrying on the campaign. It would be equally true, perhaps, to say the permission is sold. Because of the known indifference of the people to vote in primaries, it appears hazardous for an individual who aspires to office to ignore or antagonize the party boss.

If all the people entitled to vote should cast their ballots at every primary and general election, the following of the party boss would cease to be a factor, and indeed the boss himself might soon cease to be nearly so important as he is today. The most vulnerable point for attack on the boss is in the primary or nominating election. Democracy is defeated most signally when candidates are brought forth who do not represent the people's ideals and who will not as a rule represent their interests if elected. If the primary election is to reveal the people's choice, the vote of the boss's army must be neutralized. This could be done, on the one hand, by compelling all who enjoy the franchise to vote at primaries. On the other hand, a somewhat simpler means would be to deny a vote in primary elections to every citizen who is connected directly or indirectly with governmental work or a party's organization, or who receives pay, even *per diem*, for working on behalf of any party or candidate.

That democracy in practice is open to criticism is undeniable; but for its failures neither the principle of democracy nor yet the common people, who must be the foundation of democracy, are to be condemned. The failures that are revealed, are due to defects not in the principles of democracy, but in the practice of politics. For certain failures, the mugwumps are

as much to blame as the common people, since both are equally indifferent to their rights in the franchise and both are equally tolerant of the iniquitous influence exerted by the boss. At some future time, after democracy has been put to a true test by having a close approximation to the 56 per cent of its population which is now enfranchised functioning in elections, it will be proper to determine whether the means to democracy are unalterably bad. And not until the entire people have come to the point of seeing popular government, not as rule by the majority, nor yet as rule for the majority, but as a decision by a majority of the people with all the people in mind, will it be proper to pronounce final judgment upon democracy.

VIII. FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Democracy is generally regarded as connoting participation of all the people in government and the maintenance of a state of affairs which enables every individual to enjoy reasonable freedom. Just what constitutes reasonable freedom is not easily determined, although the popular conception is that a man's acts should be free as long as they do not interfere with the free acts or rights of others. But the very suggestion that one man's conception of freedom may lead him to interfere with the like freedom of others reveals the inadequacy of such a conception. If the individual takes from government the conditions that make for the enjoyment of reasonable freedom, he is drawing on a fund of governmental protection to which he must also contribute; in short, he must help to make it possible for others to enjoy reasonable freedom also. The clearing-house for this fund of protection is the body politic.

It would appear, then, that one of the chief functions to be performed by the body politic is to maintain such conditions in the land as will, within certain bounds, permit each individual to live his own particular life in an atmosphere of freedom, safety, and happiness. In order to provide the means to such an end for so large and heterogeneous a political family as the American people, the body politic should concern itself, when functioning as a national unit, only

with matters of fundamental import to the maintenance and development of a community of interests. If a matter can have no bearing on this community of interests, then seemingly it has no bearing for the body politic. For instance, that a carpenter who, for reasons of his own, does not become affiliated with a carpenters' labor organization, should still be permitted to do such work as he can engage to do, and be protected from interference by other carpenters, is a matter that may rightfully enlist the attention of the body politic, which must look at the thing not as the affair of one individual, but as a principle that affects all individuals who under the democracy have been called upon to pool their respective interests. Since democracy calls upon both union and non-union workers to put their interests in a common pool, it becomes the duty of unionized workers, if they aim to be truly democratic, to protect the interests of non-union workers as well as their own, and *vice versa.*

In like fashion, the question, in the abstract, whether an individual is a theist, a deist, or an atheist, need not be construed as a political one which concerns the body politic. But since citizens of all forms of beliefs and unbeliefs are expected under democracy to pool their interest, out of the community of interests thus created should come equal protection for each to enjoy the privilege of adhering to his particular religious viewpoint, provided the exercise of his religion does not run counter to the interests of others. But it becomes apparent here that an effort by one religious group to make its religious views a political issue with the hope of foisting that view on the nation as a whole, is a violation of the principle under which

democracy calls upon all people to pool all their interests, including their religious interests, in order that a community of interests may be created.

The moment the body politic is put into the false position of seeming to reflect the views of a few or a sect or a clique as if those views were its own, an invitation to become antagonistic is extended to all who do not subscribe to the particular views so reflected. This statement may pick a quarrel with certain professing idealists who take the stand that "everybody who attempts to do anything in a political way seeks to impose his views on the rest. There can be no objection to such an attempt unless the views to be imposed are wrong." Such a position, however, does not square with the requirements of an ideal democracy. When views are *imposed*, there is autocracy, and consequently those who see in government a need for the few to impose their views on the many, are not looking at democracy. An entirely different situation is encountered when individuals or small groups that have definite views which they would like to see become general, submit these views to the people, but depend for their acceptance or rejection upon the free decision of the people. The assertion that it is proper for an individual or a minority to impose its views on the people as long as those views are not wrong, knocks the supports from beneath its own argument by intimating that the views may be wrong. Who is to determine finally whether such views are right or wrong? Unless the answer is, "The people," the discussion cannot be regarded as dealing with democracy. Many theorists who talk democracy but think autocracy, propose a so-called benevolent

government in which the few will be placed in permanent control to direct affairs for all—benevolently. But if these few should be empowered to decide if a thing is generally benevolent or not, it would not be long before a husky form of autocracy would develop under the masquerade of benevolent democracy.

Many a family government has been wrecked because one member, presuming to be directing affairs benevolently, has sought arbitrarily to impose his views on all the rest. A son is commanded to do this or that, and required to obey by the threat to invoke, if necessary, the old principle that might makes right. Reason is not offered the son nor is he permitted to reason. He obeys as far as he dares not to disobey, but his obedience is given always with a feeling that eventually he will break the bonds and then, by mere reaction, his life becomes dead set against all the practices that were imposed on him. In such a matter as church attendance, a son may be commanded to go to church in a way that makes church-going a punishment inflicted unjustly for no wrong he has done. The arbitrary power that carries that boy into church, sours him against the institution, and even against all endeavor to influence people to go to church. The instant he can assert his authority, he damns the church and sees it no more. The view that sent him originally to church may have been good, but the practice of imposing that view on him defeats any good that it may have possessed.

As against such autocratic family administration, account may be taken of another child who dares to ask a parent why he should do this or that, and instead of getting a cuff receives a reason. He need not be

excused from doing this thing or that, but his mind subscribes to the justice of the authority exercised since he himself can offer no good argument against the view that he is asked to make his own. The simple process of giving a reason, and not denying the child permission to offer a counter-reason if he can think of one, becomes a source of strength to the family government, first, in preventing a parent from proposing something for which he cannot offer a good reason, and, secondly, in the healthy effect on the child of coming to understand how reason should operate in determining conduct. In the former case where the conduct of individual members of a family is determined, arbitrarily, by a despot imposing his views on others, the government is a shaky one resting immediately over a volcano; in the second instance the government not only answers all requirements for the time being, but it is so administered as to pave the way for both permanency and fuller growth.

While these illustrations may appear trite, they illuminate one of the major problems touched upon in this study. The imposing of the views of a few upon the many trespasses on the reasonable freedom of the individual. Of that there can be no question if democracy is to be the goal of government. That better views on government and on individual conduct may be originated by the few rather than the people in their entirety seems likely, and because such views are not a common product need not militate against their common adoption. But any attempt to impose those views arbitrarily, is unjust to both the views and the people on whom they are imposed. On the other hand if these same views are presented to and accepted

by the group, straightway they lose the handicap of being regarded as minority or individual views and become common views. Whether the view embodied in the prohibition act is good or bad need not be debated, but the view from which it sprang—voluntary temperance—was unquestionably good. The temperance idea made progress as long as it was submitted as an appeal to each individual's reason. On the other hand, the prohibition idea was imposed on the people, and the harm that the imposing did may not be corrected for generations. Out of the imposing has grown the restoration of drunkenness to that state of respectability which it enjoyed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The enactment of prohibition represents the imposing of a minority's views on a majority by undemocratic and questionable means. This violation of the principles of democracy in so imposing a view was bound to bring about a violent rejection of the view itself.

The ostensible purpose of all government is to give certain benefits to those composing the government. These benefits cannot be created out of nothing, but are manufactured from the things those composing the government give or have taken from them. It might then appear that the larger the benefits from the government, the larger also must be the levy against the individuals. But there is the element of economy that may enter in; economy not only in handling the materials from which benefits are manufactured, but also in the collection of such materials and in the distribution of the benefits. In a despotism the freedom of the governed is circumscribed in order that the liberty of the governing may be unrestricted. It is

a parallel situation to that attendant upon the production of radium, except that radium, once obtained, seems worth the material consumed, whereas despotism does not. In a despotism the restrictions are imposed on the people by those who are exclusively to reap the benefit manufactured; an enormous amount of raw material is consumed, a very small amount of benefit is produced, and this benefit not only goes to a very few, but to those who contributed none of the material from which it is made. The economies of an ideal government should be just the reverse. Out of very little material, in the way of restrictions, large benefit should be produced, and the distribution of this benefit should be widespread. Under democracy such an attainment seems possible, but it is necessary that democracy ever keep its eye on the two items—cost and production. Production may be watched from a central point—the centre of the government from which distribution takes place; but the cost must be watched by all the people who are to determine whether the value received is adequate.

This attitude may appear commercial or mercenary if government is viewed from the individualistic standpoint. Autocracy looks at government through individualistic eyes—those of the autocrat. But democracy is to see political government in the same light as family governments. The freedom of individual members of a family may become so fenced in that the daylight of personal liberty never seems able to break through. But the fencing in is not always wise and noble and democratic. Marriage itself places restrictions upon the liberties of the individuals; however, the marriage state is entered

into voluntarily and these restrictions are looked upon by the individual as something he gives in return for the benefits he gains rather than limitations imposed on him arbitrarily. The bearing of children restricts further the liberties of the members of the family. These restrictions, however, are voluntarily invited for the larger benefits to be derived through the presence of children. But in order that family government may be ideal, it is necessary always to watch the cost and benefit sides of the account. For example, if a child is tired, the parent may carry him and in doing so takes on no personal burden that is not warranted by the benefit to the whole governed body, but if a child is lazy and a parent humors him by carrying him, that parent is taking on an unnecessary personal burden, and in so doing is restricting his own freedom with no benefit to the government, but actually may be hazarding possible harm to the organization in encouraging the child to cultivate laziness.

Family government is good in so far as it develops in each member the sense of responsibility for all and creates an active group concern that each member shall work for a type of living in which every fellow has a chance to live his own life as a conscious member of the group. This means contributing to and sharing in the family's community of interests. The same principle, when applied to the political group, gives democracy. Benefits to the members of society should, therefore, be measured by the question whether the individuals are being developed so as to become members who understand and care, and who also will work to further this type of society.

If it were possible to think of the various mugwump groups that propose changing the form of the present government, so that the few will do all the governing for the many, in the rôle of an over-indulgent parent, their schemes might still be condemned as hazardous although altruistic. To say to a preponderance of the people, "You need concern yourselves no longer with the question of government—we, the select, will carry the whole burden," would be much like a parent saying to the other members of the family, "You can dismiss from your mind your responsibilities and privileges in the family group as a unit, while I, in seclusion, shall work out from time to time a program for your dealings with both the organization and also the various members composing it." This, however, is about the attitude of those who propose benevolent government, and their so-called benevolence is a twin-brother to paternalism. The twin brother is revealed when, for instance, a fanatical reformer such as Dr. Howard A. Kelly asserts in all seriousness that the American people, as a group, are not competent to work out their own moral salvation, and that a self-selected few must therefore undertake, through politics, to legislate morality for them. Revelation of the twin-brother comes again when a hat-passing reformer, such as Wilbur Fisk Crafts, intimates in print, that after he and a few fellow uplifters have compelled Congress to outlaw such types of motion picture as they condemn, then they will decide—for the nation—how often commonplace adults should be permitted to patronize movies, even of an approved standard, in the course of a month. Once more the twin-brother appears when undemocratic and not

particularly brilliant labor agitators asserts that they propose to revise common school textbooks in order that organized labor will be represented to coming generations of citizens as they wish it to be represented—or misrepresented.

One of the primary tasks of the body politic in a democracy when attempting to discharge its obligation to the individuals composing the governed, is to prevent individuals or groups from pursuing their conception of freedom, safety, and happiness at the expense of the freedom, safety and happiness of others. This principle is easily understood when the individuals to be restrained represent attitudes which society commonly accepts as vicious. The same principle obtains, although it is not now nearly so transparently dangerous, when a need arises to restrain groups of the people who are deluded into assuming that they are privileged to map out a course for the whole body politic which, even though it promises to infringe on the reasonable freedom of the people and the happiness of a great many, is justified because to its proponent's way of thinking it seems good. Since it is for the public to decide what is for the public good, either directly or else through the representatives it selects for that very purpose, any element that seeks arrogantly to disregard the rights of the people or to corrupt, although only with intimidation, their representatives, is as dangerous a force to the body politic as vicious individuals who seek to gain their own ends with the use of blackjacks and pistols.

To be truly useful in a government of the people, it is essential that every individual, who as a citizen is a member of the body politic, should learn to distinguish

between those things that belong to his citizenship and those things that belong to him solely as a social animal. There are certain standards of conduct that may be demanded of him by the body politic, and his compliance in such matters conditions his citizenship. Personally he may subscribe to a much higher code of ethics, but this is a matter that concerns him as a social animal and not as a member of the body politic, nor does it concern the body politic which is to be regarded solely as a political force. The morality of a people is as necessarily a composite product as its group intelligence, and the body politic can no more standardize morality than it can mentality. The most, then, that could be accomplished if the counsel of those who would statute morality for American citizens were heeded, would be to pave the way for converting the whole population into a nation of formal moralists—scribes and pharisees, hypocrites!

A fine distinction can be drawn between imposed and voluntarily regarded restrictions. For the public good a restriction may be placed upon the speed with which a vehicle is permitted to travel. An individual may feel that the restriction does not go far enough. If his views were imposed on all the people, this might be interpreted as a trespass upon the reasonable freedom of the individual, but his right to restrict his own speed in accord with his view is actually a form of freedom to himself. This distinction may be illustrated in another way. The economic condition of a family may permit its members to dress in moderately costly clothing. One member of the family, because of very pronounced views, possibly miscalled by him democratic, is adverse to fine gar-

ments. To gratify his mind rather than his feet he prefers cotton socks to silk. That he should insist on wearing cotton hose is a matter of personal freedom; but if he undertook to require the other members of the family, who prefer silk, to wear cotton stockings also, he would be seeking to restrict their freedom. The really significant aspect of such a proposal, which is usually lost sight of by the self-styled democrat, is that the wearing of cotton hose is a source of gratification to him while it would be a form of hardship to the fellow members of that family.

Unrestricted freedom of the individual is promised by anarchism and syndicalism, but in order to realize such freedom it is admitted that all forms of government must be destroyed. Even though the promises of anarchism and syndicalism appeared sincere, no rational man would be willing to buy unrestricted freedom at such a cost. The mere existence of government, then, entails a certain restriction of individual freedom. Therefore, the question to those who believe in law and order is not between restricted and unrestricted freedom, but between wise and unwise restrictions. When restrictions are placed on some people and not on others, government is apt to take on the appearance of being unjust; and in like manner, when certain restrictions are observed by some of the people and not by others, the people are tempted to lose their sense of fairness because of the seeming injustice of such discrimination. Striking evidence of this is found when free speech is denied one group of political radicals, who might profit by airing their views, and permitted to another group, equally radical, because it has the appearance of being more

respectable. In such instances, the very seeming respectability of the privileged group makes its free speech, if dangerous at all, more dangerous than would be the free speech of the unprivileged group. Another case in point is the wilful disregard of traffic regulations and speed laws by those whose business it is to impose these regulations and enforce these laws with others.

In order that a people may develop a true spirit for democracy, it would appear that restrictions should be imposed with caution, but when imposed that they should be uniformly placed and observed. The manner in which restrictions will be observed is dependent primarily on the way in which they are determined and imposed. If they are placed by a few arbitrarily, even though the many may be unable to point out particulars in which they are unwise restrictions, nevertheless they will be received in a mood of resentment. This is plainly indicated by the observance—or lack of observance—of the Volstead Act. On the other hand, if all the people can see governmental restrictions in the light of having been self-imposed, regardless of where or how the idea for such restricting originated, it not only seems easy, but it actually becomes pleasurable to observe them. The surest means for having all the people look upon governmental restrictions as self-imposed is to allow them to be party to the placing of these restrictions. This is part of true democracy.

The question is being raised by the mugwumps as to the common people's ability to be a party to this scheme for working out, coöperatively, a system to bring about law and order. By a process of magnify-

ing a mole-hill to mountain size, the opponents of democracy have sought to reveal an impassable chasm between the common people and themselves, the supposedly uncommon. That the chasm does not seem at all impassable from the common people's side will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters, and its apparent impassability from the other side exists chiefly in the imagination of the mugwumps. Democracy cannot be condemned as a failure, because democracy has not yet actually been attempted for a long enough time and on a sensible enough basis to show its ability to succeed. Perhaps certain elements of the American democracy have failed, but the common people, the majority, have not been the failing element. That the performance of democracy in America may in many respects appear discouraging, is due not so much to the failure of the common people to rise to their responsibility as to elements of presumed superiority seeking, by overestimating their own responsibility, to deny others an opportunity to function.

Resorting once more to the home idea as a criterion: Many a parent complains because his child is unable to go places alone, to buy things when by himself, to shift for himself among other people. But when a boy proposes that he should attend a baseball game or undertake to buy his own shoes or attempt to finance his personal requirements on an allowance, the suggestion is ridiculed with the remark: "Imagine *you* going into a store and selecting your own shoes." The boy is kept helpless because his helplessness flatters his father.

But no democratic government should be run solely to accommodate those who wish to be flattered by the responsibilities they assume.

IX. EDUCATION AND THE COMMONALTY

Preëminently, the present age belongs to Science, and Science welcomes no competitor. Art, Culture, Ethics, Religion even, are assigned muffled second fiddles, but their feeble strains are completely drowned in the jazzed rumble and roar of Science's saxophone. The world apparently is given no choice as to whether or no it will listen, for the blantant notes penetrate everywhere. Some are pleased; some affect pleasure; some are merely driven mad. It is charitable to believe that the effect of the saxophonist's playing on Education is temporary madness, and that in time Education will recover its reason. But today common school education, which should be the foundation of democracy, seems ready to emulate Browning's "Lost Leader":

> Just for a handful of silver he left us,
> Just for a riband to stick in his coat—
> Found the one gift of which fortune bereft us,
> Lost all the others she lets us devote;
> They, with the gold to give, doled him out silver,
> So much was theirs who so little allowed;
> How all our copper had gone for his services!
> Rags—were they purple, his heart had been proud!

Public education in the United States, somewhat contemptuously referred to in its infancy as "the common schools" to distinguish it from elementary

private institutions, was designed to raise the common people a little closer, understandingly, to the upper class. The common schools, attended by common children and taught by common school teachers, have grown to be an educational force which shames, both in development and in performance during development, the record of exclusive private schools. But now in all seriousness the proposal is made that the common schools be converted into an agency, first, for finding aristocrats and, then, for training those aristocrats so that the supposed difference between them and ordinary children will be emphasized or even exaggerated.

When aristocracy begins to color discussions of democracy, it matters little if reference is had to blood or wealth or intellect—it still is an effort to mix oil and water. Moreover, there is ground for suspecting that those who talk intellectual aristocracy, think something that is not conditioned solely nor primarily by mentality. President Cutten in his plea for an American aristocracy of intellectuality, referred to in Chapter One, shows plainly his inability—and he is typical, perhaps, of the average intelligence mugwump —to draw a line between superior mentality on the one hand and on the other hand, superior worldly worth and social position. He commends the South for having disfranchised the negro, as a step toward intellectual aristocracy, but adds that the South did not go far enough; it should have disfranchised the "poor white trash" as well. That so-called poor white trash produced Tillman who, with all his faults, had brains enough to equip a whole hothouse full of Cuttens.

No one interested in the development of public education under a democracy will object to the application of scientific methods to education in order that the best results may be obtained, but what makes results best must be decided by the benefit to democracy and not to science. How far an exceptional mind can be developed, if the whole machinery of the public school system is directed toward the development of exceptional minds, is an interesting scientific problem. But how far, if at all, the development of that exceptional mind will benefit democracy, which is asked to pay for the development, is a much more vital problem, and one that should surely be solved before the public school system is converted into an experimental laboratory for science. This latter problem is one for philosophy, but the scientistic educator arrogantly proclaims: "We may or may not agree to delegate to the educational philosopher the task of determining the ultimate aims of education. By unanimous agreement, the realization of those aims is at present left to the school administrator, the pedagog and the educational psychologist." This is a literal transcription from a paper by Herbert A. Toops and P. M. Symonds in *The Journal of Educational Psychology*, and is a simple way of saying that those who are attempting now to direct the course of public education are not interested in the course or destination so much as in the directing.

Since "We"—these educational scientists—have unanimously agreed that the realization of the ultimate aims of education is in their hands, although they may not know nor care what those ultimate aims are, it is in order to take account of the direction in which

they now strive to head public education. The scientific relish which is reponsible for having made "We's" eyes bigger than their stomachs, figuratively speaking, is put down on Science's bill-of-fare as "IQ." The IQ or intelligence quotient is obtained by dividing a subject's known chronological age into his supposed mental age.* Proof, according to old standards of science, has not been offered as to the absolute accuracy of the various instruments used to ascertain this mental age, although proof sufficient has been adduced as to the unreliability of many of those attempting to use these instruments, accurate or inaccurate. A child of eight who is able to score satisfactorily in the mental tests only up to seven, is given an IQ of seven divided by eight or .88, but the decimal is dropped in expressing the intelligence quotient so that the result is written IQ 88. A subject whose mental age corresponds with his chronological age receives IQ 100. But these experimentalists do not prick up their ears until IQs of the denominations of 115, 120, 130, 140 begin to roll forth. Such are the subjects that must be coddled, regardless of the consequence to the rest of childkind, by the public school system. Therefore, whether as punishment for scoring low or as a program of uneven economy which is to make available a costly experimental laboratory for those scoring high, such education as is to be offered children of around IQ 100 —the common children—is to have most of its cultural qualities extracted and the education of the uncommon

* Mental tests are useful chiefly in gauging abstract intelligence. The relative worth to democracy of this kind of intelligence and the other two forms—social and motor—will be discussed later.

child is to be enriched in its cultural aspect. For the purpose of administering these differentiated diets in education, a scheme of segregation is to be established; at least, this is the claim of timid proponents of the program, although President Cutten goes on record, perhaps indiscreetly, with the boastful statement that by the use of mental testing the public schools even now "are building up a caste system as rigid as in India."

As long as an educational system regards its mission as training individuals to meet life's situations, and leaves to them the application of the training, that system, whether public or private, is a big asset to democracy. But the instant an agency for public education presumes to create and sustain a system of caste, whether rigid or flexible, among a democratic people, it invites as prompt and thorough investigation as would a governmental department suspected of misappropriating funds. Seemingly, then, in education, as in other fields of human endeavor, the American people are threatened with a disintegration that does not promise well for the future. Here as well as elsewhere the need of pooling aims and interests with a view to bringing about a community of aims and interests is overlooked entirely. It is charitable to believe that the refusal to approach the problem in a coöperative spirit is due to the over-enthusiasm of the various groups; it is difficult, however, not to conclude that selfishness plays a larger part than enthusiasm. For example, that unionism should be treated fairly in public school teaching, is a reasonable demand, but the proposal that an alleged, insignificant injustice done to unionism in a few isolated schools

should be answered by larger and very positive injustice by unionism in retaliation, is a plea for the antiquated law which countenanced a wrong for a wrong as if two wrongs made one right. The labor leader who would take possession of public education and use it as an agency for union propaganda; the rabid social reformer who would enter the schools and annex them as a part of his machinery for spreading intolerance; and the intelligence mugwump who admittedly is already converting the common schools into a breeding ground for caste—each of these in his present attitude of mind is to be regarded as a common enemy to the whole people.

By applying the family idea to public education in a democracy, it will be found that the existence of individual differences in mentality need not be denied, nor should a futile attempt be made to eliminate such differences. Recognition of the fact that different grades of mentality are to be found in a family unit is seen in the family group's willingness to afford each member the largest possible opportunity to develop his mind to its fullest capacity. No arbitrary demand is made that these various developments should keep pace with one another nor follow the same course. Nevertheless, through the family spirit these various paces are harmonized by regarding each as a part of the family's pace. Every member of the family, no matter what his individual capacity is or what direction his training may take, sees his education from the standpoint of both individual and group, and because he sees it as part of the group performance he certainly is stimulated more than if he could conceive of

his educational attainment as a matter of total indifference to the group.

Turning from family government to political government, it is interesting, in a sorrowful way, to find two pretending Moseses seeking to lead the people out of an imaginative wilderness of varigated mentality. Each Moses displays perfect self-assurance when preaching his particular doctrine: One demands a sort of educational homeopathy while the other is an advocate of allopathic treatment. In medicine, the homeopathist, when traditionally correct, employs drugs that would produce on a well person the same symptoms that are found in the patient to be prescribed for. The allopathist reverses this principle. It should be mentioned, parenthetically, that both of the ambitious educational theorists mentioned look upon mental mediocrity as a national ailment. The homeopathically inclined theorist concludes that if a child of above ordinary mentality is subjected to restricted educational opportunities, he will in all likelihood develop the same symptoms that are noted in the mentally mediocre—i.e.: ignorance. Therefore, the educational homeopathist proposes to cure—or kill—mental mediocrity by depriving it of liberal educational opportunities. The allopathic experimentalist, on the other hand—in conformity with allopathic faith in large doses of medicine—would prescribe enormous doses of education to the mentally ordinary, presuming that if the dose is large enough and the drug violent enough, then mediocrity will be cured. Homeopathically, mental mediocrity is regarded as chronic; allopathically it is looked upon as acute and curable.

First, as to educational homeopathy: A group of mugwumps, small in number but steadily increasing, do not approve of offering the same quality or form of education to children of ordinary intelligence as they hope to make available for children who grade as mentally superior. If this were the proposal of private individuals for application by private institutions, the affair would not be public business; but the suggestion is endorsed by more than a few public school officials for the public school system. These mugwumps take the stand that the individual of average or ordinary intelligence can absorb just so much education. He has a "half-pint" mind, and a half-pint of coarse learning, carefully selected on utilitarian grounds, should be poured into that small cranium. They contend that it is not only wasteful of public money, but harmful to the child himself to pour a full pint of education into his head and have half of it spilled. Since the educability of this ordinary child is supposed to be limited, it is argued that only the more elementary forms of education should be offered him, and that he should be discouraged, if not actually forbidden, from following the diet that may be prescribed for those whom these mugwumps may label as uncommon children. In order that this ordinary child may be fed his coarse education, and given ample time to masticate it thoroughly, the educational homeopathist would segregate him from bright children; stamp him in school, at home, and in his own consciousness as mentally mediocre; and in general train and treat him as an unbeloved step-child. At the same time, this theorist would select the exceptional child and, at the public expense as well as to

the disadvantage of common children, provide him with special teachers and feed him selected educational diet as quickly as he can bolt it.

This is not the place for discussing profound educational principles. The experimentalist under consideration ignores any and all educational principles that may stand in the pathway of him and his hobby. It is permissible, however, in passing to observe that a reasonably sound principle in education is that the study which comes hard to a child may demand extra time while the study which comes easily may be allotted less time, provided both studies are equally fundamental. This principle is against the practice of permitting a child to elect to pursue only those studies which he can master easily and to slight any study which places a tax on him. There is a certain analogical bearing of this principle upon the proposal of the homeopathists. Some children learn easily; others learn slowly; a few cannot learn at all. The child who cannot learn at all calls for special attention. He is mentally defective, and society is acting wisely when it takes him in hand at the earliest possible moment. The public school has no business placing in general classes a child who cannot learn at all, even though the educational system, through special classes or institutions, may properly be asked to administer the work to be done among such unfortunates. On the other hand the child who is so phenomenally bright that he may prove as disturbing a factor in the classroom of ordinary children as the half-wit, may not really belong in the public schools, but in a museum. From a truly democratic standpoint, the public schools are for the whole people. If the whole

people are predominantly common, then the public schools are predominantly for common children. They should be administered with thought to the largest efficiency, and the largest efficiency is in giving ninety-nine common children a fair education and perhaps showing the one exceptional child no special consideration, rather than in showing one exceptional child every consideration by giving the ninety-and-nine less than a fair education. The proposal is not that the exceptional child should be made to feel unwelcome, but that in order to accommodate him he cannot be given preference over all the ordinary children.

That any public school system should be so organized as to concern itself chiefly with finding and coddling bright children, would be as bad a practice on the part of the educational system as for a teacher to ascertain which are the easy subjects for a pupil to learn and then excuse him from all others. Plainly stated, the proposition of the homeopathic theorist is this: "Let us pick out the bright children in the student body, give all our serious effort to them, and public education will make a wonderful record." Yes—with bright children! This profound asininity actually originated with those interested in higher education. College administrators have lately been making the wonderful promise that if the common schools, by process of gradual elimination, can get rid of all but the very brightest children before students are permitted to graduate from the secondary schools, then the colleges will turn out nothing but exceptional scholars. Even if public education were tempted to accept this invitation to become a weeding

school for colleges, it could receive no guarantee that bright children, by being segregated and taught intensively, would of a certainty be a credit to themselves, their training schools, or the nation. Ten years ago the world was fed, in newspaper, magazine, and books, with glowing accounts of an exceptionally bright lad who went through school like a streak of greased lightning. Much has not been heard of that lad since his education was completed. Perhaps a supplementary history of this mental wizard would cast very serious doubts upon the wisdom of parents and tutors denying even a precocious individual an opportunity to be a child during the time nature allotted for childhood.

But the proposal to restrict the educational opportunities of the average and to expand the opportunities of the exceptional, must be considered from the standpoint of democracy rather than from that of the proposition's conformity to established educational principles. Educational homeopathy is firmly wedded to the belief that the average child can absorb only a limited amount of schooling, and because his capacity for absorbing is limited (this hypothesis is seriously asserted as a fact by the group in question) therefore the studies provided for that average child must be circumscribed. The proposal is to train him to be the most useful citizen possible, but the question of his usefulness is being studied not from his viewpoint, nor yet the viewpoint of democracy, but with regard to assumed prior rights of exceptionally bright children. Thus is to be fulfilled the prophecy that to those who have, more shall be given, while from those who have not shall be taken away even that which

they have. Perhaps education cannot work marked change in the intelligence of the mentally mediocre, but if the development of man as revealed by unwritten and recorded history stands for aught, it appears a better gamble to teach the mediocre child a little more than he needs be taught rather than a little less; since it is more likely that by such a course the mediocre child of the future will hold his present ratio to the exceptional child, whereas by restricting the educational opportunities of the ordinary and expanding the opportunities of the extraordinary, time will be encouraged to increase the gulf between these two. That may be a desirable end for an intellectual aristocracy, but not for a democracy.

Opposing the educational homeopathists, is the other group that has unlimited faith in the miracles to be wrought by education. These visionaries would compel the child of limited learning capacity to submit to reckless mental over-feeding. They believe that by their program the utopian end will be attained of eliminating mental commonplaceness. They are a counterpart to those medical men who, undertaking health work in the schools, as a reward for political activity, see this work solely as an aim to standardize the physical characteristics of all students. A child of a given age and height, they hold, should balance the scales precisely at a prescribed figure. If he does not, he is either underweight and should be fed up to the prescribed point or he is overweight and should be reduced. The educational allopathists think of education as a means for standardizing the mentality of all children. Their view is that through education the commonplace child will be stripped of his medioc-

rity and made exceptional. They will aver that, if all the children are sufficiently educated, all people will become intelligent, reasoning creatures, and then the body politic will reach an ideal state. But education is not a magic wand that will change mental paupers into intellectual princes. Doubtless, it is a good thing that education cannot do this. Education will not necessarily make the subject educated a reasoning being, nor does schooling promise to convert commonplace minds into exceptional ones. Indeed, there are some individuals, doubtless, to whom a large dose of education may be as hazardous as a very small dose or no dose at all. Such individuals are decidedly in the minority. But what changes education may work in the normal creature must always remain partly in doubt, and it is for the individual to determine in large measure what kind of education he will take; he must trust to his own capabilities regarding the extent to which this education is assimilated.

If those who seemingly are mentally mediocre are desirous of attempting the flights of the intellectually exceptional, and if they are willing to bear the ordeal, it should be their privilege in a democracy for them to get the kind of education they crave and then it is up to them individually to make the best of that education. Social agencies have had a tendency in late years to instill in the minds of some people a sense of prior rights because they have been exceptionally favored. The high power automobile—thinking of it as a personality reflecting the souls of its occupants, (if they have souls!)—always presumes that it has special privileges. To the eight-cylinder it appears an infringement of its peculiar prerogatives

for a four-cylinder to attempt a steep grade if there is the least chance that in the ascent the weaker car will be overtaken by the more powerful machine and delay it. It never occurs to eight-cylinders that God didn't make the hills for them any more than for the four-cylinders and pedestrians; and it is more than merely possible that the fours, despite the strain, get larger joy out of the ascent than does the powerful machine to which the climb is easy and the scenery a blur. If the weak outfit is capable, by straining every ounce of power, to reach what to it is the dizzy heights, who can say that it has not served its owner and its maker equally as well as the outfit of exceptional power?

In passing, it is well to note that if creatures had always been segregated according to their mentality, and those gauging low had been denied the opportunity to pursue any course in education except what would prepare them for commonplace life, many an individual who has made every atom of grey matter count in his life and who stands forth as a creature who scored remarkable progress in view of his native limitations, would have been held to the drab valley of education. Under such a program, not a few educational theorists who seek today to royalize mentality, might have been unfortunate enough in their youth to have seen written across the college gate:

VERBOTEN TO THE COMMONPLACE—THIS MEANS YOU

If the success of democracy depends upon the willingness of the people to pool their interests in

order that a community of interests may be created, then education a thousand times more than the ballot seems a promising means to that end. Education means something radically more important to a democracy then to any other form of government. Those who condemn the American government because so large a part of the people who are allowed to vote are ignorant, offer no sound argument against democracy but rather are making a negative plea for more education. Education cannot eliminate mental mediocrity, but it can erase illiteracy and decrease stupidity and soften prejudice and enlighten any intelligence that the individual is fortunate enough to possess—in short, it can go far toward correcting political mediocrity. In the body politic, mental mediocrity serves as an excellent ballast for mental superiority. A nation of geniuses would be just a little worse people to live with than a nation of morons. Moreover, if the hope of democracy lies in intelligent direction or leadership, success in gaining this is more largely dependent upon having all the people educated up to the point where they will be able both to locate and appreciate men who, because of superior intelligence, promise to direct wisely than by having a majority of the people educated down to the point where they naturally will feel resentment toward those who were given preferred educational opportunities. Moreover, in the former event, if by chance the judgment of an educated common people should not always square with the judgment of the uncommon people, and instead of an intellectual aspirant being chosen as leader the voters turn to one of the common group, it will be decidedly better for democracy if that

commnplace leader has had the maximum rather than the minimum amount of education.

There is no wish here to lay down the law that all children should have the same school subjects, should spend the same length of time on each subject, and should receive the same amount of education measured by days. The educational problem confronting the United States will be disposed of by no such simple solution. At the same time, such a suggestion would be no more arbitrary, while it would be more democratic and humane, than the program which seeks to locate those who supposedly possess abstract intelligence of a superior degree and accept them as the only element in the population that is worth developing intellectually. Abstract intelligence is but one type of mentality. It stands out preëminently in educational discussions, not so much because it is intrinsically preëminent as because those who have undertaken the measurement of intelligence have, as a matter of course, been the creatures of abstract intelligence and, unfortunately, overwhelmingly undemocratic and egotistical.

The bricklayer who can build a wall that is plumb and firm and waterproof is using intelligence just as well as the student who seeks to determine "the correlations of achievement in school subjects with intelligence tests and teachers' estimates." Certainly the two men possess different types of intelligence, but then they work with different materials. The student in the library may grow cocky at the thought that he is attacking problems out of which the bricklayer outside could not make heads or tails; but he forgets that the bricklayer outside—with his superior motor

intelligence—is solving an equally important problem in building a house around that student so that he can, under agreeable conditions, exercise his abstract intelligence. The whole scheme for public education in a democracy may be tested by what would be the ideal in family government. The abstract thinker nicely walled in by the bricklayer, who possesses little abstract intelligence, may have in his home circle a mother who is not too proud to cook a meal or darn a sock. Her intelligence may be chiefly motor or social, but in the family group or even when alone with her son, he does not insist, therefore, that she should restrict her thinking to household work. Rather he cordially demands that she must try to see something of his problems in the field of abstract thinking, and she, just as cordially, insists that he try to understand the problems that she attacks with her social or motor intelligence. Meekly these various types of intelligence seek stimulation from entirely different forms of mentality, and combined they make for that mutual understanding out of which grows the community of interests which is no less essential to the ideal democracy than to the ideal family government.

X. COMMONPLACE ATTITUDES

A score of formidable obstacles stands in the way of the student who undertakes to interpret fairly the attitudes toward life of common people. Possibly through wise choice, but more likely because of fool luck, he shuts his eyes to these obstacles. Shutting the eyes does not, of course, dissolve the obstacles, but it does conserve for the student at least a remnant of faith in the reliability of his ultimate findings. Were he, on the other hand, to take account of all the variables which can raise a doubt as to the accuracy of any conclusion he may reach, he would at the very offset be tempted to give up in despair his task of interpretation. An investigator who is not commonplace—and the fact that he is attracted to so serious a job as finding the meanings of life to other people may be accepted as indication of a fair amount of abstract intelligence—when he starts out to see life supposedly through the eyes of those who are commonplace, is at best headed for speculation. His speculations may be worth much or little, but they are always to be considered in the light of that rather pessimistic axiom that, "One man's guess is as good as another's."

A seemingly commonplace man is not necessarily commonplace in all things any more than an exceptional man is unusual in everything. Without any pretense at absolute accuracy, it may be stated

that exceptional people as a rule are unusual in a few respects whereas common people are generally commonplace in most, if not all phases of existence. There are, however, a number of bonds capable of connecting an exceptional man with commonplaceness, and a scrutiny into the lives of even the most exceptional individuals will invariably disclose certain particulars in which they are linked, even though lightly, to commonplace aspects of life. The critical student of men is at first surprised to find presumably great men revealing traits that supposedly belong only to the rabble. In course of time, however, he accepts such disclosures as a matter of fact and is not disturbed thereafter to discover an aesthete with the odor of garlic on his breath or a professing positivist who carries a rabbit's hindfoot for good luck. Profound creatures who pretend to spend most of their waking moments in the ethereal, if watched closely enough will be caught frequently taking mud baths in vapid pools of commonplaceness—and enjoying the thing.

The mentality of an individual is only one factor that may place him with either the mediocre or the uncommon people. His attitudes toward the world, the flesh, and the devil are another factor. If the intellectuals were truthful with themselves and others, they would confess that the most irritating thorn in their flesh is the attitude of the common people toward life in its various phases. Ask such intellectuals of the present day to name any one attitude in particular that may be accepted as a reliable criterion for revealing whether or no a given subject is bound hand and foot to the commonplace, and the most

frequent answer would be that the ability to enjoy hugely such motion pictures as are usually thrown on the screen will serve as an accurate test. To these intellectuals, people who cannot tolerate the "movies" register an attitude of critical discernment of varying degrees, whereas the man who can enjoy the movies hugely reveals a total lack of discriminatory power—he is simply a hopeless numskull. Corral an average audience from any motion picture theatre, these intellectuals will assert, and a group will be found ranging intellectually from ordinary to mentally deficient, but not above mediocre in any case—a group that is incapable of looking at life except through the blurred eyes of convention and make-believe.

Nevertheless, if the average intellectual should attempt this experiment in a certain city, the chances are that in the corralled audience he would find a world-renowned physicist—a man whose intercourse is almost entirely with scientific men and who himself has labored over the Einstein theory until he uncovered its apparent flaws. Not for relaxation, but for sheer enjoyment this physicist frequents the movies and no scenario is so puerile that he cannot find it absorbingly entertaining, while the audiences disturb him no more than if he were in a group of college men; not even when spectators begin to applaud a "silent" actor. This ability of the physicist to enjoy silly picture plays hugely would seem to put him definitely in the class of *hoi polloi*, but most of his attitudes are fit for a super-intellectual.

Turn from this physicist to a learned jurist who, from the bench, has rendered decisions which reveal not only profound legal logic, but show a remarkable

grasp of the problems of society in its most complicated relations, and this jurist can be seen joining the mob at a baseball game where he is second to no fan in allowing enthusiasm and emotion to have free play, and where he becomes pronouncedly commonplace even to the point of noisily crunching peanuts during the game. A writer of philosophical works, who is recognized chiefly for his diligent search after truth and his faithful adherence to moderation in expression, delights his idle hours with the sort of trashy detective stories that are supposedly designed for adolescents and youths; and in his enjoyment of this type of reading he can become as completely lost to the surrounding world as any messenger boy or elevator operator reading the same rubbish. Finally, a college woman who is engaged in training females for professional careers and who might be regarded, even by other college women, as a "bad dresser," is actually as "crazy" about wearing apparel, whether it is a new hat or a bit of lingerie she has just acquired, as the most frivolous shop girl who would pawn her Bible—if she had one—to buy another rhinestone.

Intellectuals who see no good in the common people or democracy would, off-hand, write down the enthusiastic patron of insipid movies as unconditionally commonplace; they would aver that any reader who finds enjoyment in bizarre and badly written detective stories can possess little if any reasoning ability; they would label all adult maniacal baseball fans as creatures of arrested adolescence; and they would insist that any woman who can think clothes until wearing apparel becomes to her a sort of religion has less intelligence than the average female household help.

The purpose here is less to discredit the intellectuals than to reveal to the serious-minded student the questionableness of his findings when he seeks to see life from the viewpoint of commonplace man and yet fails to take account of the fact that many attitudes which he may regard as positive earmarks of commonplaceness are to be found among those who are accepted as decidedly exceptional people.

Such attempts as are made to interpret the attitudes of commonplace people to life are invariably undertaken by those who themselves are not commonplace, or at least not in those attitudes to which they devote their attention. The attitudes wherein they would show up ordinary either are overlooked entirely or else do not appeal to them as requiring consideration. Another serious obstacle in the way of their investigation is that they seek to understand how the mountains appear from the valley, but themselves remain upon the mountain top. They flatter themselves that a fertile imagination enables them to project themselves into the valley, but forget that the projected creature in the valley is merely a bad reflection of the individual remaining on the heights. The learned investigator beholds an infant and straightway attempts to understand what is in the infant's mind, although he has no right to assume that anything is there in the form of mental activity. His is a parallel position to that of a radio fanatic who, employing an agency that the world has known but a very few years, shoots his waves toward Mars and awaits a waved reply. He loftily supposes that Mars is inhabited; that its inhabitants have gone through identical stages of evolution with those on Earth; that scientific labors have

advanced in Mars exactly as far as science has progressed in this world—so that the Martians are waiting with their radio receivers against their ears to catch the message of electric currents generated from Earth. In like fashion, the "radiant" psychologist, wishing to work out a plausible explanation of the child's earliest progress to knowledge, attempts with his master mind to comprehend what is the child's attitude toward the child's world. He may write cleverly, but makes no true contribution to knowledge when he bursts forth with:

> Who can tell what a baby thinks?
> Who can follow the gossamer links
> By which the manikin feels his way
> Out from the shore of the great unknown,
> Blind, and wailing, and alone,
> Into the light of day?

This is not looking at things from the new-born infant's viewpoint—if he has one—but from an imaginary viewpoint of a man who, handicapped for his job as he is with a vast store of experiences, tries to project himself into the position of something that has had no experiences. The "radiant" psychologist finds the infant "feeling his way blind, and wailing, and alone, into the light of day." The would-be interpreter of infant life cannot get away from the supposition that the child at the very offset is conscious of its lack of certain things. Such a supposition is worse than speculation—it is forgery. Even congenital blindness can mean nothing to the newborn infant; therefore mental blindness must mean a little less than nothing. Wailing does not disturb the child in the same way that it does adults or the child

would wail less; and being alone has no meaning to the newborn until he has learned what it is not to be alone. There is no wish here to make sport of those entertaining, imaginative writers who journey into the field of child psychology; the purpose is simply to call attention to the futility in many cases of the student's attempt even to approximate an understanding of the attitudes of others by projecting himself, with his radically different personality, into what he merely supposes must be the position from which these others look out on the world.

Despite the mass of information that psychology and sociology have placed at the disposal of the student, he cannot with it free himself of a most serious agency of interference when he attempts to look out on the world through the eyes of another. The less that student is like the other individuals, the greater is apt to be the interference he encounters when seeking to comprehend their viewpoint. A conscientious investigator has gone as far as to hire out as an industrial worker so as to get the workers' viewpoint. Two facts of fundamental importance must, however, discount the impressions the investigator gets, even when pursuing his study so intensively. First, he is doing the industrial work not to get a livelihood, but to gain information to be employed by him subsequently in another task which he naturally regards as of much greater moment. Work to him, therefore, is as radically different from what it is to the toiler beside him as day is from night. With the investigator, the actual doing is incidental and preliminary to something else; to the common worker the day's toil is just one link like a thousand other links in a

chain that has been carrying him through life. Again, what can the investigator, with a hundred possibilities for more remunerative employment elsewhere, know of the emotions of the man with no such possibilities by whose side he is working experimentally? Thoughts go through the *bona fide* worker's head that he may not record consciously or which may be too personal for him to dress in words for his own mind, much less to speak to others. Now it may be a dread that employment will cease or that he may be incapacitated; next it may be vague complaint that so much labor brings so few comforts; again, it may be happy anticipation of an evening to be dedicated by a commonplace man to his commonplace enjoyment of a pipe and newspaper.

There are seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the way of the investigator—thinking of him as a man primarily of abstract intelligence—who seeks to understand the attitude of the common man toward commonplace life, even when that intellectual goes into the work world, rubs elbows with the toiler, engages in like endeavor with him, becomes as far as possible one of his group. And yet this investigator may have been a boy with commonplace boys and during his elementary schooling may have been thrown with commonplace children. Under the recent proposal to locate and grab all such intellectuals early in life; to segregate them from commonplace children by raising between them barriers of caste based on mentality, will the intellectual be brought to a position where he will be able to understand commonplace attitudes better, or is such an understanding of no importance to democracy?

Today the intellectuals gaze on Millet's "The Man with the Hoe" and conclude that the heavy-browed toiler represents the depth of listlessness to which commonplace man sinks because of drudgery—and to the rising school of intellectuals common man is fitted only for drudgery. But Millet's portrayal, after all, may not represent the drudge; it may be merely a master's conception of a type of individual whom he misunderstood more than he understood him. If for a few days the actual man with the hoe could employ the skill of a Millet, he might show a light on the face of the toiler that the artist did not see there. To the artist, looking on his subject from without, the light was not visible; but the drudge, looking out on the world from behind that sullen mask, may see much more in life and even in his drudgery than is revealed by a countenance not trained to give expression to the man's underlying feelings any more than is his tongue. The world's faith in the authenticity of Millet's portrayal is strengthened by knowledge of the fact that the artist was at one time a peasant and had toiled with crude implements in the stubborn fields. Because of this it is presumed that Millet must surely have understood thoroughly the lot of common man. But Millet, a peasant drudge with the soul of a poet, pausing in his endless grind of tilling the land, hardly had the same feelings as the common man with the soul of a common man and not given over to dreams. To Millet the task was menial, degrading; he aspired to greater things; and because his early path had been hard rather than pleasant, he doubtless rose to greater heights than if he had been discovered by genius-hunting educators of

his day. But the ungifted man with the hoe may find his task agreeable, satisfying, even though his heavy features do not reveal this to others. Even though his smaller mentality may not allow him actually to become conscious of the fact in a precise way, he may still find a certain glory in seeing how the soil finally bows to his superior force and brings forth fruit instead of weeds. In short, Millet's "The Man with the Hoe" is an imaginative creature who feels depressed by the shackles which labor imposed on him, whereas the true man with the hoe, ungifted and not bothering about what being gifted means, may never take account of his lot in life in this way. He complains, of course, because of his labor; but the intellectuals, who drudge not in the same fashion, also complain about their particular tasks.

Millet's work is not being criticized from the standpoint of art, but solely because of the impression it gives as to the attitude toward the world of the subject portrayed, and in this case the world is the world of manual labor. Rodin's famous sculptured representation of the "Thinker" is another case in point. Intellectuals accept this as depicting the labor with which early man struggled out from the bondage of primitive ignorance into the enlightenment of civilization. The intellectual, gazing on this study of a man wrestling with all his physical force while engaged in the act of meditating, does not find it difficult to see in Rodin's "Thinker" a true likeness of present-day common man when he undertakes to see the light, when he attempts to comprehend those "awful intricacies of life" which confront him. But what warrant has the intellectual, or Rodin—

to whom thinking meant no such toil—for presuming that common man, tackling his problems equally subconsciously, experiences greater difficulties than the more intelligent thinker? Rodin relied on his imagination to picture how an inferior man travails with mental operations, whereas truth shows travail on the part of neither the intellectual nor the common man when attacking problems of the size to which they respectively address themselves.

Modern man has no reason for presuming that his prehistoric forebears, tied down with what today seems a load of primeval ignorance, suffered great mental discomfort, much less physical discomfort, when thinking. And if the more intellectual of primal men, who surely were far behind the most ignorant modern man outside the ranks of actual subnormals, found thinking no burden to them, why must it be presumed that all who today cannot qualify as intellectuals find thinking so difficult that the thing is unsafe if not actually impossible to them? "The Man with the Hoe" and the "Thinker" as art are superb; but as historical or psychological interpretations they are purely speculations. The thinking of thoughtful men is not an unpleasant task. It is not a job calling for wrinkled brows except when the thinker supposes he is being watched by less intelligent people and wishes to pose. Much of the wisdom that has been brought to the world has been worked out under pleasurable conditions. Newton, the profound scholar, did not assume the attitude of the "Thinker" when he discovered the law of gravity; but he was reclining on the grass, resting as elemental man before him had been wont to loaf, and possibly was even

contemplating the excellent apple tarts that were to be concocted from the ripening fruit over his head when nature literally cast at him a hint as to the law of gravity. Franklin, the philosophical printer, was not wrapped in any "Thinker" pose when the suggestion of electricity was first revealed to him, but nature apparently had been fairly burning with impatience to have the world know the fact that she communicated to the kite-flying scholar.

The problems the intellectuals work out are not difficult, except perhaps when they seek to put into logical form some of the fallacies they hope to pan off on the world. The knowledge which common man acquires can come to him with no more difficulty than was experienced when great truths were conveyed to Newton and Franklin. It may be admitted that some dull children learn with difficulty, but this difficulty of their learning is due frequently as much to inferior teaching and badly selected subject matter as to inferior mentality on the part of the learner. Nevertheless, the student who seeks to project himself into the position of less thoughful men, is forever speculating upon the difficulty with which thinking and learning comes to these less intelligent beings. Always with the endeavor at projection, comes a tendency to exaggerate. Even Thomas Gray, who was ambitious to write "the short and simple annals of the poor," could see merely what would have been his own attitude toward life had he been poor and destined to remain unknown. He gazes upon the burial place of common man and complains:

> Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid
> Some heart once pregnant with celestial fire;

> Hands that the rod of empire might have swayed
> Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre:
> Some village Hampden, that with dauntless breast
> The little tyrant of his fields withstood;
> Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest,
> Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood.

The mute inglorious Miltons and guiltless Cromwells are freaks of imagination. True, many a deluded man supposes that he is a genius and complains to himself because an indifferent world affords him no opportunity to reveal his worth. But in a majority of such cases, if not all of them, the individual flatters himself into supposing that he has genius, and gets more pleasure out of dwelling upon the injustice of the world to him in failing to recognize his worth than he could possibly get if he had as much talent as he suspects he possesses and exercised it successfully.

This discussion will have served its purpose if it does no more than raise in the American's mind an appreciation of the enormous difficulties to be encountered by intellectuals when they seek to comprehend common man's attitudes adequately even though they have the coöperation of common man himself, and to emphasize the futility of an attempt to interpret these attitudes fairly when the would-be interpreter holds himself aloof. And yet there must be at least an approach to comprehension of one another's attitudes in order to bring about a mutual understanding. Since mutual understanding is essential to true democracy, it becomes the task of a people striving after democracy to seek diligently to understand one another—not only for the uncommon to understand the common, but also for the common to understand

the uncommon. Just as the family organization cannot serve its members fully unless there is complete mutual understanding between the members, so, too, the political organization that stands forth as democracy is dependent for its success upon establishing mutual understandings between all the people.

Almost every one of those attitudes which is regarded by certain intellectuals as indicative of a superficial or mediocre personality, will be found possessed in a marked degree by some who are, on the whole, far from being superficial or mediocre. With the intellectuals such commonplace attitudes may exist singly, whereas with common people they are usually found in abundance; but if the intellectual can perform his more exacting task unhampered by the presence of some pronouncedly ordinary attitudes, then with equal hopefulness may common man undertake his less exacting task although loaded down with many commonplace attitudes.

The meaning that life takes on for any individual is largely a matter of his attitudes toward the things of life. Life as it becomes known to a man's consciousness, is not something bound in by the contour of his body nor is it that which the surrounding world pours into him as an individual receptacle; but rather it is all those things outside of himself as they appear to him when illuminated by his attitudes toward them. The identical thing, moreover, undergoing no change in itself, may appear to him vicious at one time and entirely benevolent at another simply through a change of his attitude toward it. Since attitudes are constantly liable to change, they afford no solid ground on which to erect distinctions in the body politic with

the view of having some govern and others to be governed.

Government is one phase of life, and therefore the meaning that government takes on for any individual is largely a matter of his attitude toward the things that government is or should be. Autocracy is an expression of the attitude of a few toward government; democracy should be an expression of the attitudes of the composite body toward government. No matter how benevolent government may be to all the people, it is insecure if most of those people, because of their attitude toward it, see it as vicious. When democracy, then, seeks to approach an ideal, it is confronted with two facts of major importance: First, the difficulty of any one element being able to project itself into the position of another element so that it will comprehend adequately the attitudes of this other element to government; and, secondly, the desirability that the government from the composite attitudes of all the people should appear good. It may be asserted, somewhat broadly, that in order for government to be good all the people must see it as good. Such an end might be gained by changing the government or by changing the attitudes of the people, although the attainment is not as likely to be accomplished by either one of these two courses alone as by both of them. A change of government to make it better, will almost certainly result in a change of individuals' attitudes toward government so that they will see it as better, and likewise a change of attitudes so that government will be seen as better will of itself produce a change in government for the better. But no such change in government, on the one hand,

and in attitudes, on the other, can be accomplished except by taking cognizance of the differences in attitudes and seeking to find a common meeting point for these attitudes. Oligarchy and anarchism are merely outcomes of refusals to recognize this necessity. If the oligarch and the anarchist both sought to find a meeting point for their divergent attitudes, the two extremes of attitudes toward government would join at democracy, which thus appears as that form of government which takes account of all attitudes, not to determine which shall dominate, but to create from them a community of attitudes that can prevail.

XI. FALLIBILITY OF JUDGMENTS

One of the most delectable bits of buncombe put forth by writers on sociology, psychology, education, and kindred subjects is the intimation that modern life is fast becoming so intricate that the day cannot be far distant when ordinary man, unless guided step by step by his superiors, will be unable to cope with its complexities. Many credulous people accept this forecast seriously and, since these same credulous people usually are imbued with a belief that Providence created them especially to serve as emergency shepherds for the "common herd," look expectantly for the time when ordinary man will require the steadying hand of supposed supermen in order that he may meet life's situations without disaster to himself. These credulous people fancy that then the relation of themselves, the strong, to the mediocre, the weak, will be about that of kindergartner to pupil, and that they will be called on to tell ordinary beings when to play, what to play; when to think, what to think; when to work, and at what to work.

But this apprehension of the fearful cost in complexity that must necessarily be paid for anticipated social progress is as old as the little green hills. Who can say but that some bewhiskered patriarch in the days before recorded history grew morose over the increasing intricacies of life when first he beheld the ox tamed and utilized as an animal of burden? To

him, doubtless, this employment of a beast to do the work that had theretofore been done by common man promised to leave common man no alternative between starving because of non-employment and seeking service that was beyond his mentality. This ancient honorable, therefore, must have trembled with fear when he took account of how mediocre individuals seemed doomed to confusion by the labyrinth which progress was even then making of life. And all down the pages of written history, successors to that bewhiskered patriarch have been rising up and pulling their hair in dismay at thought of the catastrophe which threatened commonplace people by every fresh advance attained in social organization and economic progress.

As a matter of fact, however, for the halfwit of today to eke out a living is easier than it was for his counterpart in the days of the nomads. Progress is conditioned upon the creation of new means of employment, and these new avenues for service afford forms of profitable endeavor to the halt, the crippled, the weak—whether their deficiencies be physical, mental, or spiritual. Because at present there are more people in the world than there were, say five hundred years ago, greater numbers of people give up the struggle for existence and sink, suicidally, into the whirlpool of despair; but proportionately human wrecks are less common today than they have been in previous ages, and such wrecks apparently are destined to decrease proportionately to the growth in total population. A moron—using the term seriously as meaning a person who has lived long enough to have reached maturity but whose intelligence seem-

ingly came to a standstill at the point of mental development expected in a normal child of ten—this moron makes as good a chauffeur as a business man and a better chauffeur than most college professors. A female whose moral consciousness fails to keep step with the development of her body and sex inclinations has a better chance of social survival, and of eventual social redemption, under present living conditions than she would have had ages ago or even a century back. A child can cross the continent alone with less possibility of overtaxing his young emotions and unripe mentality than threatened the salted emotions and seasoned mentality of an adult making a hundred mile journey in stage-coach days.

In brief, many of the so-called complexities of life, which so awe the student who puts them under the magnifying glass of a misguided imagination, are really simple parts of an efficient machinery which has been constructed out of the group experiences of man for the purpose of making living simpler. The individual who was born with a very small mental storage-battery, and who neglected in youth to charge that battery to its limited capacity with useful elementary knowledge, is still able to adjust himself to the conditions of modern life, in the big city as well as on the farm, and to lead an existence with such comforts, contentment, and industry as his particular nature demands. A practical business man who started out with only a meagre common school education, although the limitations of his book learning may be revealed when he comes in contact with college-bred men, can nevertheless grasp the significance of such important public problems as legitimately merit

the concern of the nation—he can see these problems as clearly as the intellectual who takes to abstract thinking just as a duck takes to water. The danger, after all, lies not in the possibility that the common people may eventually be unable to grasp the salient features of their country's problems, but rather in the probability that the intellectuals, as a sop to their own vanity, will seek more and more to confuse these problems so that neither common man, nor, for that matter, uncommon man will be able to understand them.

With due allowance, then, for the good intentions of alarmists who presume that the world, if it continues to speed up, cannot possibly hope to spin along safely unless pseudo-supermen take up the creative work where God left off and devise a new form of gravity that will keep common man from being shot right off into space, it may be stated, plainly, emphatically, that progress will never so complicate life that people even of mediocre mentality will not be competent to comprehend and meet its situations, and this for the very simple reason that it is the ability of the common people to comprehend and meet new situations which is the biggest factor in bringing about progress. The man of commonplace mind—and it is he whose case is being tried—will hardly be so stupid as to assert that superior intelligence does not have its place and value in the world. There are tasks for the intellectuals and for the super-intellectuals; there are jobs for the abstract thinkers and for the profound research scholars. But the tasks for such intellectuals are not the only ones worth while in the world, nor is their accomplishment of anything like the relative

importance which those undertaking these jobs usually are pleased to suppose. In everyday life, problems come up occasionally that must be studied intensively and solved scientifically. The commonplace mind may not be built for such intensive study and scientific research. Even the common people are not blind to this fact, and they gratefully approve when superior men ponder difficult problems to solution. But no problem of everyday life has been adequately solved unless its solution can be reduced to such simple, everyday language and reasoning as the mentally mediocre will be able to understand.

The problem of urban transportation is a case in point. The problem advertises its presence just as positively as a foul odor, and every individual who finds it necessary to be transported from one place in the city to another becomes conscious of both the existence of the problem and the necessity of solving it. But before the problem can be solved, it has to be stated; and before it can be stated, its nature has to be ascertained. The average individual who feels the presence of the problem is touched only by one, or at most a few phases, of a many-sided problem. The first step in solution is for experts especially trained in such matters to find out exactly what the problem in its entirety is. The data that they assemble enable them to state the problem definitely. Then another group of experts, or those same experts using a different technique, work out a theoretical solution. These theories are translated into practices by the operating departments of the various transportation agencies; but before the problem itself is solved in making the

practices effective there has to be coöperation between those who are to be transported and those who undertake the transportation. The so-called educational campaigns of the transportation agencies testify to the fact that everybody touched by this problem must play a part in its solution. This incidental discussion of how an urban transportation problem is attacked and solved throws a bit of illumination on the consideration of how the problems of government should be met and solved. Transportation experts frankly confess that their problem—furnishing transportation—is but another aspect of the public's problem—obtaining transportation—and the safest and quickest way of working out a satisfactory solution for this common problem is for everybody touched by it to learn as much as he can of all aspects of the problem.

Holding still to the theme of transportation, but allowing thoughts of government to appear in the background, the part the common people play in the solution of problems affecting them stands forth as a primary factor in making for public good. The transportation expert recognizes the need of having the coöperation of those who are not experts—many of them decidedly mediocre individuals. He can obtain that coöperation only through presenting to all the people a statement of the problem and a suggestion as to its solution. In order to reach the understanding of the most mediocre, he must present his statements, figuratively, in words of one syllable. But the demand that he be very simple, is a promise of real benefit rather than an unnecessary hardship to the expert. When he undertakes to clarify his

arguments for comprehension by those who are not profound, any hidden fallacies in his reasoning will protrude much more pronouncedly than if he were presenting theories as such for consideration by theorists solely. As long as profound scholars can talk only for profound students, they are in danger of carrying their performance to a point where mere heaviness is accepted for wisdom. The writings and teachings of the metaphysician bear testimony to the truth of this assertion. The metaphysician does not touch the life of his community nor of the world at large. His performance is on a par with a game of solitaire. In either case it makes little difference whether the performer be honest or dishonest, as any man should be permitted to cheat himself—at a game of solitaire or in metaphysical speculations. But an entirely different situation is met when consideration is given to some matter that does concern the community or a nation, such, for instance, as the problem of producing sufficient revenue for a specific public purpose.

The average, ordinary man may be ignorant of the various means by which a governmental body can raise revenue and may lack the imagination that would help him to locate new sources for taxing. The problem, therefore, becomes a task for those trained scientifically in public financing. But not all the men experienced in such aspects of economics will propose the same solution for a given problem in revenue raising. Moreover, equally well trained experts will suggest radically different schemes for raising revenue, and because of their respective specialized viewpoints, each will be biased in favor of his own solution and

prejudiced against the proposals of other experts who do not agree with him.

It would, doubtless, be overbold to assert that common man will be as competent as these experts to pass on a question of financing. Certainly, he is in no position to judge between the several proposals as long as they remain expressed in highly technical language. But if the differing experts are called upon to reduce their proposals to such simple presentation as will be within the comprehension of common man, the suggestion to permit him to decide receives encouragement because of the attendant feature that his decision is apt to be reached with larger regard to the communized interests.

The matter of public financing is of as much concern to the common man as to the uncommon man, to the poor as to the rich. The presumption that the rich, because they have wealth, are better able to determine what revenue should be raised, and how it should be raised, is a delusion which the rich have foisted upon the intellectuals more readily than they have upon commonplace people. On the reverse side of the argument that the poor man, because not directly taxed, should not pass upon matters of taxes and revenues, lies the even stronger argument that the poor man, because not directly taxed, will probably be less biased than the rich man, who seeks to shift the burden of taxes to others. In considering taxation from the standpoint of the state, it is well to bear in mind that many poor people are invariably a primary essential for the accumulation of riches by a few; many poor are also essential to the community that would seek to maintain wealth, once accumulated, as wealth. Un-

fortunately, many conditions of poorness are necessary in order that the relatively few conditions of wealth will not be dissipated. If it should become easy for any man to make a million dollars, millionaires already made would, as a consequence, revert back to the state of men of just ordinary means or, literally, they would become people in moderate circumstances.

It is perfectly proper to draw a line of distinction between problems that should be, and problems that need not be submitted to the people either for solution or for an approval of a proposed solution. There are fields in which the profound thinker and the learned experimenter may pursue their selected courses while displaying an attitude of indifference or even arrogance to common man both as regards the conclusions to be reached and the method to be employed in presenting these conclusions. Such an attitude on their part need not hazard the usefulness of their work, provided that the fields in which they are laboring are not public fields and do not touch intimately the affairs of ordinary man in his ordinary life. The merits of radium as a therapeutic agency do not have to be presented in such form that commonplace laymen will be able to understand them. But whether it is proper to sterilize people whose moral sense may seem, to a selected few, deficient and also to deny a chance of survival to an infant showing serious physical or mental handicap at birth, are public questions on which the opinion of ordinary man, although it may seem worthless to the expert, is of enormous importance to the whole people because of the bearing it will have on bringing about the desired community of interests.

Again, in the matter of education: Such questions as the wisdom of a private university being conducted on an honor system among its students and the merits of allowing college sports to be professionalized, are not matters on which the opinions of common man need be sought. Moreover, the common man's opinion on such questions, if volunteered, may not be worth a tinker's damn. But on the other hand, whether or no a public school system should be organized so as to differentiate the education of young children according to the economic status of their respective parents, and whether selected pupils should be offered collegiate work at public expense before the elementary schools have been raised to a standard of reasonable efficiency, are matters on which the common man is apt to express an opinion that will be of as much worth in making for the desired community of interests as the opinion of experts and possibly of more worth.

Will the opinions of the common man necessarily be bad? Here is a point of which the intellectuals make much when seeking to prove—not to common man, but to themselves—that people of mediocre intellectuality are not capable of passing judgment on most matters of public concern. These intellectuals hold that the ideas of the common people are bad, their opinions poor, and their judgments consequently defective. But if on such a question as the differentiation of education for rich and poor, for wise and otherwise, common men should find themselves unable to agree with one another, they will not be in a bit different position from that of the intellectuals who have been debating these same questions learnedly for

years and consistently end with a disagreement. It will be doing common man no injustice to admit that his ideas may be bad; his opinions poor; and his judgment defective, since he can retaliate by making a like statement concerning the intellectuals. This is not an implication that the judgment of an educated intellectual upon an abstract matter is apt to be no better than that of an uneducated individual of small mentality, but on matters of government, any judgment, regardless of its origin, may be wisely submitted to review by all the people as a means of protecting the community of interests and gaining the desired general support to the course that may be accepted.

A group of intellectuals would have the American people accept its conclusion that only the individual with large so-called abstract intelligence is worth training for the purpose of passing judgment upon the problems that confront the whole people as a nation. These intellectuals explain that only a man with superior mentality is capable of forming sound opinions, and unless a man can reach judgments by way of sound opinions he is not of much value in the task of carrying the race to a point whither these intellectuals expect to carry it. Truth is that the opinions of the intellectuals are not always sound. In certain sciences a man's opinions can be based on established facts; in other cases opinions are grounded only upon theory. An engineer knows that water will seek its own level—this is not a theory, but a truth that can be proved irrefutably. When, therefore, the engineer offers an opinion as to how a given situation may be met in transferring water from one place to another, he may be sure of his premises because such facts as

he uses in reaching his conclusion or judgment will always persist as facts. On the other hand, a specialist in pediatrics may have a theory that all infants should be raised according to a common, iron-bound schedule for feeding, for playing, and for sleeping. His theory or opinion is not founded on facts, and if he undertakes the rearing of several average children he is almost certain to have his theories changed for him. He may make a controlled experiment and, because the subject, coincidentally, happens to be in proper humor, the specialist's schedule may be successfully followed. If it is, he will immediately presume that he has found facts sustaining his theories. But if it happens, as is more likely to be the case, that the child is out of humor, either because he does not appreciate the marvels of pediatrics or else is just humanly contrary, the specialist will run a chance of being ordered arrested by his neighbors for cruelty to children unless he either scraps his theories or chloroforms the child.

The opinions or judgments a scientific man may reach concerning matters within the field of some exact science must not be confused with the opinions or judgments he may offer concerning all questions that may be submitted to him. Medical men differ freely as to how a particular form of disease is to be treated. This, however, should not be regarded as warrant for asserting that the layman is as competent to prescribe treatment as a physician, since the various treatments favored by the disagreeing medical men may all have merits. But a much more significant situation is met when it is found that on a country-wide ballot of physicians, fifty-odd per cent certified to a large thera-

peutic value in whiskey while forty-odd per cent asserted that whiskey is solely a dangerous beverage. Whether whiskey does or does not have value as a medicine can surely be determined as a fact. Consequently it becomes apparent that personal ideas may conflict with and sometimes overcome factual evidence with scientific men on a purely scientific matter. This inability of the medical profession to reach a satisfactory judgment as to the medicinal or non-medicinal quality of whiskey might lead to the rash conclusion that a layman's judgment would be just as good as a physician's in the field of medicine and health. But a much more sensible conclusion to reach from the case in hand is that, while physicians should still be regarded as peculiarly qualified to dig out the essential facts concerning whiskey and health, the lay mind may be better qualified to judge which of the experts is least influenced by prejudice or irrelevant considerations, and whose opinion is to be accepted. This is the procedure found in legal cases that are tried by a jury. The presiding officer, representing the expert on law, is there to see that the rules for submitting facts to the jury are observed. But both facts and fiction make up the testimony that is actually laid before the jury, and the jury is called upon to judge what part of the testimony may be regarded as facts on which to find a decision. Again, the judge will explain the theory of the law, but to the jury—which represents the lay mind—is left the question of deciding what is to be the application of that theory to the case under consideration. On first blush, the student may be disturbed by the fact that so frequently when the presumed expert under-

takes to reach a decision on a matter affecting all the people, his decision, if put to the test, proves bad despite his training as an expert to pass on such matters. If the truth were known, it would doubtless appear in most such cases that the expert's inability to get the point of view of the other fellow accounts for his failure. A school administrator, for instance, may fully qualify as an expert in his field as long as the proposals put to him are hypothetical. But if, when attacking live problems, he translates them into hypotheses and deals with them as an abstract matter rather than live issues, his expert knowledge does not enable him to reach practical decisions. By seeking, on the other hand, to get into a position where a problem will be revealed to him as it appears to the inexpert for whom he is studying it, his decision will in all probability not only be wiser, but he will usually profit by being able to make the inexpert catch at least a glimpse of the problem from his own expert standpoint.

If the intellectuals of the country, in a spirit of coöperation, should content themselves with digging up facts that have a direct bearing on public problems and present them to the body politic so that the whole people may decide the relative worth of each such fact, the intellectuals will make a real contribution to political progress. If the intellectuals are willing to recognize their theories purely as theories, and are ready to have the whole people decide which theories appear sound and the method of application for these sound theories, the intellectuals will be filling creditably the position that exists for them in a democracy. The usefulness of a wise man in a group, whether it be

governmental or family, depends largely upon the wisdom he employs in exercising his wisdom. He may know, and he may know that he knows; but that does not make his wisdom available to others. He may tell his fellow-men that he knows, and have them write him down a fool. The sensible course, if he would have his wisdom bear fruit in the body politic, is to invite the body politic to pass judgment upon the wisdom or unwisdom of his proposals. But to do this he must acknowledge that the people as a whole have a sufficient sense to understand his proposals provided he has sense enough to make them generally understandable.

XII. ART AND THE VULGAR

Of all the damning that the common people get—and they get a superabundance—none is more scornful or more sweeping than that visited on them by critics for their lack of appreciation for high class art in its various forms. Aesthetically, it would seem, the common people are blind, deaf, dumb, and contented. Their frank unconcern regarding their failure to see beauty from the orthodox standpoint of the critics apparently makes their case hopeless.

Throughout the ages the designers of beautiful things, the thinkers of beautiful thoughts, the weavers of beautiful harmonies, and critical appraisers of such creations have made a distinction about equal to that between a soulful and a soulless creature, between those who appreciate beauty as recognized masters conceive it and those who are unmoved by such beauty. The ultra-cultured person does not measure as a degree of superior discernment his ability to enjoy only genuinely beautiful things while the common people frequently show a preference for things which to him seem actually hideous, but he accepts this difference in appreciation as separating people into two distinct breeds. The things that please his aesthetic sense are stamped by him, semi-officially, as beautiful, while most of the things that the common people find appealing are condemned by him, also semi-officially, as vulgar. And to him it does not

appear a question of legitimate variation in preferences, but simply a case of either the possession or else the total lack of taste.

When the ultra-cultured person functions as a patron of music, he boldly asserts that people who cannot enjoy the wonders of Tschaikowsky but who do both tolerate and enjoy jazz are not humanized creatures. When he passes upon literature, he regards not as a sign of misdirected taste, but rather as evidence of an inverted soul, the ability of a person to read with enjoyment Robert W. Chambers accompanied with inability to see anything in poetry or to like Maeterlinck. When he considers the theatre and finds people who fall asleep over Ibsen and rave over Charlie Chaplin, he writes them down as representatives of a degenerate type that has lost all discriminative power. Essaying the rôle of art patron, he classes people who look on Turner as stupid and Corot as not pleasing, but who are able to spend many merry hours over pictures contributed to the comic section of Sunday newspapers, as first cousins, intellectually, to the imbecile. And as an aesthete, he holds that individual who regards interpretive dancing as silly while he personally engages in such abominations as the fox-trot, closer to the orang-outang than to a man after the critic's own mold.

These are not extreme illustrations, but reflect the tone of censure that is continually heaped upon the common people by critics and patrons of art. And these critics, presiding at an imaginary bar of justice whither are brought the cultured and the uncultured, erect into a group of intellectuals those who agree with them that the things they stamp as beautiful and artis-

tic are art, and consign to the regions of the eternally damned all those who show a liking for anything which the critics have pronounced inartistic or inelegant. Aesthetics in thus attempting to ascertain what is beautiful in nature and art, and teaching an appreciation for that which it concludes is beautiful, serves mankind as a whole badly, since it surveys all attempts at art expression only from the standpoint of the most advanced and least spontaneous of idealists. Allowing that Turner is superior in technique to Opper, and that the highly discriminating are justified in doing homage to the English landscapist while regarding the efforts of the American cartoonist as crude, it does not follow that a person who relishes a drawing by Opper, but who is unable to get pleasure from a Turner is fundamentally a different sort of animal from one whose taste is just the reverse.

In attempting a critical study of the common people in their appreciation of art in any form it is only fair to bear in mind, first, that, for most people, appreciation for Turner, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, and Tschaikowsky has to be taught. That such appreciation is taught, and that the learning frequently represents an uncritical acceptance of the say-so of some one else, is significant. Moreover, it is well to keep in mind the fact that recognition of those masters who have been canonized has not always been prompt nor unanimous even on the part of the critics. Many a master who eventually gained universal approval from critics, major and minor, was at first very positively condemned by all but a few—some times all but one—of the same critic group which later undertook to certify him to the world. In numerous instances the same

evidence on which an artist has been elevated to the sainthood of art by unanimous vote of the critics, was at first unconditionally damned by many alleged discriminating critics. One lone critic, perhaps, chanced to see in the man's work a form of expression which he regarded as filling the most exacting requirements for acceptance as real art. But that lone critic had to convert his fellow critics, each of them already posing as an expert, before they could see the merits of the offering. This truth, which the biographies of the masters will bear out in scores of instances, denies to the critics warrant for that dogmatic tone which they so freely employ even after they have been won over against their will to see merit where they had been unable to see it at first unaided. From this it must not be inferred that the man who is finally acclaimed a master by the critics is undeserving of such recognition, but it places critics, collectively, in a glass house from which it is hazardous for them to throw stones—even at the common people.

Appreciation for certain simple forms of expression is spontaneous and natural; appreciation for more complex forms of expression sometimes has to be developed, but more often is taught by rote. Not every one can be trained to appreciate what might be regarded as a complex form of expression in painting, in architecture, in music, or in literature. Certain people do not possess that sort of docile mind which will enable them to see beauty in a thing just because somebody, posing as an authority, tells them it is beautiful. Others lack the imagination essential to comprehend complex forms of expression; their minds are simple like that of a child, who is capable of

enjoying crude presentations, but finds a higher type of expression unappealing because unintelligible to him. Very often the expression must be elementary and even crude to reach the appreciation of the child. This may be due to the fact that the child, living in a world where a few rough lines, made by his baby hand, are regarded by him as pictures of people and things he knows in his own consciousness, is able to grasp in a crude drawing a sense that it was created, like his own pictures, whereas a more artistic picture is a manufactured thing that is beyond his comprehension. If the child, looking at a crude drawing, has a feeling that here is a thing which a human hand created, it is alive, it has a message, he is not suffering because of the appeal made to him by the crude illustration, whereas he might suffer greatly if he were trained to feel that it is not nice for him to like such pictures. Here, then, is doubtless the explanation why most children, and not a few adults, delight in newspaper comics—a thing which is as far beyond the comprehension of the aesthete as he is beyond sympathy with everyday life.

In the matter of art, a reasonably intelligent adult may grasp the significance of ideas presented in crude or exaggerated form, but find it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the product of an artist who soars on wings of genius. Opper makes his appeal to these simple-minded people; Turner does not. The very crudeness of caricature helps them to see life and truth in the drawing of the cartoonist, whereas they do not have the imagination to put life into a picture that presents its subject idealized. The critic may feel that, for the sake of art, such people should

have their ability to enjoy work like Opper's rooted out. If a sufficiently strong effort were made to force all people to accept the views of the major critics on art, the natural appreciation of commonplace people for Opper might be destroyed; on its ruins, however, there could never be erected a universal appreciation for anything approaching Turner. These people of commonplace tastes would merely have been shorn of the capacity for pleasurable interest in forms of expression that the critic condemns, but would have nothing put into the void. They would suffer a vain loss, since surely art could gain nothing by the operation.

A sincere appreciation for art expression on a low plane is more to be desired in the common people than no appreciation for any form of expression or else a lying pretense at appreciation for a form of expression on a high plane. If art can give no pleasure, it might as well perish. And a pretense at appreciating such art as is beyond the comprehension of the individual who affects to understand and like it, does not represent art, but self-deceit, as giving the pleasure. The common people, as a rule, are sincere in their liking for sentimental music, for simplicity in drawing, for exaggeration in fiction, and for stimulating sensationalism in dramatic productions. As against the great body of commonplace people, with sincere liking for these commonplace—and condemned—forms of expression, are those who voice an appreciation for expression on a higher plane. Some of these people of supposed discrimination are sincere; but many are not. Even the man who honestly enjoys those things which the major critics

stamp as real art, is often irritated by the number of pretenders about him who affect critical taste by following blindly, and stupidly, in the tracks of the critics. Nowhere is such silly pretense more in evidence than at the average classical concert, where a lot of males and females prate, noisily and parrot-like, ununderstandable phrases which they have culled from technically phrased criticism. They get a riot of pleasure at such a concert; not from the performance itself, however, but out of their masquerading as intelligent art patrons. As between this shallow delight in foolish pretending and the genuine pleasure of commonplace people derived from commonplace forms of expression, it is not difficult to determine which group contributes most to keep alive a worth while appreciation for art.

The point may legitimately be raised whether an artificially trained appreciation for a given standard of art warrants even the major critic in condemning arbitrarily all lower forms of expression, many of which represent standards that appealed to him in his own progress from early impulsive appreciation of crude forms to his final stand of possibly over-trained discrimination. Too often the sole accomplishment of the endeavor to elevate an individual's taste, is to make natural liking subservient to blindfolded imagination. For a man to know that a thing is beautiful according to his ideas of beauty is more desirable than for him to imagine that a thing is beautiful according to standards that he cannot understand. Suppose, for example, aesthetes should decree that a liking for spring onions is to be regarded as a form of taste which should be eradicated—either

destroyed completely or else converted into an appreciation for some less offensive relish. An experiment might be made to wean three individuals from a natural but vulgar liking for spring onions by substituting caviar. Of the three, one is easily proselyted; he promptly comes to relish caviar and honestly to dislike onions. The second punishes himself by eating caviar whenever opportunity presents (also punishes others by always boasting about his partiality for caviar) but secretly is hungry for the strong flavor of his old favorite. The third courageously refuses to give caviar the shadow of commendation as he reaffirms his passion for vulgar spring onions.

A parallel to this situation is found in art, where not only many laymen who pretend to follow the major critics, but even a considerable percentage of the minor critics themselves, make a show at appreciation for the thing they praise. The major critic is too much taken up with the importance of his holy mission to concern himself with the question whether or not his following is sincere. He presumes that he holds forth only to the elect. Indeed, there is reason to believe that, should a major critic ever find the common people *en masse* agreeing with him in the view that some very complex form of expression is truly beautiful, the critic would be so disturbed at finding his lofty mind in agreement with the supposedly submerged mind of the commonalty that he would feel sure he had made a mistake and, blindly, would reverse himself into disagreement with the rabble.

The critic does not pause, apparently, to consider whether the liking of the common people for those

things which he, because of his intensive training, stamps as vulgar and crude, may not be a taste as fully justified as is the preference of the ultra-cultured for things which the critic stamps as aesthetic. Nor does he take account of the loss to art appreciation *en bloc* that would be incurred by depriving the common people of their vulgar tastes and contentment in those tastes. There is no need to demand that the critic change his opinions as to what constitutes beauty of the highest order, nor that he change his labors on behalf of lofty ideals, but art on the whole would profit a little, and society would profit much, if the critic could display more tolerance toward the uncritical and vulgar when they reveal a liking for a low standard of expression. Entirely too much has the attitude been to look contemptuously at the common people as if they are unable to know their own likes and dislikes—as if for the critic so much as to consider them and their preferences would literally be casting pearls before swine.

So far this consideration of art appreciation has been concerned with the possibility that justification can be found for common people to hold to their commonplace taste—if the super-cultured will permit this liking to be referred to as taste. To defend the common people in their preference for commonplace forms of expression, is one thing; to attempt to find in this so-called vulgar taste a real benefit to those higher forms of expression for which the major critic stands is, perhaps, a bolder undertaking, but not necessarily one impossible of attainment. That such forms of expression as meet with the approval of the vulgar do actually serve the common people ade-

quately, will be admitted even by many highly critical people. That this rather low standard of appreciation, which nourishes commonplace forms of expression, can be of any possible service in nurturing the higher forms of expression will, doubtless, be denied quickly by both the critic and the ultra-cultured patron of art. The fact remains, however, that from the "herd" sprang, in course of ages, the pioneer aestheticians, produced by the law of variation. This same law which brought forth, from the herd, both the makers of pearls and those who built up a technique for appraising these pearls, has not been repealed.

Individuals who are hot to undertake some man's size job, such as remaking the world and bringing it to one viewpoint (always their own), invariably in their impatience to get started neglect to take account of the largest element with which they will have to contend, and because of the neglect their undertaking is predestined to failure. This factor is human nature. Deviations in other matters no less than in tastes for art exist not because mankind has yet to be brought under the influence of those who would undertake to standardize all tastes, but in spite of any propaganda so far launched, or ever to be dreamed of for standardization. The man who cultivates a fastidious exactness in his speech, looks upon slang as a crime and upon those who violate the rules of syntax as criminals. He presumes that there must be a hidden scheme whereby everybody could be made to see the beauties of his absolutely pure English, so that the abhorrent crimes and criminals would be eliminated from English; presumes this because he has not stopped to take human nature into account when doing his reckoning.

As long as the world lasts, there will be slang and the users of slang. If present-day slang could be completely eliminated from the vocabularies of all Americans now speaking English, within twenty-four hours the task of creating a new slang would be under way. There are those who would be actively constructive; who, when they found the present stock of corrupt words outlawed, would immediately begin raids on the dictionary and seize virgin words to be so corrupted that they would soon be dropped from the speaking acquaintance of those who boast of using only pure English. But these constructionists would be aided by the very elect themselves, for if the ultra-cultured found their vocabulary conforming to that of the common people, they would straightway devise new and difficult words to express their old and simple thoughts, while the discarded words in many instances would, through ostracism, gradually degenerate into slang or vulgarisms. This would be true of any other form of art.

For the sake of convenience, let it be supposed that all people fall naturally into one of two classes: those who display a liking for high standards of expression, accompanied usually by an intolerance for all who do not agree with them, and those who are capable in varying degrees of enjoying commonplace forms of expression. The former may be written down as the cultured, and the latter as the vulgar. These two groups, pursuing their respective courses separately and unsympathetically, are actually interdependent. The vulgar group is incapable, let it be admitted, of being raised in its entirety to see art from the viewpoint of the major critics, or even of pretending to

see it from that viewpoint, as do the pseudo-critical. If this group, which cannot be transformed and which surely is better off not transformed, were eliminated as a human factor in patronizing any form of expression, the future of appreciation for art expression would rest upon the cultured group. But time and time again the ultra-cultured, when clothed with despotic authority, have suffered the downfall inevitable to any form of despotism. The standards set for art expression are not static, nor does the change from time to time always represent advancement. Performances and standards for appraising these performances pursue a set cycle. They soar gradually to considerable heights, but, when a peak has been attained, they invariably begin to slide downward under the seductive influence of formalism. Artist and critic concern themselves with standards until these have been worked to such a fine point that the result is restraint, which defeats its own ends—the power of expression then becomes anaesthetized. When the standards for high class expression begin to slide, it is the standard for expression on the lower planes that serves as a bulwark and prevents complete disaster. Not only do the common people with their appreciation for commonplace forms of expression prove a convenient obstacle in the way of too pronounced a decline in the standards for expression on the higher plane, but frequently when the high standards have had their setback, it is from the vulgar group that a Moses rises to pilot another flight for the cultured group.

On the other hand, if the vulgar group should become absolute, art would suffer as seriously as in the event

that the cultured group could exercise a monopoly and prohibit the appreciation of any expression not approved by it. With the vulgarians as dictators for both production and appreciation, that occasional individual who has a holy vision would not reveal his message, either because of fear that he might violate the decrees of the vulgar or else because he would decline to debase his message by making the mode of expression conform to the imposed low standard.

The interrelations between the cultured and the vulgar group find those who subscribe to the high standards above those who patronize commonplace forms of expression, but not so far above that the vulgarians are not a sort of foundation upon which the cultured group finds a footing. The vulgarians keep alive an elementary form of expression because that is all they will appreciate. If the ultra-cultured had their way, the elementary forms would be eliminated and consequently the approach to art production and appreciation would become difficult not only to the vulgarians, but to prospective patrons of high forms of expression while their tastes were still immature. Neither master artist nor major critic has the courage to ascertain how far the so-called vulgarians are responsible for the leaders in expression on the highest plane, since in too many instances they would be compelled to confess to their own vulgar beginnings. Out of environments that seemingly could produce only a vulgar taste for expression have come those who have contributed to the highest standards. The ultra-cultured sit back complacently and regard these vulgar-bred champions

of a high standard as their own children, whereas the standards to which the cultured subscribe are frequently unknown to these creators whom culture would claim to have brought forth. Not the inspiration of culture, but the failure of coarse forms of expression to satisfy him, has frequently led a child of the vulgar group to break his bonds, and in breaking his bonds to gain a momentum for flight, which could never have been gained solely by training with the cultured leaders.

The love for music is kept alive among the common people in many cases with mere doggerel. This doggerel serves a double purpose, since it both supplies the common people with a means for pleasure in music and at the same time keeps alive a passion for harmony, no matter how wretched. The world at large has danced along not to the music of the masters, but to the commonplace, doggerel music of the commonplace, simple people. These commonplace people, producing now and then a creature whose ear is not satisfied with their commonplace offerings, nourish one who eventually takes flight, and the old homespun harmonies with which he had been saturated are revamped by him until they blossom forth as masterpieces. He brings to the higher plane that occasional fresh note without which it would soon prove unable to hold its position. An occasional so-termed "swine" rises to the cultured lot, bringing with him a pearl that was not cast to him, but by him cast and polished on the coarse material against which his soul had been rubbing until it attained a luster that could never have been produced by contact with the soft environment of the cultured.

In their liking for low standards of expression, the vulgar, then, are not to be condemned, but rather encouraged. They like things that do not require too much effort in the liking, but the disinclination to put forth a great effort on appreciation for art is chargeable to their excessive utilitarian industry rather than to laziness. Their low standards are not due to low mentality, since low mentality functions no more with them than with the pretenders' section of the group which claims culture. They are a group, however, that supplies a convenient base for those who aspire to higher form of expression to rest upon when contemplating a fresh flight and to light upon when that flight terminates in descent. They keep alive appreciation for elementary forms of expression, and in the open field of vulgar taste, by the law of variation, produce occasionally a rare but hardy novelty such as could never have been cultivated under the hothouse conditions obtaining within the cultured group.

Art in its various forms—literature, painting, music, dancing—is really an effort to give physical expression to a spiritual feeling. The feeling itself is a fleeting thing. It may be revived again and again in the memory of the person who experienced it, but through the medium of art that feeling may not only be permanently recorded for the artist, but for as many as can be stimulated by the artist's record of his feeling. This stimulation will, of course, vary in its effectiveness with different individuals, and there may also be a variation to the stimulation which any one individual may experience at different times. The feeling to be recorded and the mode of expression employed by the

artist are both determinants of the size and character of the audience that may be able to find stimulation in the artist's work. The artist who clothes his feelings in such form that they will be intelligible only to a very few, has no reason to complain when no appreciation comes from those to whom he willfully closed the doors of appreciation. In the same way the artist who makes popularity his sole guiding star, although he may serve a vast audience, usually restricts the life of his record since it is apt to lack such quality as will make for survival. And yet these two creators, occupying the two extremes, serve the nation; the exclusive artist in stimulating the feelings of the few, the popular artist in stimulating the feelings of the many. Moreover, they both foster an intermediary standard of art that in course of time becomes a powerful asset to the nation. That art in which a whole people can find stimulation will serve as an influential agency for bringing about a unity of the people in their artistic feelings. What the exclusive artist accomplishes may never become an actual part of the national art, but it will prove an inspiration to those who are to help create the national art. What the artist who makes popularity his sole aim produces, may also fade in time, but it stimulates and consequently develops the people's feeling for art expression. In order that art may serve its largest possible mission in a nation, it is essential that all who create and all who appreciate should understand that they see art from but one standpoint, and that many, if not all of the other standpoints are helpful in fostering art as a part of national life. Not by arbitrary rulings, then, nor by ridicule and

rhetorical cuffings, will the group's composite taste for art be promoted, but by taking account of the bonds that bind all art appreciation into a whole, and in seeking to strengthen these bonds. A little more toleration, a little more patience from those of the high standards, will be reflected as a little more interest, a little more heeding from those of the low standards, and while no common point for meeting may be established, a place for communizing interests in art will be located.

XIII. VANITY OF MANNERS

Man's only chance of escaping vanity is to cross the River Styx, and even then the beginning of the exodic journey is apt to be tinged ludicrously with vanity through the ostentatious send-off which remaining friends prepare for the departing. Individuals will be found plenty who sincerely believe—and blandly assert—that they are free of vanity in any form, but the concomitant of such belief is itself the sublimest of all vanities, namely: that something which might be termed "self-conscious modesty." If the earlier conception of instincts was still supreme, vanity might be written down as the most persistent of all human instincts without danger of having some behaviorist spring an anti-climax by protesting that vanity is not an instinct. But should it appear necessary, in years to come, for people generally to accept the postulates of the most radical behaviorists, even then vanity will stand forth in the behavioristic data as occupying about the same relative position toward human conduct that breathing does toward life.

Vanities vary in quality and quantity. Some are sensible; some are useful although not exactly sensible; some are useless but inoffensive; and some are simply intolerable and foolish. And of all the intolerably foolish vanities, that springing from pride in manners is chief. Manners serve a worthy social purpose—at times. Such times are not when manners are

employed as a sort of staff of life by creatures of leisure, who, through studying a precisely worked-out code of responses, not only save themselves from ennui, but frequently from social side-tracking as well. It is possible for a person who so completely lacks individuality as to offer no foundation on which to erect an interesting personality, to apply a veneer of manners and to polish this veneer to such a degree that he will be tolerated even by discriminating people —tolerated because he conceals his true self beneath the veneer rather than because of any transformation he accomplished with himself. But as between many a society man and mechanic, or between many a society girl and factory operative, the chief point of difference to be found, if the two are studied comparatively, is that the former has been sugar-coated with a certain amount of standardized manners so as to cover over a creature even more pronouncedly mediocre than the latter. These manners are artificially put on just like rouge, and like rouge serve to bury a surface which, if left in its virgin state, might make the subject not less interesting, but rather offensively uninteresting to those with whom he seeks to associate. Whenever an individual who has put on manners that work no change except in surface behavior, begins to take pride unto himself because of this coating and at the same time to berate others who have not had time or, perhaps, the incentive for self-veneering of the same kind, he stands before the world in exactly the same position as would some heavily rouged female who might presume to ridicule the less florid but perfectly natural complexion of unpainted women.

As long as manners of this type are restricted to the limited social sphere in which their cultivation is encouraged, they will be found useful in some cases and harmless in most instances. When, however, the individual with manners becomes puffed up and vain, and demands that the body politic accept his veneering as the basis for class discrimination, pride in manners takes on the aspect of a public nuisance. The same thing is true with other traits wherein individuals appear differentiated, although in the case of manners the deviation is patently artificial. Superior intelligence is to be looked upon as a national asset until a group favored with more than average mentality makes its demand that, as a consequence, it be granted special privileges and considerations from the body politic. The fabulous wealth of a few need not be regarded as a menace to the nation until those possessing exceptional wealth insist that because of this possessing they shall be permitted to exercise special prerogatives in the body politic. Even the puritanical morality of the uplifters could be converted into a national asset if these modern witch-finders only had sense enough to free themselves of the delusion that their approval, for themselves, of a rigid code of ethics carries with it the right to prescribe such morality as shall be enforced upon the whole people. And so the manners of the well-behaved might be accepted as beautiful attainments, worth cultivating for the benefit of those particular groups to which such manners serve as a passport, were it not that manners so often mislead those who cultivate them into assuming that this veneering of itself connotes a superiority in breed and, therefore, singles out the possessor for

preference in the body politic. Then manners cease to serve their true purpose, and become an agency of disintegration in national life. An unfortunate thing, not only for the common people, but for all elements that go to make up the body politic, would be a widespread acceptance of the belief that manners represent a sound basis for political discrimination or to suppose that as between the man of polished deportment and the man of coarse demeanor there is any fundamental difference as a citizen.

For people of a certain standard of manners to prefer not to be thrown intimately with those who are not so well schooled in deportment, is in itself neither unreasonable nor undemocratic; but for an individual with no claim to distinction except the very doubtful one of having become superficially well-mannered, to pride himself on this accomplishment and presume that it puts him into a different group, politically no less than socially, from commonplace people, is both to raise an obstacle in the way of that efficient civic coöperation which is essential to a democratic people and also to encourage strife in the body politic. Whenever the rich flaunt their wealth before the poor; or the super-intellectuals their higher mentality before the ordinary; or the well-mannered, their studied deportment before the unmannered, an appeal is made to the passion of those who are treated as inferior beings, and that passion, if stirred sufficiently, will compel the poor, the average-minded, or the coarse-mannered to seek means for retaliation.

A much larger element of the people than ordinarily is supposed, accepts itself as constituting a gentry of manners. These people presume that manners are

inherent, and that the possession of them reveals a being above the ordinary run of man—a somebody whose superiority should be recognized by the body politic. Perhaps the mannered gentry is not as active on its own behalf at present as it has been in decades past, or as it may seek to become in the years ahead provided a recent trend in this direction continues unabated. Looking backward, it may be recalled that for a long time all the people of South Carolina bowed reverently to a tradition that a prerequisite for any citizen wishing to realize political ambition, was that he should belong to those who boasted of their manners. It did not occur to those who were most benefited by this tradition that, paradoxically, pride in manners is itself ill-mannered. The rule of the mannered gentry was more successfully maintained in the Palmetto State than anywhere else in the country, and it required the heroic, albeit vulgar, efforts of an uncouth Ben Tillman to put this tradition to flight. Because Tillman was advanced on account of his opposition to the snobbish gentry of good manners, he felt it incumbent on him, particularly during the earlier years of his public career, to emphasize ill-manners and coarseness. Here is seen the danger of reaction to manners when those who presumably possess them endeavor to lord it over the unmannered. From the unmannered group comes a champion in the form of an individual who, no matter what he may actually be, poses as coarse and ill-mannered in his fight against a snobbish gentry. If he can rouse sufficient support to win his case, he feels obligated to continue in the rôle of vulgarian.

An effort may be made by American women to recover at least part of the ground that has been lost in recent years by those who assumed that manners were something entitling the possessor to special considerations in the body politic. In many sections of the country as soon as woman was given the ballot, ambitious females, subscribing to a belief in the prior political rights of the mannered gentry, took the position that the great preponderance of commonplace women, whom they regard as socially beneath them, were also to be treated as if politically beneath them. These ambitious females felt that the commonplace woman was to be permitted to vote; indeed she might be instructed to vote; but she was to have no voice in naming such candidates as might be brought out by her own sex—this was a right reserved to women of manners and social position. It is possible that the female element of the mannered gentry because of its firmly established unsympathetic attitude toward other women, will insist more arrogantly upon the right of the mannered gentry to dictate than did the self-chosen aristocrats of South Carolina in the palmiest days of their snobbery. That the woman of leisure and manners is more entitled to political preferment than women of toil and crude exterior, would be true only if the female portion of the electorate were overwhelmingly mannered and leisurely, or if the problems of the nation concern such mannered ladies primarily.

Manners are so frequently an entirely superficial attainment, that it is not surprising to find that the person who holds himself as superior to his fellowmen solely because of his manners, is usually in all things

superficial. When a man of recognized exceptional mentality shows himself a bit vain, his pride seems pardonable, although not commendable, since it is based on a trait that is deep-rooted. The citizen who takes pride because of the distinguished ancestry from which he sprang, reveals a common human weakness to be noted in all classes of people, for the parent is naturally proud of an offspring who wins distinction and the son is generally proud of a distinguished sire. (However, those people who take a natural pride in the distinction of their ancestors must not be confused with that American snob who holds himself better than other citizens because his immigrant forebears came to America perhaps a hundred years earlier than did the ancestors of those later Americans whom he regards with contempt. If the snob's colonial forebears won no distinction, then the pride of this present day descendant appears as stupid vanity. His immigrant ancestor, whom he drags forth as justification for pride in his ancient American lineage, does not in that case show up one whit more creditably as a forebear than will appear the present-day immigrant to his descendants of one hundred years hence.) Even pride in wealth, if the one who takes the pride also accumulated the wealth personally and honorably, is not open to unconditional condemnation. But when it comes to pride in manners, the vanity is erected on an exceedingly flimsy foundation, and seemingly the flimsier the foundation, the gaudier is the structure erected thereon.

This is not a tirade against manners *en bloc*, but a critical examination of that vanity of vanities—pride in surface coating given to behavior when its primary

outcome is to prompt people to see themselves as an entirely different breed of creatures from those of less polished deportment. The whole subject might be ignored with certain other forms of snobbishness to be found in national life were it not for the fact that pride in manners presents itself as an active wedge in the process of disintegrating the American people, while manners might serve admirably as an agency for unifying the various elements of the population. Out of concern for both commonplace people and those who supposedly constitute the gentry of manners, it is well to undertake an evaluation of those manners which lead the individual who cultivates them to regard himself as a better citizen than the average unmannered man. Pride in manners is oftenest displayed by those who, without their memorized deportment, would unquestionably group with commonplace people, but who, in the unwarranted, arrogant pride in their manners, actually fall beneath the average man as regards intrinsic worth to the nation. In such instances, manners do not serve the purpose for which they originally were called into being, namely: to make life more agreeable for those coming in touch with the well-mannered and at the same time work a transformation under the surface in the character of the person himself. With those to whom manners still serve this purpose, the world has no quarrel. In attempting to ascertain the place and possibilities of common people in the nation, it is proper to survey them in their relations to manners and to the mannered. As an aid to such a survey, the attitude of the gentry of manners toward the unmannered or even the ill-mannered is of service.

A somewhat homely, concrete illustration may be presented.

A boy who had been visiting at the home of a family which could boast nothing in the way of exceptional mentality, distinguished ancestry, accumulated wealth, or economic efficiency, but whose members made great pretense because of their alleged refined manners, reported that the mother of the lad he was visiting declared to her son, in his presence, that another youth of their mutual acquaintance was not a fit companion for them because she had actually seen him butter a slice of bread in its entirety when he had taken a meal at her home. (For those readers who, according to this criterion, may also be undesirable associates for members of the mannered gentry, it should be observed that this woman had come to believe, as she was seeking to have her son and his friend believe, that no nice person would butter more of the bread at one time than that broken off piece which is to be the next bite.)

This trivial illustration in a way represents the willingness of many people of one brand of manners to make a mountain of a mole-hill by maximizing the importance of altogether unimportant things in life. How a child butters his bread is not nearly so reliable a criterion for determining whether he will make a desirable associate for other people, as is the willingness of a snobbish woman to condemn that child to others if he fails to perform the act just as she thinks it should be done. If buttering the bread in its entirety is actually bad form, a child can be corrected of this habit easily, while back-biting is surely much worse form, and a practice that soon becomes incurable.

There are certain impulses common to all beings, and these impulses show themselves alike among children born in homes of refinement and those who first see the light of day in the abodes of commonplace people. That some of these impulses should be curbed because they threaten, if unrestrained, to work ill, is undebatable; but that others are harmless, although curbed by certain groups of people solely because society has tabooed them—frequently without reason—is also beyond dispute. As regards impulses that are harmful, an individual who has been taught to restrain these has no solid ground for taking pride to himself in the accomplishment, any more than a man would be warranted in boasting that he had never committed murder every time he heard of such a crime having been perpetrated. There is a distinct difference between doing harm, doing good, and pursuing a course that results in neither harm nor good. The first is immoral; the next is moral; and the last is neutral and has no moral significance.

Manners in their virgin form were moral; they were designed to do good. The moral aspect of manners will be considered later. But manners that are put on as ornamentation either have no moral significance or else they become downright immoral. Ornamental manners do not go deep into the life of the veneered individual; in fact, their outstanding characteristic is shallowness. Table manners, for instance, which are made much of by the gentry as an indication of the breed of the animal, are almost entirely surface behavior and a form of affectation. A man and woman who have been religiously schooled in such manners may mate and bring forth a child. Both

parents have been coached from earliest infancy in table manners, so that they become able to perform the act of eating by book or rule, traditionally, noiselessly, even picturesquely. This is, however, only surface behavior and not a transmissible trait. Their child will not be born with nice table manners, but will require just as thorough drilling as did they before him and as will his children after him. In short, the offspring of the best table-mannered parents inherits not the disciplined conduct of his mother and father, but their inhibited impulses. And one of the earliest impulses of the human being who is normal, is to stuff the mouth, to bolt food, to see only the utilitarian aspect of eating and none of its aesthetic qualities which are products of culture.

Some of this cultural development is sane, but much of it has no commonsense basis. The insistence, for example, that an individual when conveying food to the mouth should hold the fork in the right hand, is a tradition reverently subscribed to by many who are ignorant of its original purpose. With these people, to be proper means that the left-handed individual must break the law or be forced, if not efficient, to eat unnaturally, awkwardly. The right hand gained its monopoly for raising the fork to the mouth in order that those who could not use the left hand gracefully might be saved from the appearance of awkwardness. Here is the acceptance of a sort of union labor principle—the most efficient shall be forced down to the level of the least efficient in order that the inefficient may survive unhurt. Eating among the mannered gentry thus becomes unionized, and the man who will not join the union and pay his dues by

observing every one of its edicts is stamped a scab—he must not be permitted to come to the table with society's unionized eaters. Certain groups of Japanese train themselves to use either hand with equal facility, and even to employ their feet almost as capably as the average person can use his hands. For a Jap with such training to attempt to use both his hands and his feet when feeding at the table of a Caucasian might merit censure. But an individual who can use either hand equally well, or who uses his left hand more efficiently than the right, opens himself to condemnation also if he has not the courage to damn this convention under certain conditions that would make it more sensible for him to use his left hand.

Bearing in mind that the natural impulse of a child, when attacking food, is to get the food into process of consumption, any lesson taught the child that will prevent him from eating so vigorously that he may either imperil his own health or develop a spirit of selfishness, has good foundation. But manners taught solely in order that the one practicing them may come to regard himself as superior to people who are not similarly trained, raise a question whether in many instances so-called nice manners are not corrupted into camouflaged ill-manners—whether the veneer of manners may not often destroy more that is truly of worth in the individual than is added to him by the acquisition. A dog can be taught nice table manners, but they mean nothing to the animal except that if he forgets his lessons he is punished. No manners can be of large importance to any individual unless some sound, underlying reason for adopting them can be adduced.

Much of what is regarded by the mannered gentry as good manners represents merely arbitrary, purposeless fads invented by idlers who have an excess of leisure on their hands. Manners of this kind are simply styles which may change over night, and which exert no more influence on those affecting them than does a change in the cut of their garments. Unfortunately, those who follow, ape-like, the dictation of others in patterning their own behavior, develop an intolerance for anybody who does not show a like willingness to be led blindfolded. Allowing that some manners are fundamentally sound, these are worth cultivating provided, always, that they do not become inseparably bound up with a spirit of intolerance for those who, because their lives may be filled to overflowing with necessary toil, find little time to devote to the study of deportment. Chief importance, from the standpoint of ethics, attaches to the need that man, cultured or uncultured, should realize how trivial a distance separates the well-mannered from the unmannered, as far as the worth of the man goes.

In discussing this subject it is convenient to refer to table manners because the mannered gentry lays such stress upon this phase of deportment. Perhaps one of the most serious offenses against conventional table manners is that of drinking from a saucer. With people of manners this is regarded as just a little less savage than eating with a knife. It is well to remember, however, that eating with a knife was universal in early days. Because some wise men, and possibly cautious mothers, saw the danger of putting a knife into the mouth in those days when knives invariably were sharp, the practice fell gradually under

condemnation, although there is actually nothing more offensive in licking a knife clean than doing the same with a fork or spoon. Nevertheless, the practice of eating with a knife has become so firmly outlawed by tradition that today even the man who is not snobbish feels a sense of repulsion on seeing another put a knife into his mouth.

Eating with a knife lost its utilitarian basis when the fork and spoon came into general use. But drinking from a saucer—damned almost as violently by the gentry—still retains a slight claim to utility in eating with some. It is not necessary for a person of good manners to endorse drinking from the saucer, but it does appear ridiculous that he should feel called upon to pretend outrage every time he sees an individual, not in his company, not at his own table, but possibly in a public restaurant, resort to this practice. The woman of refinement who sips her coffee daintily should remember that in her case eating has been developed into a form of recreation. On the other hand, the laborer's wife who pauses regretfully in a day's washing to eat—eating coarse food, and eating chiefly that she may conserve her strength so as to carry to completion the day's toil—may as a means of economizing time pour her coffee into a saucer to cool it for more rapid consumption. If this woman of toil were revealing a trait that could be found only in creatures of low breed, the refined woman might be justified in looking upon her own method as having significance. But the cultured woman's own child will instinctively show an inclination to lift a saucer—containing cereal with cream or broth or ice cream—to his mouth, regardless of how carefully his parents

may have kept him away from the sight of people who continue drinking from the saucer in adult life. Impulsively, then, the child follows in the same track as did this laborer's wife when a baby—his parents have leisure to correct him while her parents, perhaps because they were doing the menial labor for the cultured woman's parents, did not have time.

No defense is here offered for drinking from the saucer. At the same time the fact is worth noting that the original impulse to drink from a saucer is no commoner to ordinary children than to children of the mannered gentry. It is foolish, therefore, to assume that after a child has been taught to discontinue the practice, his drinking properly constitutes a trait revealing him as a different breed of person from those who continue it. In the matter of manners too often the things lately learned or acquired with difficulty are permitted to become a source of unwarrranted pride to the learner. By way of illustration mention may be made of a college man who never misses an opportunity to ridicule a speaker who uses the word *data* as if it were singular. The fact that this educator is constantly on the watch for just this one possible slip, missing many more flagrant and inexcusable inaccuracies or else ignoring them, and that he frankly tells how the use of data as singular disturbs him, leaves ground for presuming that he himself found it difficult to get used to treating the word as plural. He should, therefore, be the last to condemn others for a like difficulty, but as a matter of fact he is the first to detect the error and cast stones. Unquestionably he would have been a better social animal had he never been trained to use data as plural.

Manners of the type to which attention has been chiefly directed in this discussion, instead of being evidence of inherent superiority of the well-mannered over the unmannered or even the ill-mannered, are really connecting links between the mannered and the unmannered. Such manners as have an underlying, sensible purpose, are not impossible of attainment by the commonplace people; indeed, they find their way into the behavior of those who are usually regarded as unmannered, although they may not be easily recognized because they have been stripped in most instances of their ostentatiousness. That man of the commonplace people who refrains from pursuing the most elaborate manners he knows so that he may not be charged with "putting on airs," comes closer to having real manners than the individual who takes up manners solely as a means of putting on airs.

When an effort is made to determine the true worth of a man from the viewpoint of the state, the principal thing that separates the mannered gentry from the common people will be found to be a spirit of snobbery that is of more discredit to the gentry than can be offset by the attainment of a coating of superficial behavior. It would be relatively easy for the child of the gentry, if left free of restraint, to slip into the ways of the commonplace people; and it is almost as easy for the child of ordinary parentage, if coached for a short time, to affect the ornamental forms practiced by the gentry. But if the price to be paid is a surrender of the spirit of tolerance and reasonable freedom to others, the nation is far better off if commonplace man refuses to take up manners in which he can see no sense.

The various meanings that are given to the word manners, makes the term cover a multitude of sins and a few virtues. It is worth the while of a democratic people to give thought to those manners that are virtuous, and therefore they should have a means of testing manners. The criterion to be employed, whether for a whole people or a family, is the same. Manners that are truly good, serve in making it possible for people to live more comfortably together. Many a parent attempts to direct the behavior of children by threatening that if they do not observe this rule or that, they will not be taken out into company. The child naturally presumes that manners are a thing to be shown off in company. Manners take on a false meaning to any member of a family unless that member sees as the primary purpose of such manners the aim to make for more agreeable living conditions within the family itself. If the various members of a family should strive so to pattern their behavior as to make it easier for them to live comfortably together, they will cultivate a form of manners that will not only safeguard them from offending others, but also serve that larger purpose of manners, which is, the development of character. If all the elements of a democratic people could come to look upon manners as having as their chief purpose the working out of an attitude in behavior that will make it easier for these elements to live together, then as individuals and also as a group the people would through manners develop an effective instrument for helping to make democracy a success.

XIV. PHILOSOPHY AND MEDIOCRITY

For several generations past, man's relation to his world has been undergoing a change. Science has been familiarizing him with the notion that he is a bundle of impulses which are neither good nor bad. Morality is engaged in organizing these impulses for him. Political developments have brought into circulation an entirely different conception of society, in which there are no fixed classes with predestined leaders and predestined followers. This change in man's relation to his world demands a general re-adjustment. Fixed standards that have survived as unvarying rules but which have no relation to actual conditions of life, must be given up, while man's conception of moral, social, and intellectual values must be reorganized. In such a reorganization, philosophy should be leading the way. But what has philosophy contributed to the cause of democracy? It has remained on the level of abstract intellect, *i.e.*, the perpetuation of fixed standards, the quest of absolute truths, absolute reality, absolute goodness. It has maintained a position of complete indifference to the great problem of democracy, the problem of a common life.

Philosophy pays scant attention to commonplace existence. Such notice as it occasionally takes of mediocrity is hurtful rather than beneficial to the lot of the mediocre. When a philosopher condescends

to regard commonplace man, he assumes much the attitude that a dandy might if brought, perforce, into contact with some one suspected of being pedicular. The philosopher, an intellectual dandy, is not concerned with getting close enough to the ordinary creature to obtain an impression as to how life appears from the commonplace viewpoint; but, considering selfishly only his own security, strives to keep always at a safe distance from the so-called rabble. What he regards as a safe distance is enough to prevent him from seeing commonplace existence as an actual part of life. If such conduct were only to be noted in an occasional philosopher, the matter could be disposed of by writing the offender down as an intellectual snob; it is, however, the usual bearing. Therefore, if Royce's conception of the science is true—"Philosophy has its origin and value in an attempt to give a reasonable account of our personal attitude toward the more serious business of life"—then the stand of present-day philosophers toward mediocrity is an indictment of the whole philosophic group. (Both Dewey and James may be thought of as not deserving to be included in this somewhat sweeping condemnation. The easier course would doubtless be to write them down as striking exceptions that prove the rule, but that would not be entirely truthful. James certainly sensed the demand that philosophy be made human enough to include a consideration of mediocrity; occasionally he appeared actually to be flirting with that demand, but at the most he gave it only fragments of attention in his writings. These fragments are interesting chiefly in indicating the extent of the services he might have rendered to

democracy had he repulsed the advances of psychology, which with her coquetry landed him. Dewey has consistently sought to get very close to earth even though he warrants the suspicion that in philosophizing on democracy, in the laboratory of his own aristocratic mind, he has conceived the elements of mediocrity in a population as somewhat different from what they actually are, and—still in the laboratory of his own mind—has changed these elements to be even less mediocre than he at first conceived them. But credit must be given to both Dewey and James for having partially blazed the way toward a democratizing of both philosophy and philosophers.)

Mediocrities certainly no less than intellectuals find themselves circumscribed with the serious business of life, but ordinary man is compelled to grope about as best he can in the dark since no philosopher volunteers to serve him adequately as an interpreter of the proper personal attitude a man should cultivate toward the very serious business of living a commonplace existence. Such interpretations of mediocrity as philosophy does proffer, are not designed to help commonplace man understand his world relations better, but rather to reconcile supposedly superior men to the presence on Mother Earth of mediocrities, regarding them as a necessary evil. Commonplaceness is looked upon by philosophers much as the hookworm is regarded by medical science; it is a something that must, if possible, be isolated into nonexistence or, if that cannot be done, then reduced at least to passiveness. The complaint that commonplace existence receives no equitable consideration from philosophy will doubtless prompt philosophers

to come back loftily with the observation that the mediocre can have no interest in philosophy, nor can philosophy be expected to take an interest in mediocrity, except pathologically as a race affliction.

It appears ridiculous, no doubt, from the standpoint of contemporary philosophers to presume that they should direct their master minds into the highways and hedges peopled by ordinary creatures; to become interpreters of life for those who are pronouncedly commonplace. Nevertheless, present-day philosophy can ill-afford to be arrogant with the mediocre of any peoples since its own position in the family of modern sciences is dangerously near to one of mediocrity. Its intellectual pursuits appear the most profound, as well as the most useless type of thinking now being carried on in the world. In ages past the philosopher left his imprint on the life of his own and succeeding generations, whereas today the philosopher leaves his imprint, if at all, on recondite tomes which are destined to remain undisturbed on the library shelf except on those rare occasions when a maid, not through choice but by direction, takes them down and with her dustcloth removes the only sort of homage they receive or, in most instances, deserve.

Philosophy should be very closely tied up with the life of the people, but as at present constituted it is the deadest of all the sciences that lay a claim to being concerned with human existence. The contemporary philosopher wrestles with the dictionary until he has rooted out its most unusual words. Not satisfied that these difficult words in their virgin state will escape being understandable to a sufficient number of his prospective readers, he twists them into

such grotesque form that they become unintelligible almost to himself. Then he anchors his word-logged mind to some inanimate phase of existence until it drags up a series of postulations that are so intricate that even if set down in words of one syllable they would still assume the aspect of being conundrums. These intricacies, however, are dressed up in the involved lingo which the philosopher has adopted, and he pours forth a lot of high-sounding, low-meaning conjectures which are accepted in certain quarters as wisdom, not because there is aught of wisdom manifested by them, but because the whole discourse is as impenetrable as a London fog—and many superficial students accept as very profound whatever is impenetrable to them. These conjectures are accepted by the philosopher himself as a real contribution to the world's knowledge on the negative premise that no one rises up to debate them—but who could attempt to debate a proposition which is unintelligible even to those competent to pass upon the soundness of an understandable philosophical thesis?

This, then, is the present-day situation as regards men professionally trained in philosophy and who should be capable of working out for man a reasonable program of proper attitudes toward the more serious business of contemporaneous, commonplace life. If it were true that every individual builds up a philosophy of his own, as is frequently asserted, then a school of real, red-blooded philosophers would not be urgently needed by the world today. As a matter of fact, however, most individuals do not have a definite philosophy; they do not get a perfectly clear vision as to what is, or should be, their attitude

toward the more serious business of life. Moreover, such laymen as do, in course of time, find a supposedly personal philosophy, seldom actually create any considerable part of it, but merely put together, piecemeal, certain truths and fallacies adapted from the philosophies of others. Ancient philosophers left to the world a rich heritage for reading; and fragments of this reading matter are available for practical use. Current philosophers, however, are producing little, if anything, that is worth a tinker's damn to ordinary man. There are countless so-called philosophers plying their trade today as college teachers. They proceed on the assumption that their calling is justified if they train the relatively few students coming to them to be dry-as-dust students like unto themselves. Consequently the sum total of their contribution to a science that should ever be alive in clarifying the problems of life, is simply more confusion.

A serious business of life to the average, commonplace man is the need of satisfying the wants of his family in the matter of clothing, food, education, and social activities. The more mediocre the man, the more serious appear certain aspects of this business. If an ordinary man is unfortunate and gets out of work and his income stops entirely, his children, whom he seeks to protect because of his paternal affection no less than his sense of duty, may have to go without proper clothing, without sufficient food, without protection from the elements such as is afforded by a decent house to live in. Here is presented a problem of gigantic proportions in the serious business of life. What should ordinary man's attitude toward this

problem be? Should he, realizing the uncertainty of his ability always to provide, and the certitude of distress if at times he cannot make reasonable provision, avoid the responsibilities of a home? The professional philosopher has no more idea of the answer to this question than has the mediocre subject himself. Contemporary philosophers can talk and teach academic logic and ethics and metaphysics; they can map out precisely the route to be pursued in abstract reasoning; but when it comes to a practical problem in the business of everyday living, they are the least practical of human beings. Under them philosophy, supposed to work from the known to the unknown, hobbles along usually in such fashion as to make the already known seemingly unknowable.

The question may be asked—has indeed frequently been asked: What useful purpose do philosophers serve in the world of their day? And the half-truthful answer is: None. They have succeeded in divorcing their science from life, and consequently of denying it real usefulness or legitimate productiveness. They form a group which is ready to speculate on profound abstract propositions, such as: How can one object—a housemaid—have knowledge of another object—a dish-pan? After long and painful travail, the idea of an apron—a philosophical term and not an item of wearing apparel for the maid—is brought into existence. The idea of an apron, intended to explain how one object can have knowledge of another object, is dissolved into such thin abstraction that the philosophizing ends with housemaid, dish-pan, and apron all becoming conundrums. But as a group present-day philosophers have grown too impractical

to attack essential problems that confront the living world. Inasmuch as philosophy is now rendering no real service to mankind, it would appear, on the surface, that modern philosophers might as well close shop and take to a more lively field such as Sanskrit or mythology. This conclusion, however, would be a bit unfair to coming generations. Present-day philosophers may be looked upon, without meaning disrespect, as seat-warmers, for they as a group manage to keep a place reserved for philosophy in the educational system. For this service the philosopher is well paid, receiving remuneration far in excess of that due even a college-bred caretaker. And should a group of real, modern philosophers come along in course of time, its members will find a niche conveniently set aside for them where they will be able to function, teaching abstract philosophy, abstractly, if needs be, to abstract students, but concurrently working constructively to revive the true spirit of a living philosophy. Then modern philosophy will resume intimate relations with the real world of its day, and human relations with mediocrity—which is so large a part of the world of any age.

If America should produce in years to come, a true, modern school of democratic philosophy, it is not to be supposed that these philosophers will feel obligated to address themselves to the mentally mediocre any more than do the philosophers at present holding forth—but they must take account of the mediocre. The world is never likely to be so stupid as to insist that its philosophers speak only in the vernacular of the commonalty or that they think no thoughts above the comprehension of a man with a child's mind. Such

faults as are to be found with contemporary philosophers touch their lingo only incidentally, and are founded chiefly on the fact that the philosophers do not attempt to understand life in its broadest sense or to ascertain what actually is life's serious business. That the teachings of the prospective real philosophers may be clothed, if they see fit, in philosophical nomenclature, is a matter that must rest with them individually, and their choice of a form of expression need not militate against the ultimate widespread diffusion of the underlying truth. But no philosopher can hope to interpret life correctly unless he knows life intimately through personal contact. Again, no philosopher can expect to make a real contribution to knowledge in his chosen field unless the principles he seeks to expound can eventually be translated into the commonplace language of the commonplace people.

Granting that the constructive philosopher of the future must needs go to life itself for his data, it does not follow that, when he has gathered his data and wishes to digest them, he may not seek the exclusiveness of his study if he so elects; or, after he has worked out his propositions in retirement, that he must personally appear before the people *en masse* to present his findings. The traditions of his profession may urge that he express himself in the accepted Grecanized English of his group. This tradition deserves some consideration, since it is proper for any scientific man to submit to his specially trained group the principles he espouses, and he is fully warranted in resorting to a form of presentation that will dignify his work with his group as that of a scholar. He will,

however, always have the satisfaction of knowing that should he be able to cast a new light upon the proper attitude of people toward the serious business of life, it will not be long before his teachings, by popularization, will be translated into understandable language for the people at large. Both the group to which he first addresses himself, then, and the form of expression employed, will be of secondary importance to this future philosopher, since, if the content of his teachings has aught of real value, this will find itself readily adapted to the mental capabilities of commonplace people.

Here is revealed a two-fold significance to the mission of contemporary philosophers which is certainly not now being taken into account by those who are working in the field. When the philosopher expounds a truth, no matter how profound may be both the principle and the form in which that principle is cast, the truth taught is not to be regarded as permanently above the comprehension of the common people, for it will quickly force its way down until it touches and influences the lives of such people as may have seemed very far out of reach of the philosopher while he was working on his problem. The second aspect of significance to the situation is that not with sages, but with commonplace people rests the final word in passing upon the worth of a philosopher. If he has no truth to teach that can eventually be presented in understandable form to the commonplace people, then he has no truth to teach that will survive, and his professional labors and profound meditations are to be looked upon as just so much marking of time while he draws his wage for a sup-

posedly worth while task. Philosophers who work only for the purpose of getting a livelihood, are not of course concerned with making a contribution to the world's knowledge or in redeeming philosophy from its present position of seat-warmer. But such past philosophers as have survived did not teach in vain even as far as the most commonplace of people are concerned, since their teachings, in changed form it may be, but yet not changed past recognition, have found a passage way into the everyday life of mediocrity.

The ambition of any philosophical endeavor should be that any truth uncovered will as quickly as possible come to touch all life by being filtered down through the various strata of society. This process of percolation should serve both in carrying the truth to all elements of society and at the same time in increasing the sympathetic relations of these several elements, one to the other. If this be the goal of true philosophy, then fallacious indeed is the assumption that common people can mean nothing to the philosopher and that philosophy can mean nothing to common people. A philosophy that hopes to survive must both see and reach the common people. Consequently the philosopher who aspires to have his teachings live in the lives of succeeding generations must descend, figuratively speaking, to the level of the common people. The contemporary philosopher has not done this, and because of his failure he is contributing nothing of permanent value to the world's store of truth. When tomorrow's philosopher gets a truer insight into the mission of his science, then a new school of philosophy will spring into being and life will take a fresh

spurt forward—philosophy will once more come into its own.

Commonplace existence is at present stirred with a feeling of restlessness. This unrest is not due to any other cause so much as to the failure of intellectuals or uncommon people on the one hand, and on the other hand of mediocrities or common people to see in commonplaceness a state as fully justified as any other to which man can be cast, and one that should be accepted with as good grace—indeed with as much pride. The philosopher of the present goes along with something little short of contempt for the common people, and he has been responsible in no small measure for encouraging among his following a like attitude. He has shut his eyes to the fact that society is not made up of distinct and independent groups, but that each group touches some other groups intimately, and that every group has its share in making the composite body called society what it is. By this attitude of the supposedly superior to the presumedly inferior, not only has the inferior element been put into an unquiet mental state that prevents it from filling adequately its large mission in society, but it has, from the outside, been coaxed on to conclude that perhaps it must wage a war against the supposedly superior for its own self-preservation. There is not only an urgent need for the intellectuals to recognize mediocrities as equally necessary and desirable parts of society, but it would be well also for the intellectuals to bear in mind that they are intellectuals only relatively and by contrast with others who chance to be less intelligent.

As long as philosophy looks on life as it is lived by the intellectuals only, it is seeing but a small part of the structure which is the subject of its study. It is attempting to ascertain the strength of the structure by examining the steeple instead of the foundation. Life in the broad is not understood by restricting a study of it to any one group of the people, nor to any single phase of existence; indeed the life of just one group cannot be studied scientifically without taking into account other groups with which the studied group has relations. Each element and class constitutes a feature only of society as a whole, and it is fully as ridiculous for philosophy to attempt a study of just one group when seeking to determine proper attitudes toward the serious business of life, as it would be for medical science to attempt to study and understand the functioning of the nose after having amputated that feature from the face and while refusing to acknowledge any relation between the isolated feature and other parts of the body from which it had been severed. The philosopher ceases to be true to the purpose of his science when he soars to heights where only the existence of the super-intellectuals is visible to him, or presumes that he can find a distinct form of existence which has meaning only to such intellectuals. He then becomes a decoy for error rather than the revealer of truth in persuading his adherents to follow him along a path which obscures from scholar and student, life in its entirety. Whatever ability he may have is made ineffective by his attitude in failing to see life as comprising all the people. Life after all is not quite so much in evidence with the intellectuals, who live in abstraction, as with

the mediocrities, who live face to face with its serious business.

Master philosophers did not set the precedent for regarding philosophy as concerning and being of concern to only the intellectuals. In the days of the older philosophers, the ability to read was restricted to the select few, but the philosophers through public discourse spread their truths before all people. Commonplace people then had fewer responsibilities because they had less independence, and discussions concerning life and its serious business may have seemed above the heads of many of them. But the present-day counterpart of these commonplace people of long ago has grown up to the sane teachings of early philosophy, and today in the lives even of the mediocre are found translated fragments of truths that have been taught by sages of all ages. That a new reign of philosophy may dawn, is not only a possibility, but a desirability. But it must be inaugurated by scholars who will look on life not as a transient society would make it nor as an infinitesimal fragment of it may appear when isolated in a vacuum, but as nature has decreed that it shall always be—which is to say, that it will ever be largely commonplace. The prospective true philosopher of tomorrow will see commonplace existence as a permanent and important reality, and he will undertake to reveal mediocrity in that light. This will lead him to study reverently the life of mediocre man—in his home, in his toil, in his civic activities, and in his religious expressions. He will see commonplace existence not as a state which should be altered, but as a state which is to be accepted as of primary importance

and dignity, calling for development, but not alteration or elimination.

It would doubtless greatly offend current, unproductive philosophers to be warned that they should proceed with greater regard—or even with greatest regard for the mediocre; but in so far as a philosopher ignores this warning, in just so far does he shut to himself the doors to a useful purpose as a national factor in American life, despite all his profound reasoning. There is no denying that modern philosophy has been asleep on its job. The world has spun on, working out the freshly arising problems in industry, in commerce, in education, in politics, in social life; but all this has been done to the snoring of philosophy. It may be convenient for the philosopher to offer as an offset for his shortcomings, which he occasionally acknowledges, the plea that in these other fields men have not solicited his coöperation when attacking the task they found waiting for them. But if the philosopher is to be useful, he cannot stand on his dignity and allow pride to prevent him from working out his part of the problems that are revealed with each forward step in the various activities engaging the minds and hands of human beings. Whatever charge could be brought against men outside the field of philosophy for having ignored the philosopher, will crumble away when these men show that philosophy has not sought to keep pace with the times; that it has elected rather to live in a dead past while the world has been wrestling day by day with the serious business of present living.

Of course, there is a stock reply to this criticism of modern philosophy, and so, instead of waiting for the

philosophic group to present it, the defense may be anticipated. This defense is that the modern philosopher regards his subject as belonging to the classical field. He is a disciple of Aristotle and sees good only in the Aristotelian tradition of the cultivation of the mind in the abstract. And to this defense may be made, as answer, the indictment which Spencer brought against the metaphysicians of his day when he wrote that they, "rising to abstractions and thence to abstractions of abstractions, take their stand upon these and proceed to abolish the realities from which the abstractions are derived—apparently supposing that the abstractions continue to exist." Recurring to a reference made earlier in this chapter; the contemporary philosopher, first isolating himself in a vacuum of abstraction, then endeavors to explain how one object can have knowledge of another object, and carries his abstract reasoning to a point where he literally destroys both objects, and then rests his labors with the conclusion that the *how* on which he has been toiling is the only reality that remains. But, significantly, the *how*, even as it lives in his abstractions, is not an answer but still a question. Modern philosophy is as ineffective when seeking to perpetuate the Aristotelian tradition, as psychology would be if it held to the antiquated theory that mind is distinct from body or as medical science would be if it still regarded dissection as sacrilegious.

In the absence of aid from the philosophic group, the common people have too frequently allowed those who had been trained—usually inadequately trained—as spiritual advisers to work out patterns for their attitudes toward those serious businesses of life that

are not concerned with religion. This has been unfortunate for the incompetent would-be guide, for those who accepted the guidance, and for many who fall into neither of these classes. The bad preacher is invariably a worse philosopher, and it is because he cannot be critical of his own performance that he becomes, first, a bad preacher and later turns a worse philosopher. Religion has to do with teaching beliefs; philosophy with finding truths. If philosophy could produce men of wisdom and courage and practicability, who would look with clear eyes at the whole of life as it is lived, and attack the worth while problems that are awaiting solution by philosophy, not only would it become a mighty force in contemporary life, but it would stimulate to more sensible endeavor those who are engaged on problems of government, industry, education, and religion. Philosophy cannot, of course, work out the problems inviting its consideration in the same precise way that is possible in the field of exact sciences. It cannot present a teaching whose truth will be as self-evident as the assertion that two and two are four. But it has a higher incentive than that offered students in the field of mathematics, for if its teachings are truth, the answer will be "good." Philosophy can attempt to work out a program of attitudes toward life's serious business which will tend to cement the sympathies and interests of all people, and at the same time make each element contented with its own particular place in life. Such contentment will not lead to inactivity, but will serve as an incentive for each individual to attack the job for which he is fit and to make a good job of it because he and the world will recognize it as a worth while job.

XV. REPRODUCING THEIR KIND

A marked change has occurred during the past decade in the attitude of Americans toward their government. From colonial days on well through the Nineteenth Century much thought was given by the American people to the task of working out a form of government under which coming generations should find it possible to live in peace and prosperity. Along what lines governmental activities should be expanded and how the government might be expected to behave in the future when so expanded, were then matters for grave concern. These citizens of former years looked reverently upon the things that had been accomplished by pioneers in colonial and early national days, and conceived it their own business to see that the type of government already worked out should not be changed rashly; should not be changed at all except with a view better to serve the interests of the governed. They were content, seemingly, to trust to a wise Providence to continue peopling the land with creatures fit to inherit and capable of maintaining that government.

But old-fashioned conservatism has gradually been shoved off into one corner, while the center of the stage is monopolized by a troupe of adventurers—or bandits?—each of whom appears desirous of playing a dual rôle as remodeler of the existing government and substitute for a discarded Providence. These ambi-

tious schemers regard government as a sort of incubator that can be used for producing future generations of predetermined character, and themselves as expert breeders upon whom falls responsibility for originating a hybrid species of citizenry which will fit an artificially mothered Americanism.

It may be that in the past both statesmen and citizens were disposed to accord disproportionate glory to those who had settled the land; who determined its initial national aims; and who fought, first, to free the colonies and later to keep them free. It may be that the people of yesteryear had entirely too much confidence in the ability of Nature, which had evolved man, to keep him evolved. But after making allowances for possible blunders on their part through innocent credulity, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that they rested their case on more logical premises than now support the claims of those who ridicule them and seek, through ridicule, to bring about a complete repudiation of the past. If these earlier citizens exaggerated the worth of their leaders, this was due to that common human susceptibility to hero-worship, and hero-worship at its worst is better decidedly than self-worship. If they placed absolute reliance on the existence of some greater force than man's intellect for directing the world's destiny, due to their old-fashioned religious teaching, history revealed to them testimony which warranted such faith. It is well to remember that those they hailed as heroes had actually served their country, and received public recognition only after work—and frequently the life of the worker—had been completed. But what, by way of comparison, can be said of the

horde of present-day theorists who expect the world to pay them homage in advance for results which they claim will accrue, at some future time, should their proposals be foisted upon the people? No guarantee can they offer that these results would be attained, much less that the proposals themselves are not hazardous for any democratic people.

These contemporary theorists wail and gnash their teeth whenever they think of what the country will come to, if they fail to salvage the ship of state and bring to a close its present aimless drifting. There is no positive evidence, of course, that the nations of the world are merely drifting today any more than that they have always been drifting. If nations have ever just drifted, then to their credit be it admitted that frequently they have chanced into pretty snug harbors and have for long periods not been disturbed with rough sailing. Moreover, from its very beginning the world has seemingly always been sufficiently stocked with a satisfactory run of human beings. There is no reason to suppose that the force which has heretofore been responsible for supplying a reasonably good quality and quantity of human beings, is now about to fall down on its job, and that a group of rash theorists must jump into the breach and save the day and the tomorrow. But these theorists are exceedingly busy in America at present working out plans for saving the nation from race suicide, race deterioration, moron predominance, and other dire dangers that thrive chiefly among the weeds that grow in morbid minds.

As is usually the case with a widespread public movement, back of the present scheme to save the

nation and the race may be found, in each active group of propagandists, a few serious individuals whose purposes are good, whose views are moderately sane, and whose labors might bear at least a little sound fruit were it not for the unhappy presence, in each group, of a preponderance of individuals whose purposes are vague, whose views are stupid and whose labors are spent solely in self-seeking.

In this contemporary campaign which is undertaken, it is alleged, for the purpose of making sure that the land will hereafter be peopled with the right kind and right quantity of citizens, three distinct points of approach are to be noted. At each of these points will be discovered a relatively small number of scientific, or least sincere and intelligent, men who would, if left alone, do no harm, but might actually accomplish a bit of good. However in each instance a typical mob of superficial busybodies who make a fad of what should be a serious investigation, dominates the group, and these busybodies by their fadding preclude all possible usefulness to the movement. Although the three points of approach already referred to might be regarded as constituting each a distinct movement, they all have a somewhat common aim and may therefore be treated collectively as one concerted endeavor to preserve the race from its presumed peril, and at the same time to develop a governmental technique for producing a type of future generations that will be immune from such peril as at present is said to threaten.

First, there is the movement aimed at what is referred to as race suicide, and the group back of this movement beholds with dismay the unwillingness of

married couples to produce the same sized families as were common a generation and more back. Those active in this movement insist that it is a citizen's duty to rear a large family—his duty to his country. Fully as active, but not quite so open in their preachings, is the second group of propagandists who, regarding themselves as the select, are visibly disturbed by the fact that heaven seems to give more children, per family, to the common people than to those whom these theorists regard as of their own superior group. Finally, the problem of the future peopling of the land is attacked by dabblers in eugenics who would put reproduction of the human species on the same practical, industrial basis that it occupies in the field of modern animal husbandry.

(In passing it may be observed that if students of eugenics could pursue their study without having to drag along a host of irresponsible faddists, it is possible that in course of years some worth while truths might be popularized regarding the bearing of eugenics on human reproduction. The scientific facts established could be filtered down to the layman and gradually these truths would assume the aspect of traditions, and as such would command respect even if not literal translation into everyday living. But that eugenics will ever become a general study to be pursued by all people with a view to employing the knowledge gained as a guide when mating and bearing children, is so preposterous a suggestion that it does not merit serious consideration. Before people generally could be brought to look upon themselves as put on earth for the sole purpose of trying to produce a generation of physically and mentally better people

than themselves, and for that next generation in turn to have as its primary aim the production of succeeding generation of increased superiority, common man will have to have prepared for him a much more convincing explanation of the purpose of life than has yet been offered by scientists, theorists, or propagandists.)

Too much do the theorists who rant against race suicide take it for granted that they have license to pour tirades upon any married man and woman who, possessing the means and leisure to rear a large family of favored children, avoid the responsibilities accompanying parenthood. That couples which are highly favored with this world's goods should not engage extensively in child-rearing is not in itself a threat of race suicide, although invariably it is written down under this heading. If married couples of culture, of wealth, or broad education, purposely hold their families to a minimum, or else flatly refuse to have offspring, while, on the other hand, common people for some reason or other raise large families, there is no race suicide in a literal sense. As a matter of fact, under the surface of most of the propaganda against race suicide will be found a wish not to stimulate reproduction generally, but to encourage child-bearing among those who are accepted as of the select. The agitators entertain no actual fear of a decrease in the number of people who will constitute America's population in decades to come; their interest is in the maintenance—or increase—of a certain ratio between what might be thought of as well-born children and children of commonplace parentage.

With the exception of possibly a few primitive races that have become so circumscribed by the progress of

civilization that they find themselves living in an artificial and not agreeable atmosphere, the rate of reproduction is going on satisfactorily throughout the world. The gospel against race suicide, if stripped of its mask, will be revealed as motivated by the wish to stimulate people who are able to rear large families in comfort to do more child-bearing; and, on the reverse side, this scheme carries with it the purpose of discouraging fruitfulness on the part of those who find it difficult to provide for large families or whose offspring may, in the judgment of these propagandists, not be regarded as desirable to constitute a predominating element of future generations. In the final analysis, it is largely a matter of supposedly uncommon man seeking to rouse his kind into competition with supposedly common man in the privilege of parenting the American people of tomorrow.

This subject leads naturally to a question of birth control. Birth control is one of the favored tools considered by those who are active in the general movement to take from Providence the job of peopling the world wisely. Bare mention of birth control stirs up one element of the people as quickly as the sight of a dog prompts a cat to prepare for defensive combat; while another element—the birth control faddist—is guilty of acting much like that meddlesome dog who maliciously arouses the combativeness of the feline. The intimation that some families which are properly conditioned for the comfortable rearing of large families, do not produce such families, is in itself an admission that birth-control is practiced. Strong denunciation of birth control comes from two radically different sources. The individual who has

no faith in common people, damns birth control as practiced by those who, he feels, could produce uncommon children. At the same time violent opposition is made even to the suggestion that birth control be discussed, in order to ascertain its merits and demerits, by a body of clergy who, presuming to see the subject from a religious standpoint, actually view it from the standpoint of politics. They see birth control as a threat against the fruitfulness of their own communicants, while the success of their church is viewed by them as resting chiefly on the numerical strength of its membership.

Hand in hand with those who condemn the practice of birth control among married couples blessed with this world's goods, because of a fear that in course of time there will be, not race suicide, but class suicide—if the phrase may be used—of the select, go those who advocate the teaching of birth control among the common people. These latter propagandists draw appealing pictures of the burden which child-bearing brings to the lowly, and claim to be inspired with the altruistic purpose of lightening the heavy load of the oppressed; but in the next breath, as at the recent international birth control congress in England, they tell how the British Isles, for instance, face a very serious situation in the danger of being over-populated. It is apparent that both groups of agitators aim at the same end. The denouncers of race suicide actually desire married couples of the better class to bring into the world more children so that any change in the ratio between the offspring of common and select parents will be to the advantage of the select; the birth control advocates wish to give the lowly such

information regarding reproduction as will enable them to restrict their families, thus accomplishing about the same percentage of reduction in the birth rate among common people as has already been recorded by birth control among select couples. (Race suicide, it may be mentioned, is also condemned, although without warrant, by an element which looks beyond class divisions, perhaps, and thinks that a nation, such as the United States, must rear children prolifically for the purpose of creating a great reserve force of humans as a measure of preparedness against that day when this country might enter a struggle with some other world power.)

Forgetting for a time the grades of children produced, it may be in order to consider whether a danger threatens the United States because the average family of today may be smaller in size than was common in past generations. Due to the abundance and cheapness of domestic help in past decades, the raising of a family placed on parents in good circumstances a comparatively smaller burden than does the rearing of one or two children today. Servants were somewhat generally employed to care for the children of the middle class people no less than those of means; but today a mother of the group regarded as middle class is compelled to give her children most of the attention they receive. There is reason to suppose that efficient females for domestic service will become increasingly scarce with the passage of years, rather than that domestic helpers will ever again become available in such adequate numbers and at such relatively low wages as characterized this field of employment up to the close of the Nineteenth Century.

When the propagandist takes modern well-to-do couples to task on account of bearing fewer children than were reared by couples in like circumstances many years ago, he fails to make allowance for the increased burden which child-rearing heaps on the couples. He also loses sight of the increased success of child-delivery today, so that, with a steadily decreasing rate in infant mortality, there may still be a decided decrease in the birth rate without spelling any change in the number of children who will actually come to maturity. In years gone by the greatest infant mortality was, of course, among parents in poor circumstances. The decrease in infant mortality, therefore, records its largest gain among children born to parents in such circumstances. If these parents were educated in matters of birth control, however, and practiced the things taught, it is probable that the steady decrease in infant mortality would offset any possible decline in the birth rate among this class as far as concerns the number of children who will be successfully carried to maturity. But the effect that would result from teaching birth control promiscuously is purely a speculation. It is too readily assumed that many parents bring a large number of children into the world solely because they are ignorant of means whereby they might regulate the size of their families. This is a presumption pure and simple, as no data are available to indicate that the common people are not acquainted with methods of birth control, and that their families grow despite such knowledge. Teaching a people a thing does not necessarily mean that they will put the teaching into practice. There are a host of factors

that must be counted on to offset those results which the birth control faddists suppose would follow a widespread campaign of education setting forth the means for controlling reproduction.

Going below the surface in search of the true underlying motives of those who advocate the teaching of eugenics and birth control and who attack race suicide, it will be found that most of this propaganda is rooted in a subconscious dread that the nation may be dependent too much on the common people for furnishing future generations and too little on the select, the intellectual, and the physically exceptional. It would be unfair to imply that those who preach eugenics, who decry the failure of the select to have big families of choice youngsters, and who would spread the doctrine of birth control among the lowly, all aim consciously to accomplish something toward maintaining or increasing the ratio between select and unselect children. Many of the propagandists do not have intelligence enough to go this deeply into the subject; they enlist in one or another of the movements because it appeals as a fascinatingly morbid hobby. A portion of these agitators do, however, note that the common people are bringing forth many children while uncommon people are producing few children, and they wonder if too many common children are not being born for convenient assimilation by the body politic without lowering its quality. They see no means of escaping the danger except by reducing the birth rate among common children, and they delude themselves about their altruistic interest so that they can grow emotional over the unjust burden placed on common parents through bearing

common children. A few who denounce race suicide see the same problem, and they seek to stimulate reproduction among the select on the plea of patriotism. In the same way, certain students of eugenics behold the identical thing, and they would use wisdom —such as they possess—for regulating the selection of the male and the female with particular regard as to what kind of a product will result from the union. It all resolves itself into a dread lest the common people, through ignorance, normal sex relations, or the very form of patriotism that is preached to the select, bring into the world too many of their kind, so that the predominance of common people will steadily increase.

These views should be thoroughly tested in order to determine whether the dread itself is valid. It is not necessary to question the assertion that commonplace people do produce larger families on an average than select couples. But no proof has been offered to show that the children of common people are always common or that the children of uncommon people are always uncommon. Theoretically, it may be claimed that the same probability exists for common parents to produce an uncommon child as for uncommon parents to produce a commonplace child. This is purely a hypothesis, but it affords ground for asserting that, if the common people continue bringing forth children as freely as is their wont, in the great mass of offspring of common parents will be found enough uncommon children to relieve uncommon parents entirely of the job of attempting to reproduce their kind solely as an act of patriotism to keep alive an element of uncommon creatures. This

touches merely the genetic phase or what the child inherits from his parents.

Assuming that a nation is dependent upon a certain percentage of uncommon creatures being born to leaven the lump of commonplace children, the task of producing these uncommon creatures can safely be left with the common people, since by the law of variation they will continue producing the occasional uncommon child just as they always have been doing. That they have always been doing this is attested by history which records countless instances where the exceptional individual had his origin among pronouncedly commonplace people. Moreover, any democratic country is safer if it trusts to the whole people to provide it with the requisite number of uncommon creatures, than if it selects the exceptional people of any given period and conveys to them and their descendants forever responsibility for making up what is to be regarded by the nation as a superior class. Finally, a survey of the statistics afforded by history and biography justifies the conclusion that with equal educational opportunities more uncommon individuals will be developed from seemingly commonplace parents, with their prolificacy, than could be expected from any selected group. For certain forms of government, where leadership seeks to be hereditary, this conclusion will make equal educational opportunities appear as a threat against the existing form. In a democracy, however, it becomes a real safeguard, because positions available to those of exceptional ability are thus rotated from generation to generation.

XVI. FOLLOW THE LEADER

When democracy is attempted on as extensive a scale as in the United States, the only practicable method for conducting the government is through representatives. Representative government provides for the election by the people of agents to act for them in directing matters of public concern. (Certain governmental officials may be appointed; but since such appointments are made by duly elected representatives even the appointive offices are to be looked upon as having been filled by the people.) In a government where suffrage is as nearly universal as in America, it may, therefore, be presumed, off hand, that all those having to do with public business represent selections by the people. Moreover, since the common people predominate so overwhelmingly, these agents may be regarded as having been named by the common people. But common people whenever they undertake to elect representatives make a mess of it—at least, this is the contention of those who are impressed with the defects rather than the merits of government in the United States. Consequently all criticism directed at the American democracy takes its fling at the type of leaders who are put into public office; and whether this fling reaches its mark or not, it never misses the common people back of the leaders.

The anti-democrat is bold in asserting that whenever the masses are afforded an opportunity to choose between several candidates of varying degrees of

worth, or else worthlessness, they invariably select the least capable one. The anti-democrat calls on his auditors to visit the gallery of the national or any state capitol, and survey the specimens in the seats below them as typical of the sort of politician the people select as their legislators. The visitors will go away, this anti-democrat asserts, convinced of the stupidity of common people in the matter of naming representatives. The moralistic mugwump is equally bold in scoring the inability of the masses to choose the right kind of leader unless specific instructions are given them concerning the candidates for whom they are to cast their ballots. Proceeding with this view in mind, the moralistic group quizzes all candidates concerning their attitude toward this or that moralistic program, and puts its stamp of approval only on those who promise to coöperate with the uplifters. If no candidate seems entirely acceptable to this group, it occasionally places its personal candidate in the field. The distrust of this moralistic element in the leader-choosing ability of the common people finds further expression when an effort is made to coerce ministers of the gospel to instruct the members of their congregation, from the pulpit, how they are to vote. Finally, the educational mugwumps voice their lack of faith in the ability of common people wisely to select leaders when they propose that educational experts hereafter be permitted to pick such persons as to them seem fit timber for leadership; dress this timber according to their ideas as to how a prospective leader should be schooled; and then commission their products to serve as leaders for the always unwise masses.

With these three divergent elements intimating that in the matter of selecting leaders the American democracy has not been a success, and implying that it can never hope to have decent leaders as long as the mode for selecting them is on a strictly popular basis, it would surely appear as if there must be something radically wrong with the functioning of the common people when they seek to direct their collective affairs under a representative form of government.

But in their haste to criticize, mugwumps of all classes have not taken time to consider a fundamental preliminary to any discussion of leadership. It is foolish to condemn some one type of leader as unfit unless there is a standard showing what type is fit. Going a step further, it is impossible to come to any safe conclusions as to what would constitute a fit type of leader without first agreeing what is to be the purpose of the leadership. There is no end of discussion today concerning the need for a different type of leadership in America; but there is little discussion on a sound foundation regarding what should be the purpose of leadership among the American people. In days gone by American youths were wont to play "Follow the leader." This game was conducted democratically. Choice of the leader was by majority assent. But the leader was a leader only so long as he attempted no stunt in which his followers could not at least approximate his performance. A professional acrobat, for instance, would never have been tolerated as leader, nor would a bully; for the leadership was conditioned upon having a voluntary followership. On the other hand the boy who could think of moderately difficult feats was highly favored as pace-maker.

Critics of representative government as found under the American democracy can, when they approach the matter of leadership, learn something from the boys' game of "Follow the leader."

Practically all mugwumps who find fault with the present government expect that the changes their proposals would bring about would put them in power as directing forces; in short, they have designs on the leadership. If they, or any of them, are peculiarly qualified to direct the affairs of the nation capably toward a realization of democracy, then it would be a misfortune to all the people if they should be denied the opportunity to lead. But such leadership, if it is to be pronouncedly superior to the leadership it seeks to supplant, must be acquired by honorable means only. A leadership that is gained by chicanery invites suspicion at the offset, and the leader who does not have the trust of his followers is usually predoomed to failure. It must be admitted, in all frankness, that the suggestions so far advanced for bringing about a more efficient form of leadership in America do smell with the same odor that permeates party politics and boss domination as at present encountered in the United States. Ethically, there is little difference between stuffing a ballot-box and blanking the ballot of a *bona fide* voter, but the proposal that a majority of the people should be deprived of any part in the government by excluding them from the privileges of suffrage through tests that measure only one form of intelligence, is simply a conspiracy to blank ballots. Ethically, there is little difference between the political boss who corrals an army of political menials in order to control the electorate, and the intelligence

mugwump who would corral an army of abstract thinkers for the same purpose. When two such divergent elements as the political boss, on the one hand, and the intellectuals, on the other hand, are willing to resort to the same methods for control, it is permissible to assume that they may have the same object in view. If government is to continue to be looked upon as a game of politics, no reason could be presented for changing the deck, since the political boss has the advantage of long experience, and he has another advantage, from the standpoint of democracy, that he does endeavor to learn the views of all elements of the people—he constantly has his ear to the ground.

Until the mugwumps, when condemning the government as at present conducted and urging a change, formulate and publish a statement as to the aims they have in mind for the American people, it is necessary to study their past performances in order that some idea as to the underlying aims may be obtained. The anti-democrat is never against himself as a governing factor, but his opposition to democracy is rooted in antagonism to the majority. His complaint is based largely on the ground that the government is not agreeable to him personally, and consequently he does not even intimate that he is thinking of a change in terms of betterment for all the people. He would restrict the authority of the people only to such an extent as to exclude the common people from the electorate and, once having succeeded in such exclusion, it would thenceforth be his purpose to keep them excluded. As far as democracy is concerned, the criticism of the anti-democrat is purely destructive.

He does not openly propose an oligarchy or some other like governmental scheme as a substitute for the form he opposes, but confines his efforts to damning democracy. The moralistic mugwump would play the game of "Follow the leader" according to chain-gang rules. He is alert in building up a political organization with a few in authority, and the authority of those few supreme. Administratively, he parallels the unholy pattern of the political boss, but in one respect he appears less honorable in that he tries to play political boss while concealing his true self under a cassock. The great army of subservient tithe-givers which he enrolls as a "supporting army," has no voice in the organization's program except that of producing a chant with clinking tithes and mortgaged ballots. The educational mugwump proposes arbitrarily to name leaders, and to perpetuate leadership on this basis.

Leadership as at present determined is condemned by all mugwumps. Such condemnation is based on different premises by different mugwump groups. None of these groups is truly representative of the whole people, nor are the views of these various mugwump groups in harmony with one another. If present day leaders are representative of the people being represented and the government appears bad, then ground exists for criticizing representative government; but if the representatives are not actually representative of the people or bent upon representing them, then an entirely different situation obtains. Therefore, the first test to be made of any proposal for changing the type of leader or the method for determining leadership, is this: Does the proposal

offer to make government either more representative of the people or of the interests of the people? Technically there is a vast difference between representing a people and representing the interests of the people, but from the standpoint of the results that should obtain the two would seem to be synonymous. Thinking of representative government, then, as one in which duly qualified agents will represent the people by representing their interests, the program of one of the mugwump groups may be studied.

Inasmuch as the educational mugwump professes to be democratic, his proposals because of these professions invite consideration rather than those of protestants who are avowedly anti-democratic. The educational mugwump asserts that it will be advantageous to democracy if he is permitted to pick individuals with choice minds and train these minds for leadership. The purpose for which such leadership is to be trained is not stated by the mugwump; it doubtless has not been given as much consideration as the desire to hold the promise of leadership forth as a prize to those possessing in a high degree a certain form of intelligence. The educational mugwump's plan for making leaders is based on a differentiation of education, which in some respects may not be undemocratic. However, his selection of those who are to get training for leadership is to be decided by intelligence tests. Intelligence tests measure not mentality, but what the subject has learned or his education. The educational mugwump does not deny this, but he asserts that this revelation of the education of a subject indicates precisely that sub-

ject's learning capacity or abstract intelligence.* The validity of this claim can be gauged by finding a correct answer to the following two questions: First, do intelligence tests always reveal clearly the so-called abstract intelligence of the subject? Secondly, (and this is perhaps of even larger moment than the first question), is that something termed abstract intelligence which it is claimed will be revealed by these tests, the sort of intelligence that is most desirable for leadership outside the field of science and research?

A child reared in a home where from early babyhood he comes under the influence of highly educated adults, who associated intimately with the child, will, unless he is subnormal, score higher in such intelligence tests as the educational mugwumps propose to administer to him on his entrance into school, than will another child of exactly the same mentality but who has been reared in a home where there is a low standard of education or even illiteracy, unless the handicap of poor home environment has been offset in some way for the less favored child. On the other hand, if the parents of education should entrust the entire rearing of their child from the day of his birth to a family of little or no education, and, in exchange, should undertake to bring up as their own the lowly born child of the other home, the lowly born child would, under the mugwump's intelligence testing, show just as much surface superiority as might have been

*Native intelligence is the term usually employed, but as soon as the theorist begins to define native intelligence he shows very plainly that he is thinking of abstract intelligence which may have no larger claim to being native or innate than other forms of intelligence.

recorded by the well-born child had their positions remained unchanged. Moreover, this apparent initial advantage in intelligence revealed by whichever child has had the benefit of the superior home surroundings, will to a certain degree be reflected during his passage through the grades, while the handicap of the boy growing up in the home of low educational standards will also persist in a measure in subsequent testings, provided both of the children are given the identical educational opportunities in school and get no help in the preparation of their lessons outside of what is obtained in their respective homes. This being the case, it is very apparent that when candidates, in the form of entering pupils, come up for mental testing in order that the educational mugwump can determine which are to be trained as leaders and which as followers, the child of educated parents will have a very decided advantage, while the child of uneducated parents, starting in school with the handicap imposed by his inferior home environment, will in addition be threatened with having this handicap perpetuated as a political disadvantage because of the proposed differentiation in education of the two youths.

At least part of the educational mugwump group will contend that the influence of environment will not factor largely in the grade a child makes under intelligence testing. They claim that these tests measure accurately the abstract intelligence of the subject. If this claim be true, then its very truth condemns the entire program of the educational mugwumps. This so-called abstract intelligence is the thing which the mugwump would royalize. He stresses that form of

mentality which enables the individual to think abstractly. His quest, then, is for abstract thinkers; but an abstract thinker, no matter how valuable he may be as a scholar, is of doubtful value as a leader if he has small social intelligence—which is the type of mentality which enables a man to get on with his fellowmen. There are three recognized forms of intelligence. (Proof has not been adduced as yet to show that all of these are either exclusively inborn or amenable to training.) These three forms are usually written down as abstract, motor, and social. By practice the abstract form of intelligence is the one the mugwump has in mind when he speaks of native intelligence or general intelligence. It may be from the educational standpoint that abstract intelligence is the most to be desired; but no facts are offered to show that any one of these three forms of intelligence is not equally essential to the group success of a people. It is fairly well established, on the other hand, that those who possess to a large degree any one of the three forms of intelligence are sometimes deficient in the other two. In many instances the individual who develops into a profound thinker—the man with abstract intelligence—is woefully lacking in social intelligence. In modern civilized life social intelligence certainly is fully as important as abstract intelligence. Moreover, for leadership among a miscellaneous body of people, social intelligence is probably more important than either abstract or motor intelligence.

There may really be a fourth type of intelligence which is a coördinating agency for bringing about intelligent relations between an individual's abstract, social, and motor intelligence. If this is the case, the

educational mugwumps need desperately to find and recognize this type of intelligence. This would enable them to escape their present untenable position of seeing abstract intelligence as mentality, and motor and social intelligence as ignorance.

The educational mugwump proposes to select those individuals who, he thinks, possess superior abstract intelligence, accompanied probably with little social intelligence, to segregate these individuals as a favored group and train them for leadership, not of other abstract thinkers, but of the great body of the people. Under such segregation, the social intelligence of the selected group would be neglected, or at most would not be developed in an atmosphere of democratic intercourse with unselected individuals, and the hot-house grown leader would come forth less fitted to get on with his fellowmen than he would be if left to mix with other strata, for his greatest initial deficiency for leadership might have been a pronounced inability to get on well with people, and this an enforced give-and-take with a heterogeneous group might well correct.

It is apparent from this that the educational mugwump fathers a scheme which promises no betterment of conditions in the matter of finding leaders who will be peculiarly equipped to represent the people. This self-evident defect in an abstract intelligence proposal coming from an element which boasts of its own abstract intelligence, raises a question whether after all this group itself possesses abstract intelligence of a very high order.

Democracy is being written down as a failure on the score that the common people invariably select

unfit leaders, and that these unfit leaders are an insurmountable obstacle in the way of efficient government. One group of fault-finders comes out openly as opposed to democracy; another group, professing deep affection for the principles of democracy, really seeks to betray democracy under the pretense of striving to improve existing conditions. This group asserts that the salvation of the people depends upon abstract thinkers directing the affairs of the nation, but in a preliminary performance these abstract thinkers fall down in solving a problem in abstract reasoning that has a very important bearing on democracy. Moreover, this blunder on the part of the abstract thinkers doubtless explains in itself why apparently the electorate, when it is asked to choose between a candidate of exceptional intelligence and one of ordinary—or less than ordinary—intelligence, frequently favors the latter. Too often the candidate with abstract intelligence has little social intelligence, and scorns to use the little social intelligence he has to reveal his personality to those whom he invites to elect him as their leader.

It has previously been implied that preliminary to a discussion of what would constitute a fit leader, there should be an agreement as to the purpose of the proposed leadership. Such a preliminary decision is desirable regardless of the fact that a marked difference will almost always be noted between the avowed purpose of a leadership and the actual outcome of such leadership. The aim is the ideal; the performance is at best an approximation to that ideal. The mugwump who opposes the present democratic form of government has not seen fit to formulate for public

consumption a well-defined outline of what would be the aim of the leadership he proposes to substitute. It may be asserted, however, with certain reservations, that if the purpose of leadership in America is to be the maintenance and development of democracy, then the proposals of those who have been most pronounced in damning the United States have little to recommend them to the people in general, since in no single instance is it apparent that those who propose to alter the existing order have devised a plan that would make the government more democratic, or indeed permit it to continue even on a semi-democratic basis. The mugwump usually conceals his real purpose—provided he actually sees a purpose—by pretending that he altruistically aims to better conditions for the people. Naively he thinks much too often of himself as the people.

The aim of leadership in a democracy, it would seem, should be to bring about a pooling of the interests of all the people so as to create a community of interests, and then to direct all governmental affairs with that community of interests in mind. If the anti-democrat were given free rein, he would eliminate all common people from the electorate because he has no sympathy with common people, and the attitude that would prompt him to take the vote from the common people would, naturally, prompt him to deny to their interests admission into the national pool. The moralistic group would imprison the entire people in a structure of rigid moral laws so that man would not dare think, talk, or act as a free individual, but would lead his moral life negatively according to a chart of things forbidden. Whenever leaders of the moralistic type

have succeeded in gaining control of a government, liberty has been crucified; moreover with the downfall of every reign of leadership based on rigid morality enforced by the sword, the world has found itself dirtier morally than before the rule of statuted morality began. From an ethical standpoint, it is better for a people to be 50% pure voluntarily because of personal convictions than to be 99% pure because of a fear of criminal convictions. As to the educational mugwumps: autocratic intellectuals have controlled the destinies of nations before—and usually discreditably. Invariably when the autocratic intellectual has been permitted to deify learning, learning has been purposely restricted so as to limit the number of deities. No progress in living conditions has been recorded by the restriction of learning; progress has come when some democratic intellectual saw the evil of the prevailing restrictions on educational opportunities, and broke away from his group; beat down the barriers and opened the way for all to learning. The educational mugwump implies that the common people have been tried long enough, and that their past performance makes the future appear hopeless unless the educational mugwumps come forward and assume responsibility for patterning future leaders. Even the intellectuals will not deny that up to the present the electorate has been steeped in ignorance. Illiteracy and ignorance are steadily being reduced. But no one can say how well or how poorly an educated commonalty can be expected to govern itself since no self-governing commonalty has yet been afforded an opportunity to become educated. Moreover, as between the manner in which the whole American

people, despite the limitations of their education, have directed administrative affairs and what the intellectuals have done in the administration of colleges, it must be confessed that for an approach to efficiency American democracy appears superior to college educatocracy.

What should be the aim of leadership in a democracy when considered with the family idea in mind? It should be to carry the whole body of the people as close to ideal living conditions as the means available will permit. The first step is to take account of the means. Just as the interests of the individual members of the family are pooled, so their means, spiritual as well as material, are pooled. It is not only the abstract thinker who makes up the intellectual means of the family. The daughter whose deft fingers create wonderful bits of embroidery, is part of the intellectual means and recognition is given the intelligence revealed in her work when the product calls forth some such homely commendation as: "My, but you're smart!" Abstract intelligence is revealed by the mother who knows that the appearance of food adds to its palatableness; social intelligence prompts her to wish to give a dish an appetizing appearance; and motor intelligence results in the garnishing of the food to be set on the table. Social intelligence of another kind enables one of the members of the family to make the assembling of the family delightful, although the member with largest abstract intelligence may, at such times, be a taker and not a giver of the things that are then making for the intellectual life of the family; but he may have been largely instrumental through his abstract intelligence in providing for the material comforts of the house.

A better type of leadership unquestionably is desired in the United States. But the leader must be chosen with thought as to the aim of the leadership. The aim of the leadership, if it is to be one-sided, will defeat the primary purpose of leadership; it will divide, whereas leadership should unit. The first test, then, to be put to any proposed scheme either for bettering the existing form of leadership or creating a new type of leadership, is to determine, with the interests of all the people in mind, whether that leadership promises to harmonize all elements of the people to move forward as a unit for the common good.

XVII. FINDING A BULL'S-EYE

What are the conclusions to be reached by this study? Is the present form of government in the United States a failure? Have the common people, who form so large an element of the population, any real value for the body politic?

It would appear that democracy is now being pronounced an unsuccess solely on evidence of conditions as they are at a time when both government and the people are disregarding the underlying principles of democracy. It would further appear that the common people are being damned on the basis of data which are not reliable; but which, even if reliable, are being willfully misinterpreted by those bent upon damning the common man.

Faith in democracy in America has been strongest when the people as a whole had truly democratic ideals and sought, individually and as a nation, to attain those ideals. "In union there is strength," was their belief, and through politics and other human activities a closer knitting together of the people was being accomplished. The electorate was liberalized; education was democratized, as, for instance, with the founding of the agricultural colleges; and a feeling for a national culture was encouraged by those who were democratic enough to follow the niceties of the New England literati and the bluster of writers inspired by early life on the Mississippi and the Pacific Coast.

In the phenomenal growth and development of the nation—things accomplished by all elements of the people working toward a common end—later generations, doubtless, found cause for unwarranted smug confidence in the security of the government, and they forgot, as their forebears never forgot, that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Presuming unwisely that democracy's ideal had been attained, they dismissed from their minds all thoughts of a national ideal. In course of time, bonds by which the various elements of the people, together with their differentiated interests, were gradually being joined more firmly together, were neglected and allowed to fall into decay. As the component elements began to separate because the ties that should have held them together had not been reinforced or, where necessary, replaced, groups that had no clear vision of a truly democratic ideal seized an opportunity to pry the differentiated elements apart. This widespread disintegration in the body politic is the chief cause of America's instability today.

The damage has already progressed too far that safety will be found merely in calling a halt. The command must be: "Right about face." A new inventory must be taken of America's means; the old ideals must be restored and perhaps expanded; there must be a new pooling of all interests out of which will come a community of interests, and public opinion must be so developed and guided that it will henceforth insist that those who touch public matters shall see above all other things else this community of interests as the fundamental objective of our common endeavor.

The mugwumps have nothing better than democracy to offer America. Their promised land is no Utopia. Utopia lies beyond the reach of man. Its inaccessibility is not, however, a misfortune. Visionaries see reflected, by mirage, the perfect state and reach out for it just as a baby stretches forth his baby hands for the moon. Utopia is as far beyond the reach of man as the moon is beyond the baby's reach. Parents there are who would be foolhardy enough to fetch down the moon for baby, if only they could. The question then would be not the individualistic one of what baby would do with the moon, but the democratic one of what the rest of mankind would do without the moon. There is no law in the land prohibiting babies from crying for the moon, nor forbidding parents from humoring the crying youngster by promising to climb up and get the orb. But there is a sense of common ownership in the moon that would bring all men down on the back of any parent who could, and would, convert the world's night lantern into an exclusive playtoy for his child. Likewise there is no law against visionaries dreaming of an Utopia brought to earth; but these visionaries will run afoul a very positive law—that of self-preservation—if they or those they encourage are indiscreet enough to continue riding over the backs of men in chasing, not after Utopia, but a misleading reflection of it seen by mirage.

The United States will never reach an utopian state. But America can be made a better place for mere man to live in than Utopia ever could seem to those clothed in flesh. Man to inhabit Utopia would need to check his human element on entrance. He would sur-

render known compensations for being a mortal, whereas no one can say that a state of utopianism would afford human beings as adequate compensations. Moreover, man, despite his physical and mental and spiritual limitations, is capable of developing democracy so that the government of the United States as it exists today will seem as different from what it will then be as the treadmill is from the dynamo. Such development may take decades in time and billions of units in effort—each unit representing the contribution of one individual; but the individual need not look upon his personal endeavor as being spent for the benefit of another and as yet unborn generations; he may regard that effort's promise of benefits to future generations as merely incidental, while to him an appeal, sensible or selfish, will be found in the knowledge that for the endeavors of today immediate benefits will be reaped in the form of better government tomorrow.

The first step toward such progress must be a formulation of an ideal, and then the aim of government will become the attainment of that ideal. This ideal must seem difficult but not quite impossible of attainment, or else the incentive to endeavor will be small. The appeal of target-practice lies largely in the difficulty of making a high score. The true sportsman does not demand that the bull's-eye be made so large that it can be reached easily by him, but rather, as his performance improves, that it be made smaller and smaller so that it will exact increased precision.

The ideal of democracy may be regarded as the bull's-eye of a target. A great mass of people, differentiated in countless physical and mental aspects,

engage in team practice. Their abilities vary; but these individual variations will disappear in the composite score for the whole body. By eliminating all but the most expert marksmen from the contest, the score might be improved, but the primary purpose of the undertaking would be defeated. This primary purpose is that each individual should be permitted to contribute his best so that he will feel a sense of common ownership in the composite best. To each contestant, then, there comes a double incentive: First, the ambition to make his performance creditable to himself personally; secondly, the knowledge that the closer he comes to the bull's-eye, the larger will be his share in raising the score of the entire group.

The bull's-eye of democracy is a government in which the interests of all the people are pooled so as to create a community of interests, and, in turn, the acceptance of this community of interests as a touchstone by which to test all governmental activities.

INDEX

PAGE

American ideals 18, 59
Anarchism 111
Ancestry, pride in 185
Anti-negro movement 81
Anti-tobacco campaign 6
Army tests v
Art defined 176
— appreciation for, in children 166
— appreciation for, real and pretended 168
— appreciation for, taught and natural 164

Birth control 219
Bolshevism 62
Bossism in politics 97
Bright children and the schools 123
— — and average children 124
Bryce's definition of Democracy 16

Child rearing, past and present 221
Class antagonism 8, 26
— distinctions 63
Common and uncommon people 49
Common man's opinions, value of 156
Common people and national problems 149
Common people, composition of 47
Common people's national ideals 57
Commonplace attitudes of uncommon people 133
Community of interests 19
Constitution of the U. S. 34
Cutten on intellectual aristocracy 5, 115

Democracy and common people 60
— and individual rights 33
— and the majority 52

PAGE

Democracy and voting 83
— attained by pooling interests 26
— definition of 33
— ideal of 27
— pure 83
— under Jefferson and Jackson 88
— weaknesses of in practice 98
Dewey, John, and philosophy 197
— and Henry Ford 50

Education, aims of 116
— and science 116
— differentiated 121
Educational opportunities 120
Elections 89
—, failure of 90
Environment and intelligence 233
Eugenics 217
Experts versus laymen 153
—, failure to agree 159
— opinions of, when valid 157

Fair play in family government 24
Familism 17
Family government and pooling of interests 22
— — and law 31
— —, autocratic and democratic 103
— —, ideal of 18
— —, beginning of 16
— —, when practicable 20
Federal courts and individual rights 38
Ford, Henry, and Dewey compared 50
Franklin 142

Give-and-take 21
Government agents and individual rights 37
—, benefits of, ... 105
—, meaning of to people 145
—, purpose of 105
Gray, Thomas 142

PAGE
Hero-worship versus self-worship 214

Iconoclasts 77
Ideal of democracy 28, 246
Individual differences in family 69, 119
— — in nation 71
Individual, freedom of, in the family 106
— growth and the family 119
Infant mortality and birth rate 222
Intelligence, abstract 73
— and family government 130
—, motor and abstract 129
— tests 70
—, various forms of 117, 235
Intellectual aristocracy 5, 11, 73, 115
Interdependence of the cultured and vulgar 174

James, Henry 197

Ku Klux Klan 4

Labor, rights of union and non-union 101
— and radicals 10
— unions and teachers 6
— — and non-union workers 6
Laws, dangers of ignoring 34
— versus ideals 31
Life, meaning of 144
Leadership, aim of in democracy 238
— and abstract intelligence 74
— and common people 126
— based on intelligence tests 232
— in the family 74
— purpose of 228

Manners as a fad 191
— as a veneer 180
—, purpose of 195
—, superficial 194

PAGE
Manners, table 187
—, when a virtue 186
Majority, composition of 54
—, power of 56
—, when dangerous 63
Mediocrity and heredity 48
"Melting pot" 69
Mental defectives 35
Mental tests 117
Mentality and perseverance 127
Millet's "The Man with the Hoe" 139
Minorities, antagonistic 3
Moral delinquents 35
Mugwump, definition of 66
Music 175

Negro and the nation 80
Newton 141

Opper versus Turner 166

Paternalism 17
Party organizations 94
Philosophy and life 199
— of the future 203
—, present restrictions of 208
—, rewards of 212
—, usefulness of 202
Political "boss" 93
— government, ideal of 18
Pooling of interests 19
Primary elections 94
Problems, private and public 155
Public financing 154
— education in U. S 114
—restrictions and benefits 110

Race suicide 216
Racial antagonism 4, 11, 79, 102, 108

PAGE
Reform movements 6, 78
— — and antagonism 10
Reformers as politicians 231
Religious freedom 101
Restlessness of common people 207
Restriction of the individual 112
— in the family 107
— in the government 109
— of the franchise 86
Revenue 153
Rodin's "The Thinker" 140
Russia 62

Science and education 114
Sectionalism versus class antagonism 8
Shaw, George Bernard on Democracy 15
Slang 171
Social classes 43
— progress and common people 147
Subnormal children 122
Syndicalism 111

Thinking 141
Transportation as a public problem 151
Turner as an artist 166

Vulgar tastes, value of 170

Woman's position in social life 21

— — in politics 184

DATE DUE

GAYLORD			PRINTED IN U.S.A

WITHDRAWN FROM
OHIO NORTHERN
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

HETERICK MEMORIAL LIBRARY
323.32 B91 onuu
Buchholz, Heinrich/Of what use are commo
3 5111 00142 4591

OCLC

Heterick Memorial Library
Ohio Northern University
Ada, Ohio 45810

T5-AVN-208